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ABSTRACT 
This thesis reviews some fundamental risk measurement and management concepts that 
insurance companies will face in the following years. The first chapter evaluates the 
theoretical and practical framework of the different approaches with respect to the 
determination of regulatory capital held by insurance companies. A critical assessment 
and substantial interpretation of these approaches is performed. Moreover, a number of 
new approaches is brought forward in order to add a more thorough and clear way of 
evaluating the level of the regulatory capital. 
Then, we provide evidence of the presence of the underwriting cycle in the UK. The 
underwriting cycle has been identified in a number of OECD and non-OECD countries 
and highlights the different stages and maturity of the insurance market. A number of 
reasons for the presence of this cycle is presented and evaluated in contrast with the 
reasons behind the underwriting cycle in other countries. The level of profitability of the 
insurance companies is used to determine the presence of the cycle. 
In the third chapter, profitability and cost of capital are connected with the credit rating 
assigned by credit agencies to insurance companies. The credit risk that insurance 
companies face is explained by the use of financial ratios that explicitly explain the 
particular credit rating. The credit rating is implicitly connected with the cost of capital, 
which in turn is explained by the level of the credit spread between the Treasury Yield 
and European bonds. 
Finally, securitisation as an alternative method of minimizing credit and market risk is 
analyzed. Different structures of securitised deals are presented and evaluated. The 
benefits of securitisation are presented in a systematic way. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the face of new century, firms in the global financial marketplace have been 
scrambling once again, searching for -appropriate tools and managerial approaches to 
guide their organizations. Adequate risk management systems and expertise require 
substantial firm-level commitment. Risk exposures must be identified, measured and 
managed. To do so, financial institutions must have the ability to understand global 
positions and the exposure inherent in them. Moreover, financial institutions need to 
exploit new ways of gathering and redistributing capital and managing the cost that is 
associated with it. 
The research presented here provides a structure for better understanding the new 
dimensions of risk measurement and management performed by insurance companies. 
The ultimate strategic issue in insurance today is how to invest in unique talents and 
capabilities to generate sustainable attractive returns in a rapidly evolving and therefore 
challenging world. 
The issues that we utilize here cover a wide range of the insurance companies' activities: 
regulation, risk measurement, and risk management. The regulatory framework that 
European insurance companies currently operate is being evaluated and compared with 
the approaches in different parts of the world (US, Canada, and Japan). This framework 
has been criticized in the past years for a number of reasons. We identify these reasons 
and provide a new framework that can be employed in order insurance companies to 
operate in a more efficient way. 
Furthermore, the underwriting cycle that pertains insurance companies' activities is 
identified for the UK market and proof for the existence of this cycle is provided. An 
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extensive number of reasons with respect to the nature of the underwriting cycle is 
validated and a by-line analysis of the cycle is performed. The macroeconomic activity of 
underwriting cycles can provide a specific linkage between underlying macroeconomic 
conditions and the credit risk assumed in different asset portfolios. 
These credit risk and credit rating issues are raised in chapter three. The state of the 
market is one of the major drivers of systematic credit risk, especially as lower credit 
classes are much more sensitive to macro-economic factors. The cost of capital for 
insurance companies is explicitly associated with the credit rating that credit agencies 
assign to insurance companies by employing an analysis of the close relationship between 
corporate bond credit spreads and credit rating classes. Since most business decisions 
important enough to occupy the attention of senior decision-makers will involve sunk 
costs and the danger of loss, credit risk represents one of the major threats for an 
insurance company's viability. 
Finally, the securitisation process employed by insurance companies is investigated as a 
different approach in order to access the capital markets. Securitisation can provide extra 
capital for the insurance companies alloxving them to assume higher market and credit 
risk levels. The whole process is analyzed and proof of its efficiency is provided. Capital 
markets have shown themselves willing to provide capital when the price is right. The 
breaking down of the barriers between banking and insurance will enable securitisation 
to flourish. On the other hand, government solutions to the problems of the private 
market do not really come to grips with the problem of capital adequacy. By and large, 
these plans are not adequately capitalized to bear the losses that would be created by 
major catastrophes. With the reforms suggested in our analysis, however, and a 
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consequent increased level of support from capital markets, there seems to be no reason 
why a purely private insurance/capital industry cannot provide catastrophe insurance 
products which provide full insurance to all policyholders and a reasonable level of profit 
for all concerned. 
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CHAPTER 1 
RISK AND CAPITAL MANAGAMENT IN INSURANCE 
12 
Over the past several years, there have been rapid advances in the risk measurement and 
management capabilities of financial institutions. Increasingly sophisticated tools have 
evolved to measure market risk (value at risk measurement tools), credit risk (expected 
and unexpected loss measurement tools) and insurance risk (dynamic financial analysis 
tools). There have been also advances in using these evolving risk metrics to help guide 
executive management in their strategic decision-making. The framework through which 
this is accomplished typically has two parts. 
Firstly, risk is related to the amount of capital the firm requires to achieve a sufficient 
level of protection against adverse circumstances. Secondly, risk is used to adjust the 
returns from business activities to determine whether activities are value-adding or value- 
destroying. The first part should reflect a debtholder's perspective on risk (i. e., is there 
sufficient capital to cover "worst case" risks? ). The second part should reflect a 
shareholder's perspective on risk (i. e., are we getting a sufficient return for the systematic 
risk being taken? ). 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the role of capital in the modern insurance 
markets. It is crystal-clear that the optimum level of capital held by a financial institution 
is subjective, hence difficult to replicate and validate. Moreover, the fiduciary nature of 
insurance companies imposes an extra burden in the calculation of the appropriate level 
that has to be held. As a result, there is a number of different approaches in the 
calculation of regulatory capital that essentially try to measure the riskiness of the 
insurance company. Furthermore, the level of regulatory capital can be employed as an 
early insolvency flag for the public. The public may be aware of the estimated levels of 
regulatory and economic capital only to the extent that the firm is able to attain these 
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levels on an ongoing basis, in which case it would be reflected in the publicly reported 
actual capital level. A close examination of the current approaches is, therefore, of 
interest in order to establish a clear picture of the ways that insurance companies 
calculate their regulatory capital and possible implications that might be caused. 
The level of regulatory capital is also closely related to the stage of the insurance business 
and underwriting cycles. Numerous studies have identified the cause and nature of the 
underwriting cycle across different markets. It is self-evident that regulation will be 
tightening up in a falling market in order to protect policyholders and shareholders from 
possible insolvencies. Thus, it is of interest to identify and measure the current state of 
the insurance underwriting cycle since it is closely related to the level of regulatory capital 
held by insurance companies. By determining the nature and the causes of the 
underwriting cycle in the UK, we can provide a solid framework of analysis with respect 
to the appropriate level of capital that must be held in order for the insurance companies 
to operate in an efficient way. 
Moreover, the first step in attributing capital is developing a theoretical framework for 
relating risk to the amount of capital the insurance company needs to hold. Many 
insurance companies have developed a framework based on their financial statements. In 
our analysis, we employ financial ratios that are observed from the financial statements 
of insurance companies with the cost of capital related to the credit rating of them. Since 
the credit rating of an insurance company implicitly represents the cost associated with 
the capital of this company and the credit risk inherited in its financial statements, we can 
identify a number of key financial ratios that provide further insight to the cost of capital 
and credit risk of insurance companies. 
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Financial regulation has made increasing use of external credit ratings in recent years. 
One of the key examples of such applications is the package of rules for determining the 
required capital with respect to market risk issued by the BIS in 1996. Moreover, the new 
guidelines with respect to the calculation of regulatory capital will force financial 
institutions to form their own modeling approaches with respect to credit risk and 
internal credit ratings. A byproduct of this approach will be the increased need for a 
more thorough and in-depth checking of financial ratios and their relation to the credit 
rating and the level of capital held by financial institutions. Thus, the insurance regulatory 
approach will need to determine a new framework for the calculation of regulatory 
capital by taking into account how these ratios determine the financial health of the 
insurance company. Statistical scoring credit scoring methods have been shown to 
perform quite well. In particular, linear discriminant analysis seems robust even when the 
underlying statistical hypotheses do not exactly hold, especially when used with large 
samples. Logit analysis has produced similar results. nforeover, measures of credit quality 
based on equity price data have been used in analyzing credit risk. 
If regulators apply a process for certifying rating agencies' ratings for regulatory use that 
employs similar criteria to what investors use when determining which rating agencies 
provide them with credible signals about credit quality, there will be an explicit 
recognition of the credit rating as a measure of the financial health of a company and its 
relation to the level of capital held. In an international context, ratings-based capital 
requirements that rely on this sort of synthetic market discipline would be most effective 
if regulators cooperate closely, so that the certification criteria are harmonized across 
borders. Absent such coordination, international financial institutions would have an 
15 
incentive to book a rated asset in the county that certifies the rating agency with the most 
benign view of the underlying credit risk. 
An important issue in analyzing ratings of insurance companies and their impact on the 
level of capital is how to best incorporate underwriting cycles. Cycles are forces 
exogenous to the insurance companies and companies cannot control them. The timing, 
length and severity of underwriting cycles are at best difficult to predict, which 
complicates further their incorporation into credit ratings. However, given the current 
state of the market, rating agencies are supposed to separate out equilibrium and cyclical 
components of companies when assigning a credit rating. Thus, it is self-evident that an 
analysis of the underwriting cycle will be of help when assigning credit rating to 
insurance companies. 
Finally, innovative insurance companies will engage themselves to a number of financial 
engineering activities in order to mitigate credit risk and employ their capital in a more 
efficient way. By doing this, insurance companies can lower the levels of capital that they 
need to hold as a buffer against "worst-case" scenarios and utilize it in order to get 
excess returns to their investments. Today, many large insurance companies use modern 
risk financing methods to reflect a total financial risk management approach whereas 
traditional insurance/reinsurance places emphasis on risk transfer. However, lack of 
insurance capacity and price volatility frustrate insurance companies seeking stability in 
risk financing. Scarcity of capacity may also generate concern about the availability of 
reinsurance security. The result is a notable increase in self-insurance. Within an 
alternative risk transfer segment, this capacity can be accessed via securitisation. It makes 
sense to unite reinsurance and finance skills in order to address these concerns with a 
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number of initiatives that can be used in combination. Traditionally, the need for 
liquidity in the event of a major claims experience and the need for financing to smooth 
the impact of reserve strengthening or claims payout over time to mitigate volatility in 
reported earnings, have been met through reinsurance or finite risk arrangements. It is 
easy to imagine insurance companies underwriting insurance policies, effectively acting as 
originators, sourcing and selling those risks to the capital markets much as interest rate 
and credit risk are traded today. Insurance risk has always been traded, but the trading 
activity has been confined to the insurance capital market. The use of financial products 
can expand trading to broader capital markets. These would include structured financings 
and insurance derivatives to transfer insurance risks to the capital markets. 
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CHAPTER 2 
RETHINKING THE SOLVENCY MARGIN SYSTEM 
IN EUROPE 
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2.1 Introduction 
The regulation of insurance companies has evolved over the years both in the United 
States, the European Union, Canada, and Japan. The current regulatory framework is 
wide, covering both prudential and market regulation. Prudential regulation seeks to 
ensure the financial soundness of insurance companies and to protect consumers from 
insurance company failures. 
As insolvencies are a normal side effect of competitive markets, the justification for 
prudential regulation and regulatory control rests on consumer protection issues (e. g. 
Berger et al., 1995): 
1. To limit the real costs associated with insurance companies' failures, while at the 
same time permitting insurance companies to carry out their socially critical 
functions, including the insuring of risky counter-parties; 
2. To limit the losses to the government associated with providing a safety net to 
regulated entities; 
3. To prevent resource misallocation that might result from moral hazard (i. e., to 
eliminate the chance that insurance companies might engage in riskier investments 
than those chosen in an unregulated system with no safety net); and 
4. To promote macro-economic stability, in particular by limiting the chance of a 
"systemic" event that, for example, might cause a general collapse of confidence in 
the financial system (i. e., a severe weather event on the part of a number of general 
insurers, who might withdraw coverage from a particular geographic area or type of 
risk). 
19 
It is for these reasons that prudential regulation is implemented through the requirement 
that insurance companies maintain a minimum level of capital. The appropriate 
minimum level of regulatory capital for any financial institution should be consistent 
with the objectives of regulation. In an unregulated market there is no requirement for a 
minimum level of capital. The other extreme case is when prudential regulation requires 
that the probability of insolvency is zero. However, if the maximum insolvency 
probability is set to zero it is very doubtful that insurance companies could continue to 
perform their social function of insuring risky counter-parties (Klein, 1995). 
If the maximum insolvency probability cannot be set to zero, what should then be the 
level regulatory capital? Arguably, it should satisfy the following criteria: 
1. It should be sufficiently high to provide effective protection and ensure that 
insurance companies operate at an "investment grade" level of financial soundness; 
2. It should not be higher than the "economic" level of capital. Requiring firms to 
increase their regulatory capital is not costless where it leads to an increase in actual 
capital. In economic terms, regulatory capital should not be increased beyond the 
point where the marginal cost of further increases outweighs the marginal benefit 
from holding capital. The costs of excessive capital requirements may include a 
perverse incentive effect, since requiring more capital might induce firms to seek 
higher returns in areas that are high risk or outside their core business. 
3. It should be at a level that will generate the appropriate intervention by the 
authorities. 
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The US liability crisis of the eighties and Hurricane Andrew in 1992 caused the number 
of insolvencies in the US to spiral upwards over a ten-year period. In the UK, a string of 
natural catastrophes at the end of the eighties and a contracting market at the beginning 
of the nineties caused major losses, resulting in a wave of insolvencies. However, even in 
pears in which market results are satisfactory, the wide spread of results and capital bases 
can also lead to insolvencies. In contrast to the US and the UK, the German market 
- 
which has been heavily regulated since the 1930s 
- 
has not suffered a single insolvency. 
France has experienced insolvencies, particularly at the beginning of the nineties (Figure 
2.1) 
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Either side of the balance sheet can trigger insolvency: 
1. Loss of value of the assets/investments, e. g. due to a stock market crash, interest rate 
changes or defaults by the issuers of bonds. 
2. Underwriting risk (increase in liabilities) 
" Risk of random fluctuation (random increase in claims, although the loss 
distribution was estimated correctly) 
" Risk of error (calculation of the premium on the basis of an incorrect estimate of 
loss distribution) 
0 Risk of change (the loss distribution changes during the treaty term or run-off 
period). 
Table 2.1 provides data from A. N1. Best on the causes of 683 insolvencies in the US 
between 1969 and 1998. The most common triggers were insufficient premiums or 
reserves, rapid growth, and catastrophic events. At least 41% of all insolvencies are 
attributable to underwriting risks. 
Regulators have adopted different ways of determining the amount of regulatory capital. 
The US and Japanese approaches are relatively new measures and they apply various 
weights to the different aspects of the risks associated with the insurance business. 
Essentially, they comprise asset risk, credit risk, underwriting loss and loss adjustment 
expense reserve risk, underwriting premium risk and off balance sheet risk. On the other 
hand, the European approach is employed within the context of the premium income 
and the realised losses by the insurance companies. 
22 
Table 2.1 Main causes of insolvency in the US from 1969 to 1989 
Main causes of insolvency Insolvencies In % 
Insufficient reserves/premiums 143 22% 
Too rapid growth 86 13% Underwriting risks 41% 
Catastrophe losses 36 6% 
Overvalued assets 
Failure of ceded reinsurance 
40 
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6% 
3% Asset risks 13% 
Subsidiaries 26 4% 
Significant change of core business 28 4% 
Fraud 44 7% 
Miscellaneous 44 7% 
Non-identifiable 169 26% 
Total 638 100% 
Source: A. M. Best (1991) 
Browne and Hoyt (1995) have also confirmed that underwriting risk is the major factor 
influencing the frequency of insolvencies. They also find that the number of property- 
liability insurers is highly and positively correlated with the insolvency rate. Moreover, 
they identify that the failure rate is higher in the first quarter of the year, suggesting that 
regulatory oversight with respect to insurer insolvency is not being applied evenly 
throughout the year. 
In a subsequent study on the factors that cause the insolvency of life-health insurance 
companies, Browne and Hoyt (1999) report that life-health insurer insolvencies are 
positively related to increases in the average yield on long-term interest rates, personal 
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income per capita, unemployment, the stock market, and to the number of insurers, and 
negatively related to real estate returns. Whereas in their 1995 study they find evidence of 
increased failures in the first quarter of the year for property-liability insurers, in the 1999 
study they identify a seasonal pattern of insolvencies among life-health insurers, which is 
highest in the second quarter of the year. 
In September 2000, the European Commission put forward a proposal for a directive on 
changes to the solvency margin system for insurance companies. These changes, which 
are discussed below, are expected to be approved as a Directive by the European 
Parliament later this year or early 2001. It will then be incorporated into national 
insurance legislation within the countries across the EU, and the wider European 
Economic Area (EEA), in 2001. The need for change was clear when redrafting the 
Third Insurance Directives in 1992 for life and for non-life insurance (92/49/EEC and 
92/96/EEC): the solvency margin requirements for life and non-life insurance 
companies had not been changed since the 1st Insurance Directives (the Establishment 
Directives): 1973 for non-life insurance and 1979 for life insurance. Hence, a reappraisal 
after a 20-year interval was long overdue, in part because of the cumulative effect of 
inflation, and in part because of new approaches for setting capital adequacy which more 
accurately reflects the risks facing an insurance enterprise. Some changes were made to 
solvency margins for credit insurances in the Credit Insurance Directive of 1988, and 
there were also a few minor indirect changes in the Third Insurance Directives, such as 
the use of subordinated debt as admissible capital. But there were no fundamental 
changes. The Third Directives, however, obligated the European Commission under 
Article 25 of the Third Non-Life Insurance Directive and under Article 26 of the Third 
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Life Insurance Directive to review and report on possible changes to the solvency 
margin system. In April 1994, the EU Insurance Committee requested the Conference 
of the Insurance Supervisory Authorities of the European Union countries to set up a 
working party to look into how the solvency margin system might be updated. This 
working party, consisting of representatives of insurance supervisory authorities from 
across the ERA countries, was formally set up in May 1994, under the chairmanship of 
Dr. I-Iehnut Muller. 
The conference reported back to the Insurance Committee of the European 
Commission in April 1997, putting forward an analysis of the current system, detailing its 
strengths and weaknesses, and suggested areas for reform (Conference of the Insurance 
Supervisory Services (1997)). Reflecting a wider concern with the need to look at capital 
adequacy across the financial services sector as a whole, the issue of capital standards for 
insurance companies was endorsed in the Financial Senrices Action Plan at the Cologne 
Summit of heads of government in 1996, which committed the European Commission 
to introduce a directive by mid-2000. Subsequently, the EU Insurance Committee 
decided to pursue a two-stage approach to the problem. The first stage was to restrict 
itself to introducing some improvements to the existing solvency margin system; this is 
the proposal for a Directive announced in September 2000. A second stage of the 
review was to explore alternatives to the current solvency margin system in the context 
of the wider solvency assessment of insurance companies. This second stage report is 
expected to take three to four years to complete. 
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2.2 Reasons behind the two-stage approach 
There were several reasons why a two-stage approach was adopted, apart from the tune 
exigencies to mid-2000 deadline under the Financial Services Action plan. First, capital 
adequacy standards for insurance companies have been undergoing major change outside 
of Europe. In the United States, risk-based capital systems had been introduced in 1992 
for life insurance and in 1994 for non-life insurance, and similar risk-based capital 
systems have subsequently been introduced in Canada, Australia and Japan. These risk- 
based capital systems for insurance have modeled themselves on existing banking 
standards which were risk-capital based. Hence, one future option for Europe is to 
consider adopting some form of risk-based capital system. Second, Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision at the Bank of International Settlement which had established the 
widespread use of risk-based capital standards for the banking sector has begun to review 
its own capital standards, which had been in place since 1988. A new capital adequacy 
framework was introduced by the Basel Committee in June 1999 (Bank of International 
Settlements, 1999). It has initiated a discussion process between regulators, banks and 
other specialists in order to come up with a more robust system which can more 
accurately reflect the underlying risks faced by banks and to take into account the 
improvements of new risk management techniques and computer-based modelling 
approaches. In its terms of reference, it has explicitly recognised the limitations of an 
over-reliance on the present risk-based capital system. 
Third, under the umbrella of the Financial Stability Forum, set up by the G7 Finance 
Ministers in February 1999, there is renewed pressure to ensure that any capital standards 
for insurance, banking and securities sectors should have a common underlying 
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structure, even though financial services enterprises face different types of risk and have 
different demands for capital. While the main reason for the Forum is to underpin the 
stability of the global financial system by having sound and transparent regulation, there 
is a subsidiary concern with ensuring level competitive playing fields between financial 
institutions internationally, with the growing overlapping of financial services. Examples 
arc: the Alternative Risk Transfer (ART) products, which combine investment banking 
and insurance products; and bank guarantees, credit insurance and credit derivatives have 
common features. There is also a wish to minimise potential regulatory arbitrage, 
whereby corporate customers can exploit anomalies in capital requirements between 
financial services providers. In addition, with the emergence of financial conglomerates, 
double gearing concerns have been brought more into focus. Double gearing can occur 
in a financial group, whereby it can count capital twice, both in a holding company and 
in one of its subsidiaries, thus reducing its overall capital requirements compared to a 
single financial services provider. 
Finally, a capital adequacy system has to be underpinned by consistent accounting and 
actuarial valuation procedures, since the measurement of capital depends critically on 
how one measures assets and liabilities, since capital is, by definition, the difference 
between assets and liabilities (to policyholders and other non-capital providers). The 
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) is currently engaged in a process 
of trying to establish greater harmonisation in the published accounts of listed financial 
services firms. There are specific proposals for insurance companies, as there are for 
banks and securities firms. So far the proposals by the IASC for insurance have not 
found a general consensus, in particular there are differences on the degree to which fair 
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value accounting should be used, in contrast to the more traditional deferral and 
matching approach (EU Insurance Committee, 2000). Moreover, there arc also 
differences between the IASC and the FASB, the US accounting standards body, on 
what an international insurance accounting standard should be. 
It was because of the uncertainty created by these various background developments that 
the decision to move cautiously on a new capital adequacy standards for EEA insurers 
was seen to be, and indeed is, a sensible way forward. 
2.3 The current European solvency margin 
The European solvency margin system was set up under the 1st Insurance Directives in 
the 1970's as a first step in seeking to create a common market in insurance. The move 
towards a solvency margin system was seen in general as an improvement over deposit- 
based systems, which still existed in a number of European countries, whereby insurance 
companies set aside funds in trust and were only recoverable in the event of financial 
distress. Solvency margins were more flexible and allowed insurance companies to invest 
their funds more efficiently, as well as not having these funds tied-up. It was clear at the 
outset that the solvency margin system did not capture all the risks that an insurance 
company would face. The overriding concern was to have a system, which could be 
easily implemented and monitored by the regulatory authorities. The fact that there were 
significant accounting and actuarial differences between countries in how assets, 
particularly investments, were valued and how liabilities, particularly technical provisions, 
were valued encouraged the adoption of a simple standard. 
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The overall structure of solvency margin systems for life and non-life insurance in the 
ERA are broadly similar. There is an absolute minimum level of capital, the minimum 
guarantee fund, which is the legal minimum which an insurance company must hold at 
all times, including at its inception. This minimum guarantee fund for life insurance was 
set at 0.8 million ecu (now the euro), with some possible reductions for mutuals. For 
non-life insurance companies there are four categories of minimum guarantee fund, 
reflecting different types of business and their inherent riskiness. The minimum 
guarantee funds range from 0.2 million euro to up to 1.4 million curo. Although these 
are minimum requirements, in practice national supervisors have normally required much 
higher levels when new companies have been established. When a new insurance 
company is set up, there needs to be sufficient funds not just to absorb the risks of the 
business but to also fund anticipated business growth. 
The required solvency margin is the higher threshold and hence is more binding. The 
required solvency margin reflects the scale of business: larger insurance companies 
requiring more capital than smaller ones. For non-life insurance, the required margin of 
solvency is expressed as the higher of two results: a) 16% of the gross written premiums 
up to a level of 10 million ecu (curos) plus 16% of the gross premiums in excess of 10 
million ecus, during the last year; b) 26% of the gross average of claims up to 7 million 
ecu plus 23% of the gross claims in excess of 7 million ecu. The inclusion of the claims 
basis was in part to loosely capture the riskiness of claims over time and in part to 
penalise companies with consistently poor underwriting performance. The averaging of 
claims for most classes of business for the last three years, while for natural hazards 
insurances, there is an averaging over seven years. 
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Although the premium and claims systems were both on a gross of reinsurance basis, 
some reduction for reinsurance was allowed. Non-life insurance companies are able to 
reduce the required margin of solvency by the ratio of net claims incurred to gross claims 
incurred, but with a lower limit of 50%. The 50% limit was set to capture some of the 
credit risks which insurance companies face when buying reinsurance, but also it was to 
discourage insurance companies from fronting activities. 
The solvency margins for life insurance are lower than for non-life insurance, reflecting 
the fact that life insurance is, in general, a less risky business. For life insurance business 
which contains investment risk, the minimum required margin of solvency is 4% of the 
gross technical provisions (i. e. the actuarial or mathematical reserves) plus 0.3% of the 
capital at risk, where capital at risk is an amount equal to the difference between the 
maximum payments under the policies underwritten and the actuarial (mathematical) 
provisions. The 4% figure sought to capture the investment risks and the expense risks 
faced by a life insurance company, while the capital risk percentage captures mortality 
risks. For term insurances under five years, there were some reductions to the 0.3%. 
For life insurance contracts where there is no investment risk carried by the insurance 
company, which related mainly to equity-linked life contracts, the solvency margin 
requirement is 1% of the gross technical provisions and the 0.3% capital at risk, again 
some reduction to 0.3% for term insurances under 5 years. 
Hence, there is an explicit recognition within the life insurance solvency margin 
standards for investment risks and these were captured, if in an approximate way, by the 
3% of the gross technical provisions requirement. On the other hand, there is no 
explicit recognition at all of investment risk in the solvency margins for non-life insurers. 
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As with non-life insurance, there is scaling down adjustment for life insurance, based on 
the ratio of net technical provision to gross technical provisions, with a maximum 
reduction of 85%. The higher value of 85% for life insurance companies reflects their 
lower need for reinsurance compared to non-life insurance companies, and because the 
consequences of the fronting of business are much less. 
In addition to the required solvency margin, there is a guarantee fund, which is one third 
of the required solvency margin. The guarantee fund was set up as a specific threshold 
that would automatically trigger regulators to intervene, if the capital of an insurer fell 
below this level. Hence, the required solvency margin, the guarantee fund and the 
minimum guarantee fund are a set of technical thresholds. Regulators within Europe 
have always had the powers to intervene well before the capital level fell below the 
required solvency margin, and this has occurred on a number of occasions. There has 
always been flexibility in European system, since it is well recognised that the solvency of 
an insurance company depends on a wider set of factors, other than capital adequacy 
alone. 
The second important issue in the European system was that the insurance company 
must at all times hold capital in excess of the required margins of solvency. Only certain 
types of capital are admissible in determining the level of capital that is deemed to be 
held for this purpose. In addition, the valuation of assets and liabilities have to be 
carried out on a conservative basis. Hence, the `true and fair' valuation of capital held by 
insurance companies is well above the admissible level that regulators recognise as capital 
to meet these regulatory threshold levels. Insurance supervisors take a worst scenario, a 
liquidation scenario, when measuring the capital available to meet policyholder demands 
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above the levels set aside in the technical provisions, and equalisation provisions. 
Indeed, the solvency margin is the word used to describe the level of capital held by an 
insurer when valued under the conservative criteria required by regulation. 
Figure 2.2 illustrates how the structure of the European solvency margins operates. The 
solvency margin, which is the qualifying capital of the insurance company, must be in 
excess of the required solvency margin, the highest of the three thresholds, at all times. 
The value of the solvency margin will fluctuate from time to time, for example, as assets 
values change, due to movements in the stock market prices and interest rates, and as 
liability values change. In general, the required margin of solvency was set at a relatively 
low level to provide for flexibility in the light of to changing economic and market 
forces. But the quid pro quo has always been that supervisors have the discretion to 
demand that an insurance company rectifies its capital positions before the required 
solvency margin threshold is reached. 
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Figure 2.2 Structure of the solvency margin system 
Must 
immediately 
rectify 
situation (e. g. 
raise new 
capital) 
Minimum 
guarantee fund 
(1/3 of required 
margin of 
solvency) 
Source: Dickinson (1997) 
Requirement 
of plan for 
restoration of 
financial 
position 
Guarantee Required margin Capital held by the 
fund 
of solvency insurer 
Table 2.2 shows information collected by the Conference of Insurance Supervisory 
Authorities in their report to the EC Insurance Committee. It details the solvency 
margins of a large sample of European insurance companies in 1995, and shows the 
various types of admissible capital that was held. 
Table 2.2 Solvency margins of European insurance companies 
Life insurance Non-life insurance 
Solvency margin (breakdown) 
Paid-up capital + reserves 
+ profits brought forward 
Profit reserves (life insurance only) 
Limited Other Limited Other 
companies (mutuals) companies (mutuals) 
63,543 16,094 50,342 21,267 
18,563 5,908 None None 
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Hidden reserves 
Unpaid capital 
Future profits (life insurance only) 
Supplementary contributions 
(mutual undertakings) 
Subordinated loans 
and cumulative preferential shares 
Other 
Total solvency margins 
Total required solvency margins 
Number of enterprises 
Source: EU Insurance Committee (2000) 
19,534 9,049 7,478 4,939 
347 59 243 15 
4,791 1,015 None None 
None None None 3,674 
801 150 640 2,956 
568 20 1,231 193 
149,198 67,665 70,297 34,669 
46,246 14,150 22,361 5,737 
952 198 1,569 630 
Apart from paid-up capital and reserves and profits brought forward, some of the hidden 
reserves in the assets and liabilities have been allowed by supervisors. These hidden 
reserves in assets relate mainly to insurers in a number of continental European countries 
teere current or market values of their investment holdings are not used. Similarly, for 
life insurance, it can be seen that some of the future profits have also been allowed as 
part of the solvency margin, reflecting the slow emergence of profits when conservative 
actuarial valuation bases are required to be used. 
2.4 Weaknesses of the solvency margin system 
The solvency margin system has a number of weaknesses. The first of these is that there 
is inadequate recognition of investment risks. As noted above, the required solvency 
margin for non-life insurance companies demands no extra capital to be held to cover 
these risks. This assumption has never been accurate, and this weakness has increased 
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over time as non-life insurance companies have held riskier investment, viz. longer dated 
bonds, loans and equities, in order to increase their overall profitability, in the face of 
poorer underwriting results. Similarly, for life insurers, the recognition of an investment 
risk is only an approximate one, with a value of 3% of technical provisions required as 
capital to reflect these risks, irrespective of the characteristics of the investment portfolio 
or any significant maturity or interest rate mismatching of assets and liabilities. To some 
extent this weakness in the solvency margin was addressed by a reconsideration of the 
investment regulations in the 3rd Directives, but this is only a crude recognition. 
Similarly, the currency matching requirements of assets and liabilities also capture some 
aspects of the investment risks. However, these are clear weaknesses in the current 
system. Under risk-based capital systems in the United States and elsewhere, and indeed 
in the banking sector, asset risk is a key component of capital adequacy requirements. 
Another weakness of the solvency margin system is its inadequate treatment of 
reinsurance. It is clear that ceding insurers carry credit risk and, if this credit risk is 
significant, there should be extra capital to absorb this. The 50% reinsurance constraint 
for non-life insurers and the 85% constraint for life insurers are inefficient risk controls. 
The current system tends to penalise smaller insurance companies rather than capture 
the credit risks attendant on buying reinsurance. In addition, the quality of the 
reinsurance supplier is not taken into account in the capital requirements, although it 
must be said that the adequacy of reinsurance suppliers is separately checked by the 
supervisory authorities, as part of the wider solvency assessment process. Similarly, non- 
proportional reinsurances are penalised compared to proportional reinsurances, since 
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there is a greater risk transfer per unit of premium paid under non-proportional 
reinsurance contracts. 
In addition, the risks associated with underwriting in non-life insurance are only 
approximately recognised by the claims criteria. Riskier lines of insurance, including long 
term liability insurances, are inadequately captured in the capital requirements. 
Paradoxically, insurers that set aside stronger technical provisions are penalised, since this 
increases the values for claims incurred more than they would be if reserving had been 
less conservative, thus penalising the more prudent insurers. Even so, regulatory 
authorities separately look at the determination of technical provisions to ensure their 
adequacy. For life insurance, another weakness in the solvency margin system is a failure 
to capture any mismatch in the duration and interest rate risks in the assets and liabilities. 
Similarly, a rapid growth of business has no direct impact in the solvency margin 
calculation, since the solvency margin requirement is retrospective in nature; evidence 
shows that rapid growth can overstretch resources of an insurer and a poorer quality of 
business is likely to be underwritten. 
The above outlines the main weaknesses of the current solvency margin system. There is 
much less fine tuning than under a risk-based capital system. However, the European 
solvency margin system is simple and flexible, and is not costly to administer. This is its 
main strength. It also presupposes that other aspects of solvency assessment are 
important other than capital. 
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2.5 Risk-Based Capital Systems 
Risk-based capital approach will be one alternative to the solvency margin system, in the 
deliberations of the second stage of the EU solvency review. Hence it would seem 
appropriate to evaluate the US experience in using a risk-based capital system, since it 
has been now been in operation for several years. It is worth observing that the 
motivation for the introduction of a risk-based capital system in the United States arose 
from pressure in the federal government to have a more formalised system of capital 
adequacy, following the failures of one or two major US insurance companies. 
Previously, state insurance supervisors (commissioners), and the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), already had for many years informal guidelines 
relating to capital adequacy. They clearly realised the importance of capital but were 
aware that there are a variety of other factors that can contribute to the insolvency of an 
insurance company, apart from capital. 
The NAIC had in place an early warning system (IRIS) based on a multi-factor model to 
determine potential insurance insolvency, with capital being one of the factors. But it 
was political pressure from the federal government that led to working parties being set 
up (under the auspices of the NAIC) to propose with a more formal system, even 
though regulation of insurance was the responsibility of state governments. 
The key feature of a risk-based capital system is that the main types of risk that a 
financial services company faces are separately identified and measured and a specified 
minimum amount of capital is required to cover these risks. Providing the individual risk 
exposures are measured accurately, and the capital requirements for each risk class are 
allocated appropriately, a risk-based system tailors the capital requirement of a company 
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to the risks that it takes. These minimum capital levels are then aggregated across the 
company as a whole to obtain the overall minimum level of capital to be held. However, 
because all risks will not occur at the same time (i. e. the principle of the law of large 
numbers or portfolio diversification), some method of scaling down of the summation 
of these individual capital requirements is necessary. This scaling-down process is critical 
and depends on the knowledge of how all the individual risks are correlated between 
themselves. 
Risk-based capital is used to determine the acceptable minimum level of capital that an 
insurance company must hold as part of its solvency assessment. This minimum standard 
should safeguard insurers from financial crises, allow them to fulfil their obligations at all 
times and in the long term, and above all prevent them from ever going into liquidation 
(Cummins et al., 1993). Risk capital charges (i. e. the required margins for adverse 
deviation) are calculated for the different aspects of risks faced by the insurance 
company. It is not the purpose here to go into detail on the various risk factors which 
make up the risk-based capital system in the United States. The main risk factors for 
non-life insurance are: Ro 
, 
asset risk (guarantees and contingent liabilities from affiliates); 
Rl 
, 
asset risk (fixed income bonds and short-term investments); R2 
, 
asset risk (stocks, 
real estate and participations); R. 
, 
credit risk (50% of RBC of ceded reinsurance and 
other receivables); R4 
, 
loss reserves risk; and R5, written premium risk (NAIC, 1993). 
Off-balance sheet risks are split into various groups. Non-controlled assets, guarantees 
for affiliates and contingent liabilities are included in Ro. Risks from strong company 
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growth are divided into requirements relating to loss reserve growth in R4 and premium 
growth in R5 
. 
These charges are then summed to give the total RBC (before covariance adjustment). 
The total RBC charge after the covariance adjustment is equal to the' result of the 
following formula: 
R0 +R+R; + R3 +2+ RS 
where Ro to R5 are RBC charges. The covariance adjustment is then simply the 
difference between the straight sum of Ro to R5 and the result of the formula above. 
The reason for incorporating a covariance adjustment in the RBC formula is that the 
total RBC for an insurer should generally be less than the simple sum of the RBC 
amounts for each risk element, because of the benefits of diversification and because the 
separate risk elements are not perfectly correlated (Hooker et al, 1995). 
Having a formula in place to compute uniform minimum capital standards for insurers is 
only part of the risk-based capital system. Regulators also need some legal basis to act. In 
addition to defining a minimum threshold for each insurance company, the US system 
has introduced a detailed set of regulatory responses that are triggered if the capital base 
of an insurance company (measured by conservative valuation criteria under state 
regulation) falls below these thresholds. 
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US regulatory action levels 
(percentage of the total capital / RBC ratio) 
Below 70% Regulators nnut seize the company. This is called the Mandatory Control Level. 
70-100% Regulators nia)ý seize the company. This is called the Authorised Control L. evel. 
100-200% The company must submit a plan of action to regulators. The Regulatory Action Level 
is set at 150%, below which the regulators will perform an examination of the 
company and issue a corrective order. Above 150%, but below 200%, is known as 
the Copp y Action Level, where the company's actions alone are deemed to be 
sufficient, without the need for a regulator's corrective order. 
250%+ Typical value for the vast majority of companies. 
Source: Hooker et al. (1995) 
In the United States, a risk-based capital system for life insurance and health insurance 
was introduced relatively quickly, since there were no major disagreements within the 
insurance industry about the determination of the risk groupings and the details of 
implementation. The fact that sufficient flexibility existed in the actuarial valuation basis 
for solvency assessment was a key factor in achieving this consensus between the 
regulatory authorities and the insurance industry. However, problems arose in respect of 
non-life business, not least in determining the risk factors for loss reserves (outstanding 
claims provisions) and the underwriting risks attached to new business: the liabilities side 
of the balance sheet. In addition, the correlations between assets and liabilities were also 
more complex. For example, the system would have to cope with determining the 
correlation between capital market movements and the underwriting cycle if it were to 
provide a credible measure of capital adequacy. 
40 
For most US non-life insurers almost two-thirds of their aggregate risk, and hence their 
minimum risk-based capital requirements, arc considered to arise from their current and 
past underwriting operations (underwriting risks on new business and risks associated 
with claims provisions and their associated settlement expenses); investment risks are 
significant but less important. In contrast, most of the risks for a typical life insurer, and 
hence its capital requirements, are related to risks from its investments and to interest 
rate risks from the maturity mismatching of assets and liabilities. 
Japan introduced a risk-based capital system for non-life insurers in 1997. This system is 
similar to the US system and is designed to act as an early warning system for the 
regulatory authorities. The solvency margin is calculated as a ratio of the admitted capital 
base and the total risk. The adjusted capital is compared to the insurer's total risk. The 
total risk is calculated using the following formula: 
Total risk =! 
(\IR 
+ (Rb + Rr )Z + Rd) + R,: 
where Ra is the underwriting risk, Rb is the interest rate risk, R, is the asset- 
management risk (price/downside risk, credit risk, derivatives), Rd is the management 
risk and R,, is the natural catastrophe risk. 
Similar to EU Directive, underwriting risk is determined using the premium or loss 
index, whichever is higher. The risk factors vary for six different lines of business. 
Natural catastrophe risk is defined using the actual catastrophe exposure. As in the Us 
system, there are different threshold levels giving the regulatory body the power to 
intervene. 
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2.6 Critique of US Risk-Based System 
There are a number of criticisms that can be levelled at the US risk-based capital system. 
Several types of risk are not incorporated into the US system, for example: 
" there could be a substantial adverse movement in the market value of the company's 
investments, as opposed to normal investment volatility; 
" the nature, currency and term of the company's assets could be inappropriate, given 
the nature, currency and term of the liabilities; 
" the company could be exposed to an accumulation of risk, either from a natural 
disaster or from a combination of economic conditions; and 
" there could be a significant loss due to exposure to investment trading, e. g. in 
derivative instruments, for speculation rather than hedging. 
In addition, the cross balance sheet correlations between assets and liabilities are not 
captured in non-life insurance. One clear omission is the failure to explicitly recognize 
any potential for currency mismatching. Moreover, the calculation of a number of the 
risk factors appears to be arbitrary (Dickinson, 1997). For example: 
0 the charge against reinsurance ceded in the credit risk factor; and 
" the allowance for excessive growth in the off balance sheet risk factor. 
The risk framework is also essentially retrospective in nature, being based on statistical 
data at both the industry and company level over a preceding time period. For example, 
the factors for the 1994 year-end reflect the historical experience of the U. S. insurance 
industry in the period 1984-93, including the severe adverse development that occurred 
in general liability and the very severe loss ratios in medical malpractice and reinsurance. 
Another limitation is that the risk-based capital system is based on a "snap-shot" of a 
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company at a given point in time. It is a static rather than dynamic approach to solvency 
testing (Cummins et al., 1993). A modern approach to solvency testing is dynamic 
financial analysis, usually implemented by cash flow simulation (Cummins et al., 1999). A 
cash flow model can take into account patterns of loss reserve runoffs and asset cash 
flows and can incorporate external economic information such as yield curves and 
inflation rates. Thus, it can provide information on a company's ability to withstand 
potentially adverse economic developments that cannot be captured by a static system. 
Criticism of the static nature of the current solvency model and its focus on the past as 
evidenced by its use of annual report data has led to a discussion of future oriented 
models. The cash flow models that are often used in this context are based on the 
principle that the economic value of a company is determined by the discounted value of 
all future cash flows. Cash flows are forecast over a certain planning horizon and the 
cash values added. The cash flow forecast is heavily dependent on the assumptions made 
regarding the future development of the business. 
Given the interaction of risks on the asset and liability sides, this model is also a regular 
topic of discussion in the context of asset-liability management. For regulatory purposes 
the focus is on honouring existing obligations, however. Cash flow models that are 
drawn up at the request of regulators tend to simulate the liquidation of the insurer (run- 
off) and not a continuation in the underwriting of new risks, as in the case of asset- 
liability management. 
Cash flow or dynamic financial analysis (DFA) models are currently being used by life 
insurers in some of the states of the US and, since 1999, by Canadian non-life insurers as 
well. The Canadian DCAT model (dynamic capital fund adequacy testing), which is 
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based on the "going-concern" principle, carries out stress tests on non-life insurers 
regarding their capital base. 
These tests apply to: 
" loss frequency and severity 
" pricing 
" under-reserving 
" inflation 
" change in interest rates 
" premium volume 
" expense increase 
" reinsurance failure 
" 
depreciation of investments 
" government and political action 
" off-balance sheet risks 
In addition, to plausible base scenarios, the above-mentioned risks are to be modeled 
and the three scenarios involving the greatest risk published. The additional use of cash 
flow models for non-life insurers is currently being discussed at an abstract level in the 
US, although there are currently no concrete plans for their introduction. 
The experience during the development of the risk-based capital formula was also 
dominated by several factors: 
- 
The 1984-86 US liability `crisis', particularly in relation to medical malpractice; 
- 
The emergence of long-tail asbestos and environmental pollution claims; 
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- 
An apparent increase in the frequency of natural catastrophes; 
- 
High interest rates, creating pressures to engage in cash flow underwriting; and 
- 
High inflation rates. 
Management competence is also an important concept that is missing altogether as a risk 
factor, although it would clearly have been difficult to measure it. The history of 
individual managers may be relevant, but it will be almost impossible to score this on a 
numerical scale. 
An inaccurate risk-based capital formula will have quite obvious results both in terms of 
the behavior of insurance companies and the costs that are associated with it. There will 
be distortion of investment, underwriting, and reinsurance decisions of well-managed 
insurers, leading to less effective diversification, reduction of safety levels for financially 
sound insurers and higher premium rates for any given level of safety. A poorly designed 
system could also lead to unjustified damage to the reputations of well-managed insurers, 
raising the costs of capital for these firms and impending their ability to raise new equity 
capital. The result could be a reduction in the efficiency of insurance markets and an 
inefficient shift by buyers towards self-insurance and other risk management alternatives 
(Cummins et al., 1995). Furthermore, there is an impact that regulatory capital has on 
both insurance companies and policyholders, and it is associated with the way economic 
resources will be absorbed in order to restore a certain level of capital. The value of the 
extra resources that would be absorbed by the regulatory regime in this respect reflects a 
direct cost imposed on both the regulator and the policyholders. Also, there are costs 
that would not have been incurred in the absence of risk-based capital, for example the 
costs of any additional systems, training, and management time that is required by the 
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regulator. Finally, there are indirect costs that are least obvious from a cash perspective. 
These include the costs of reduced competition, the costs of imposed uniformity and the 
costs of moral hazard (Richardson and Stephenson, 2000). Cost-effective capital 
standards will be met only when their economic benefits exceed its economic cost 
The trigger points for regulatory intervention in the US system are also quite rigid, in that 
they give a relatively small amount of discretion to the regulator. It can be argued that 
policyholders are likely to be disadvantaged if insurance companies are forced to hold 
excessive levels of capital, since there is a cost in holding capital for an insurer, and in 
competitive markets costs tend to get passed onto policyholders over time. 
2.7 Empirical Tests on the Efficacy of the US Risk-based system 
Since its introduction, there have been a number of empirical studies in the United States 
which have sought to test the efficacy of the risk-based system in identifying and 
predicting the failure of insurcm- Grace, Harrington, and Klein (1993) calculated the ratio 
of capital held to the risk-based minimum capital in 1990 and 1991 for those US non-life 
insurers that failed between 1991 and 1993. They found that, while there was a 
significant inverse relationship between the ratio of actual capital to their risk-based 
capital minimum (the RBC ratio) and their insolvency risk, in both univariate tests and 
multiple logistic regressions, relatively few failed companies had RBC ratios that would 
have triggered regulatory action prior to their failure. 
A subsequent study by Cummins, Harrington, and Klein (1995), employing a similar data 
set and a multiple logistic regression model of insolvency risk, determined that the 
accuracy of the RBC ratios in classifying failed and surviving insurers could be materially 
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improved by adjusting the weights of the basic RBC components, and by including firm 
size and organization form as additional variables in the risk-based system. They also 
found that the NAIC risk-based capital formula classifies small firms more accurately 
than large firms. 
Finally, Cummins, Grace, and Phillips (1999) compared the risk-based capital system 
with other models for predicting insurer failure. These models were the Financial 
Analysis and Sun eillance Tracking (FAST) audit ratio system and a cash flow simulation 
model. The FAST system and the older Insurance Regulatory Information System (IRIS) 
were designed to prioritise insurers for further regulatory action. The IRIS system 
consists of twelve audit ratios with published ranges that are deemed acceptable by the 
regulators. The FAST system consists of twenty-nine ratios and corresponding scores for 
each ratio (NAIC, 1995). The ultimate output from the FAST system was that the overall 
FAST score equal to the sum of the individual insurer's audit ratioYmultiplied by the 
corresponding scores. 
Logistic regression was used to test the models for a large sample of solvent and 
insolvent property-liability insurers, using data from the years 1990-1992 to predict 
insolvencies over three-year prediction horizons. They found that the FAST system was 
superior to RBC as a static method for predicting insurer insolvencies. Furthermore, they 
found that the cash flow simulation variables add significant explanatory power to the 
regressions and lead to more accurate solvency prediction than the ratio-based models 
taken alone. 
47 
The general conclusion of these studies is that capital levels of insurers, even when 
measured under a complex risk-based system, are not sufficient alone to predict or 
prevent the failure of insurance companies. 
A. M. Best, the rating agency, undertook a study of the causes of all nonlife insurance 
company failures over the period 1969 to 1998 (A. M. Best, 1991). The main causes are 
listed in Table 1.1. As can be seen there were a wide variety of underlying causes. These 
findings do not weaken the case for a reliance on capital standards. Capital still acts as a 
line of last defense to absorb all risks, and even if an adequate level of capital does not 
prevent failure of an insurer, it can reduce its likelihood, or delay its occurrence so that 
supervisors have time to find an orderly wind-up. 
2.8 The capital base in selected markets 
The average values and distribution curves of the solvency ratio (capital funds expressed 
as a percentage of net premiums) show that insurers in the US, UK, Germany and 
France currently hold far more capital funds than required by the regulators (sec Figure 
2.3). A comparison can be drawn between the solvency ratios for the US and the UK as 
both countries use similar accounting principles when calculating capital funds and 
consequently have similar average solvency ratios. A comparison of the frequency 
distribution shows, however, that US insurers are more heavily capitalised than their 
European counterparts. This can be traced back to the large number of small but well 
capitalised US insurers which even together represent only a small market share. 
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FIGURE 2.3 Frequency distribution of solvency ratios in 1997 
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Table 2.3 shows the median ratio of the effective solvency margin to the target for the 
US and UK. It reveals that the average insurer holds around four times more capital 
funds than the amount required by the regulators. This shows clearly that the minimum 
statutory standards in force constitute no effective restriction to the activities of the 
average insurer. 
Table 2.3 Comparison of average current and target solvency ratios 
1990 1994 1997 
US N. A. 345% 389% 
UK 400% 278% 469% 
Source: A. M. Best (1999) 
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From the beginning of the nineties onwards the solvency ratio increased dramatically in 
all the markets. In the UK and US, where capital funds are calculated largely at market 
value, the increase was the most striking. In the 1990-1997 period it soarcd. by 168% and 
199% respectively (see Figure 2.4). 
The rallying capital markets in combination with relatively good insurance results 
boosted market capitalisation in relation to premium volume. However, only part of the 
rise in the solvency ratio translates into improved risk security, since premium volume 
alone does not give a sufficiently accurate picture of an insurer's overall risk. Falling 
premium rates reduce premium income in relation to risk exposure. Furthermore, the 
trend towards higher cover limits and rising retentions by commercial policyholders 
increases the volatility of the portfolio. A further rise in risk exposure is the outcome of 
the growing significance of asset risk. In summary, all these effects serve to increase the 
capital funds requirement in relation to premiums. In the US this can be seen clearly in 
the rise in the amount of the risk-based capital required per dollar of premiums earned 
(Table 2.4). 
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FIGURE 2.4 Rise in the average solvency ratio 
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Table 2.4 Rise in the capital requirements 
1998 
France 
2000 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Solvency ratio 72% 76% 82% 92% 103% 
RBC/net premiums (average) 21% 26% 26% 28% 29% 
Proportion of shares in total assets invested 17% 18% 19% 21% 23% 
Shares as a percentage of net premiums 40% 46% 46% 57% 62% 
Source: A. M. Best (1999) 
Insurers' capital bases have increased at a faster pace than risk exposure, however, with 
the result that substantially more capital funds are available to cover technical and 
investment risks. Consequently, the European and North American insurance markets 
find themselves with excess capacity today. 
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2.9 Stress tests on the capital base 
The main reasons behind the accumulation of capital funds were the rallies on the US 
and European equity markets. On the other hand, this has also significantly increased 
investment risk over the past few years. Figure 2.5 shows the rise in the value of equity 
investments expressed as a percentage of net premiums in the UK and US. Today 
insurers are exposed to investment risk on equity investments amounting to more than 
55% of their net premium volume. 
FIGURE 2.5 Growing volume of equity investments 
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An interesting question arises here on how would the capitalisation of the various 
markets will react to a stock market crash. Table 2.5 shows the simulated effects on the 
solvency ratio of a 35% downward correction of equity markets. 
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Table 2.5 Consequences for the solvency ratio of a 35% fall in stock 
market prices 
Average market data Germany UK US 
Equities /Capital funds 1998 59.2% 68.3% 46.2% 
Solvency ratio 1998 159.8% 114.7% 103.3% 
Change in solvency ratio (% points) 
-31.2% -25.9% -15.7% 
Source: A. M. Best (1999) 
Capital funds react immediately to a change in the market value of assets without losses 
having to be realised in the profit and loss account. A 35% market correction would 
substantially reduce capital funds (at market value) and in turn the solvency ratio. 
Average solvency, however, would not fall to a critical level in any of the markets 
examined 
- 
although this would not necessarily be the case for every individual 
company. To take UK as an example, the share of insurers failing to meet solvency 
FIGURE 1.6 Frequency distribution of the solvency ratio for 
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requirements would increase from 3.6% to 4.7%. Figure 2.6 illustrates the impact of 
market crash simulation on the frequency distribution of the solvency ratio for the UK. 
The curve shifts to the left whenever capital funds are reduced, i. e. the solvency ratio of 
most companies and therefore of the market average is reduced; however, it would still 
be higher than five years ago. 
The consequences of a large loss event are more difficult to simulate. The influence loss 
events can have on the solvency margin is in the form of a negative annual result, 
although the company has a range of financial instruments at its disposal that can be 
used to try to bring losses under control. While reinsurance covers some of the gross 
losses, a company can avoid a balance sheet loss and thus a reduction in capital funds by 
releasing reserves and selling some investments. This was the reason why, despite 
Hurricane Andrew in 1992 ($17 billion in gross losses), capital funds in the US market 
grew by 2.6%. Extreme loss scenarios involving hurricanes in Florida or earthquakes in 
California of a magnitude that takes place only once every hundred years are based on 
insured gross losses of $60-$70 billions. After reinsurance net losses arc likely to still be 
between $40-$45 billions for direct insurers. However, with the introduction of new 
financing techniques, like catastrophe bonds and catastrophe options, the insurers are 
able to mitigate their exposures by reinforcing their capital base with these new tools. 
The high average capitalisation of the markets examined does not mean that catastrophes 
cannot result in individual insolvencies: in 1992 Hurricane Andrew triggered the greatest 
number of insolvencies ever in the US (63). In weakly capitalised markets natural 
catastrophes can have far-reaching consequences for the capital base. 
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2.10 The trade-off between security and capital costs 
Generally insurers hold substantially more capital than the amount required by 
regulators. The main advantage of this buffer is that policyholders can feel secure in the 
knowledge that their claims will be paid and shareholders can be comfortable that the 
ability of the company to continue making profits is protected. However, holding capital 
funds is costly. Incurring unnecessary capital costs lowers shareholder investment returns 
and raises policyholder premium rate. 
A number of stakeholders have perhaps diverging interests regarding the equity base 
required of an insurer. Policyholders benefit from the knowledge that the insurer can 
meet claims-paying commitments 
- 
yet policyholders do not want capital requirements 
to become so burdensome that premium rates become excessive. Regulators, on the 
other hand, aim at protecting the consumer while maintaining the long-run viability of 
insurance markets. A company's owners, in contrast, are interested in generating a high 
risk-adjusted return on their investments and so must make a trade-off between 
protecting the franchise value of their company on the one hand and incurring capital 
costs on the other. Both staff and management have a vested interest in keeping their 
company in business and in having leeway for action, while also keeping shareholders 
happy. Rating agencies, too, are interested in the fulfilment of all obligations, which 
includes all the claims of investors. Each of these stakeholders has a different view 
regarding the trade-offs involved in holding capital, and conflicting views about the 
optimal amount of capital funds can result. 
Only a relatively small number of physical assets, such as an office building and 
computer hardware, are needed for a company to offer insurance protection. Risk capital 
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is not tied to normal business activities and can thus be invested profitably. The net costs 
of reserves are thus the costs of capital funds minus the investment returns. From the 
investors' standpoint, the fact that an insurer has capital funds available which it can 
reinvest in the capital market gives it the traits of an investment fund.. The insurer's 
indirect investment risk in the capital market is leveraged by the underwriting risk. 
However, an insurance company's investment of capital involves substantial tax 
disadvantages and agency costs when compared to a direct investment by an investor. 
An insurer's cost of capital depends to a certain extent on the company's legal form. 
Mutual insurance companies generally hold more capital in relation to business volume 
than stock companies (Table 2.6). In the case of mutual insurance companies the owners 
and policyholders are one and the same. They are therefore under less capital cost 
pressure than stock companies, which constantly have to balance the interests of the 
policyholders and shareholders. 
Table 2.6 Solvency and ROE by legal form 
Mutual companies Stock companies 
ROE Solvency ratio ROE Solvency ratio 
France 5.9% 123% 9.1% 72% 
Germany 8.6% 64% 5.4% 59% 
US 8.7% 94% 14.2% 82% 
Source: A. M. Best (1999) 
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Table 2.6 shows the average solvency ratio of the markets for the 1995-1997 period in 
which mutual insurance companies play the most important role. A wider survey of 2424 
European non-life insurers confirm these results and show that the average 
current/target solvency of mutual insurers is 5.4: 1, in contrast to 3.7: 1 for 
. 
public limited 
companies (European Commission, 1999). 
On the basis of the above-mentioned effect, the direct consequence of a wider capital 
base is a lower return on equity. This is confirmed for the US and France in a 
comparison of the legal forms of companies shown in Table 2.6. The conflicting aims of 
solvency and return on equity have not been so obvious over the past few years as 
insurers have been generating above-average returns on the back of the rallying stock 
markets. 
2.11 Capital requirements of the rating agencies 
The capital requirements imposed by the rating agencies are becoming increasingly 
important to the success of insurance companies. In a market characterised by growing 
international competition, a top rating is a must. The capital requirements needed in 
order to be assigned a top rating are normally higher than those laid down by state 
regulators. Figures 2.7 and 2.8 show the distribution of ratings assigned by Standard & 
Poor's (global) and A. M. Best (US) for 1998. Despite their basically generous capital 
base, most companies are assigned ratings in the middle categories. In this way the rating 
agencies make an important contribution to the establishment of a high standard by 
which to measure a company's capital base. 
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Rating agencies aim at encouraging security in the fulfilment of payment obligations to 
policyholders and investors. In addition to solvency, criteria such as liquidity, financial 
FIGURE 2.7 Frequency distribution of ratings in 1998 
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strength and management quality are factored into complex models. Given the different 
models, it is difficult to find an empirical agreement between the solvency ratio or risk- 
based capital ratio and the ratings. An analysis of 878 US companies revealed only a very 
minor correlation between the risk-based capital ratio and the ratings assigned by A. M. 
Best, which are based on publicly accessible information. 
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FIGURE 2.8 Frequency distribution of ratings in 1998 
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Over the past few years the rating agencies have contributed to the increase in the 
solvency standard. In their models the rating agencies use among other factors the 
relative assessments to the market average. Since the market average has risen, so too 
have the demands for each rating category. However, critics of the ratings base their 
arguments on the inherent conflicts of interests between the rating agencies and the 
insurers who sometimes request the rating to be drawn up. On the other hand, various 
surveys have shown that even private ratings do not sufficiently forecast insolvencies 
(Cummins et al., 1999). 
2.12 Hybrid capital and the cost of capital 
Hybrid capital ranks somewhere between equity and debt. This form of capital usually 
guarantees a constant return if the insurer generates a positive annual surplus, and serves 
as risk capital in the event of an insolvency. By issuing hybrid capital the insurer can 
target a reduction in its insolvency risk without having to expand its equity base by 
issuing shares with voting rights. In addition, the interest payments are tax deductible. 
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The cost of raising this capital thus lies between that for equity and debt. Hybrid capital 
represents an interesting investment instrument for institutional investors as it enables 
them to generate higher returns on a form of fixed-income security. However, non-life 
insurers have as yet made little use of this financing possibility 
In the event of bankruptcy, subordinated debt ranks for repayment behind all the other 
borrowings. The issue of subordinated debt does not reduce the right for "normal" 
creditors. Subordinated debt carries a higher default risk than a "normal" loan or bond 
and thus increases the security of higher ranked liabilities. The advantage this form of 
funding has over the issuance of shares is that it avoids diluting the voting rights and 
dividends paid out. The ratios used in financial analysis, such as earnings per share or 
ROE, are affected by changing the numerator, as additional interest payments reduce the 
amount of profits earned. There is no dilutive effect on the denominator. 
Participation rights bear more similarity to capital funds, although have limited terms to 
maturity and no voting rights. Participation rights come in various forms but the interest 
they generate is usually dependent on corporate earnings. They also have no right to any 
residual claims in the event of an insolvency. Interest income is normally tax deductible. 
This form of security does not dilute capital funds, for example, in the ROE calculation. 
In the case of surplus notes (US), regulators have to give step-by-step approval, not only 
of their issue but also of their interest payments and redemption. In this way a reduction 
in the assets can be prevented if the risk-based capital requirements have not been 
fulfilled. As surplus notes are classified as capital funds, in contrast to subordinated loans 
or participation rights, there is a dilution of capital funds, e. g. in the calculation of the 
ROE. 
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Provided certain regulations are complied with, hybrid capital can be combined with the 
available capital funds in the calculation of a company's solvency both in the EU and in 
the US. The rating agencies also include a certain share of hybrid capital in their 
calculation of the capital funds. The term to maturity plays an important role in this 
respect. The general rule is that the more of an equity character the hybrid capital takes, 
the more of it can be classified as capital funds. In Tables 2.7 and 2.8, there is a 
breakdown of the amount of the hybrid capital that can be included in the calculation of 
the solvency margin in the EU and in the calculation of the risk-based capital in the 
United States. 
Table 2.7 Amount of hybrid capital in the EU calculation 
Fixed term (up to 25%) Undefined term (up to 50%) 
" Subordinate to other liabilities 
" Fully paid in 
" Subordinate to other liabilities 
" Fully paid in 
" Original term at least five years; " May not be redeemed without the 
amortised over the last five years or, approval of the regulators 
with the approval of the regulators, " The issuer must have the option of 
one year before maturity postponing the payment of interest 
" Premature redemption only in the " Both the nominal value and unpaid 
event of liquidation or with the interest must be able to absorb losses 
approval of the regulators 
Source: European Commission (1999) 
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Table 2.8 Amount of hybrid capital in the US calculation 
Surplus notes Capital notes 
" Capital funds in accordance with " Debt capital in accordance with SAP 
SAP' 
" Capital funds in accordance with 
GAAP** 
" Full inclusion in the RBC ratio 
" Subordinate to other liabilities 
" Capital funds in accordance with 
GAAP 
" Inclusion of up to 25% of capital in 
the RBC ratio 
" Subordinate to other liabilities 
" Interest rate and redemption only " The regulators can cancel interest rate 
with the approval of the regulators payments if the RBC ratio falls under 
100% 
* Statutory Accounting Principles ** Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
Source: NAIC (1995) 
Hybrid capital is still more the exception than the rule. Participation rights equalled 0.6% 
of equity at market value in Germany in 1997. Subordinated debt amounted to even less. 
In the US, surplus notes have become slightly more important in the financing of mutual 
insurers (around 3% of capital funds), as this represents their only external access to risk 
capital. The attraction of hybrid capital can increase very rapidly if, for example, 
following a stock market crash, an insurer's capital base is reduced and the cost of capital 
rises. 
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2.13 Supervision of insurance groups and financial conglomerates 
Currently only individual companies arc subject to solvency regulation in the EU. This 
enables insurance groups to use the same capital funds several times at different levels; 
this is termed double gearing. If a parent company increases the capital funds of a 
subsidiary, for example, the underwriting capacity of the subsidiary increases, although 
the consolidated funds of the group have not changed. The directive on the supervision 
of insurance groups that came into effect at the end of 1998 is meant to address this 
problem (Directive 97/78/EC). Supervision will remain at the individual company level, 
but regulators will require intra-group relationships to be monitored as well. The EU 
Directive has to be transformed into the national law of the EU member states by June 
2000 and to come into effect by the 2001 business year at the latest. 
The additional supervision mainly involves the insurer having to provide its adjusted 
solvency ratio. In addition, regulators should check whether intra-group business (e. g. 
loans, guarantees) poses a risk to the insurer's solvency. If the adjusted solvency margin 
is negative, the regulators must intervene. Since a number of European states had already 
introduced provisions relating to the supervision of insurance groups before this 
directive was brought into effect, three different options of calculating adjusted solvency 
have been specified in the EU directive. Each individual member state has to decide 
which of the three methods it wants to employ. In the case of the requirement deduction 
method, the sum of the elements eligible for the solvency margin are subtracted from the 
parent company's capital funds. The disadvantage of this method is that any surplus 
funds of a subsidiary or participation are not taken into account. The deduction and 
aggregation method is aimed at correcting this disadvantage. A third method is the 
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calculation of adjusted solvency using the consolidation-based accounting method. If the 
company in question is a wholly owned subsidiary, this third variation gives the same 
result as the deduction and aggregation method. 
Moreover, the advancing convergence of banking and insurance through mergers and 
acquisitions represents a great challenge to regulators in the US and Europe regarding 
the capital requirements of conglomerates. The European Commission plans of drafting 
a directive relating to the supervision of financial conglomerates by the end of 2000. One 
core theme is likely to be the problem of double gearing. However, it is difficult to 
abolish double gearing since different regulators are responsible for insurers, banks and 
securities firms, all of whom, given the different risks involved in the individual 
businesses, have different solvency requirements. 
In drawing up a draft directive, the European Commission will take the 
recommendations of the joint Forum into account. The Joint Forum was established in 
early 1996 under the aegis of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (Basle 
Committee), IOSCO (International Organisation of Securities Commission) and IAIS 
(International Association of Insurance Supervisors). During the course of 1999 the joint 
Forum published a number of papers on the supervision of financial conglomerates. The 
recommendations put forward by the joint Forum include various measurement 
techniques for determining the amount of capital funds financial conglomerates should 
hold and suggestions on how to approach the problem of double gearing. The paper 
does not recommend replacing the system for the supervision of individual companies 
for the supervision of individual companies, but rather the introduction of an additional 
supervisory element. 
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In the US, discussions revolving around the supervision of financial conglomerates apply 
more to the jurisdiction of the authorities that they do to the substance of the 
recommendations. These discussions are closely linked to the revision of the Glass- 
Steagall Act according to which the strict division between banking and insurance 
services are being relaxed. As insurance is supervised by the individual states and the 
banks by a federal authority, there are basic conflicts regarding jurisdiction that will have 
to be overcome before joint supervision can be introduced. A model is currently being 
discussed which leaves the supervision of insurance companies to the individual states, 
while making conglomerates subject to additional supervision by the Federal Reserve 
system. The development of integrated models to measure all the risks to which a 
conglomerate is exposed is also at its early stages. As it will most likely be difficult to 
develop a universally valid model, one possible solution would be for companies to take 
on the responsibility for their own risk management and seek regulatory approval for 
their risk management models. 
Closely connected with the introduction of an international supervisory standard is the 
discussion of a universal accounting standard. In addition to the proposals made by the 
European Commission, the IASC (International Accounting Standards Committee) is 
endeavouring to introduce one universal accounting standard. However, the JAS would 
be in competition with US GAAP. The introduction of an international accounting 
standard would influence the amount of capital reported by a financial conglomerate. 
65 
2.14 Conclusions 
In comparing the current European solvency margin system with the US risk-based 
system, one must conclude that the European model is inadequate. How should one 
proceed to draw the best from the risk-based models which are conceptually superior, 
without having the complexities, rigidities and costs of these systems? There is no 
simple answer to this question. One solution that suggests itself is a more collaborative 
approach between regulators and company management. Under such a system the 
regulatory authority would define risk models that would be acceptable, but would leave 
the detailed modelling to the companies themselves, with the oversight of an approved 
internal audit function within the company. Hence it would be possible to combine 
sufficient rigour without undue cost and inflexibility. An internal audit team combining 
actuarial, accounting, underwriting and economic expertise would seem appropriate for 
non-life insurance; perhaps an actuary alone would be sufficient for life insurance, since 
the task is less complex. The role of the regulatory authority would be to approve the 
models and to monitor the output of the models against benchmark standards. 
Although the current European solvency margin system may appear crude compared to 
the US risk-based system, with weak theoretical foundations, its application is very 
straightforward. The dilemma between objective correctness and functionality is resolved 
in favor of the latter (Farny, 1997). The US risk-based capital model is significantly more 
tailor-made to an individual insurer risk profile, although its theoretical foundations are 
far from strong. It is also harder to apply in practice and imposes high internal 
compliance costs on insurers. There is a general skepticism as to whether the US-style 
risk-based model could be transferred to Europe. And this skepticism can be found 
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among European supervisors in the Muller Report. Moreover, the US system is not only 
complex but is also very prescriptive even for insurance supervisors, since it has a 
detailed set of regulatory responses that are triggered if the capital base of an insurance 
company falls below the minimum risk-based capital level. One can argue that this 
degree of prescription builds undue rigidities into the regulatory process. 
Regulatory capital is of course just one of a number of regulatory tools, alongside other 
supervision techniques and regulations covering conduct of business rules and client 
money. Ideally, the marginal costs and marginal benefits of all these tools applied in 
combination need to be judged, to try to decide on the most efficient mit. 
Additionally, the imposition of capital rules in isolation is of little value if the regulator 
cannot be sure that the insurer has adequate systems to monitor and measure the risks 
that the capital standards are intended to limit, and that the firm's management are 
honest and competent. As well as choosing the right balance of regulatory tools, 
regulators need to take account of other mechanisms which are not part of the regulatory 
armoury, but which can also help them achieve their objectives. Market discipline is one 
important example: if the market is in a position to judge that a firm is weakly capitalised 
or poorly run, it may penalise the firm in various ways, such as discounting the firm's 
share price. And less tangibly, evidence of weak management can damage a company's 
reputation, which may make it harder for it to write new business. All these factors 
impose incentives, in different degrees on different companies, to operate in a sound and 
efficient manner, and to hold capital as a cushion against future losses. 
These are some of the lessons that the Stage 2 of the EU solvency exercise. But it is clear 
that insurance supervisors and the insurance industry will also need to work together to 
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construct a workable and cost-effective system for solvency of assessment, including 
capital adequacy, if the new computer-based risk modelling techniques are to be used. 
The fruitful interaction of regulators and the insurance industry has a good precedent in 
Europe: the development of the 3rd Insurance Directives. But what is also clear is that 
the current rethinking of capital adequacy and solvency within the banking sector by the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision will also have a key influence, as banking 
regulation itself moves away from its own static risk-based capital rules. A new solvency 
framework, including capital standards, is likely to emerge which has common features 
across the financial services sector, not least because of the need for level competitive 
playing-fields, as product and corporate convergence within the sector continues. 
However, the framework must be able to take into account the particular characteristics 
of the risks facing non-life insurers and those facing life insurers, if it is be effective. 
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CHAPTER 3 
UNDERWRITING CYCLES IN THE UK 
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3.1 Introduction 
It is the prevailing wisdom of the insurance industry the world over that the industry is 
subject to an underwriting cycle. The study of cycles in general insurance is of major 
importance. In the last ten years, the study of cycles has progressed significantly. The 
industry results tend to follow a cycle consisting of alternating uniform periods of rising 
and then falling underwriting profits. 
A study of insurance price cycles is of interest for a number of reasons. Firstly, since 
insurance profit is a component of total earnings of insurers (along with investment 
income), a study of temporal behavior is of interest to those seeking to value insurance 
stocks 
Secondly, cyclical behavior of insurance earnings might, under some circumstances, be 
transmitted into temporal movements in insurance stock prices. If confirmed, such 
movements would carry challenging implications for the weak form of the efficient 
markets hypothesis. 
Moreover, if temporal price movements represent adjustments to changing market 
equilibria, they may present valuable insights into the competitive processes at play in the 
insurance market. Furthermore, it provides a case study of the price linkages between 
two markets; the insurance product market and the capital market. 
The underwriting cycle is characterized by periods of intensely competitive insurance 
pricing that result in low premiums and sizeable insurer underwriting losses, followed by 
periods of much higher insurance prices (see Venezian, 1985; Cummins and Outreville, 
1987; and Winter, 1994). Although variations in profits suggest that a market mechanism 
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may be operating, industry observers usually interpret the cycle as a supply-side 
phenomenon. 
The typical explanation is that the insurance industry causes the cycle more or less on its 
own, through periods of destructive competition followed by cutbacks in supply. More 
sophisticated versions relate the recurring phases of the cycle to key operating ratios such 
as the premiums-to-surplus ratio, which is said to represent capacity. 
An underwriting cycle can be viewed as a repeated sequence of "hard" and "soft" 
markets in the industry (Harrington and Danzon, 1994; Niehaus and Terry, 1993). The 
sequence may be observed in the prices, profitability, and supply data. In a "hard" 
market, the supply of insurance coverage shrinks amid high and rising insurance prices 
and profitability. In a "soft" market, the availability of insurance coverage expands as 
prices and profits tumble. The underwriting cycle does not necessarily synchronise with 
the general business cycle. In fact it is much more regular than the general business cycle 
(\Vcbb, 1992). 
The existence of an underwriting cycle has been recognised by researchers. In addition, 
they have been numerous studies and debates on the causes of the underwriting cycle. 
Nevertheless, there is no generally accepted view of what the causes are. One school of 
thought suggests that the causes are irrational behaviour like competitor-driven pricing, 
narre rate-making processes, and capacity constraints. Another school of thought, which 
is related to the rational expectations /institutional intervention hypothesis, however, 
does not agree that insurance markets and insurers are irrational. Instead, it suggests that 
the underwriting cycle is created by external factors and market characteristics that are 
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outside the control of insurers. These factors include data collection, regulatory, policy 
renewal and accounting lags, interest rates, stock markets, and the general business cycle. 
3.2 Market imperfections theory 
- 
The first school of thought is based on the premise that insurance markets operate 
irrationally. Venezian (1985) attributes the cycle to the imperfection of extrapolative 
methods used in the naive rate-making process. He finds that the United States 
underwriting profit data follow a second order autoregressive process with a cycle period 
of about six years. 
The argument of irrational behavior suggests that insurance markets are destabilised by 
phenomena such as extrapolative forecasting and so-called "cash flow underwriting", 
which can result in prices considerably higher or lower than competitive levels due to 
erroneous estimates of losses or investment income. 
Venezian (1985) describes a ratemaking model in which past loss levels are used (via time 
trending) to extrapolate estimates of losses in future periods. These forecasted losses, in 
turn, are used to set premiums. By incorporating reasonable estimates of experience and 
policy projection periods used in the United States, Venezian predicts that a cycle with 
average periods ranging from four to nine years should exist. 
Venezian's model is substantiated by empirical tests. Parameters needed to measure the 
cycle period are obtained by estimating the following autoregressive model with ordinary 
least squares: 
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_, 
+ cýý (3.1) 
where fI r: the underwriting profit 
in period t, and 
wt :a random error term 
The profit margins for each line of insurance, adjusted for linear trend, were used as 
dependent variables in regressions that included up to four lagged values as independent 
variables. In the majority of the cases the first two terms give the highest adjusted r- 
squared, and generally these two terms do as well as four terms in predicting 
underwriting profit margins. 
A cycle will be present if a, > 0, a, < 0, and a2 + 4a, < 0. In this case, the 
characteristic of the second order difference equation in underwriting profits will have 
complex roots, implying that profits follow a cyclical pattern. The period of the cycle is 
obtained from the following formula: 
_T 
2zz (3.2) 
cos a1/2 
- 
a, 
The cycle will be damped (i. e., have a tendency to die down over time) if 
- 
a, < 1. If 
- 
a2 > 1, the cycle will be explosive. Even a dumped cycle will be maintained over 
time if random shocks occur. 
Cummins and Outreville (1987) show that simple lags in data collection or price 
regulation may be sufficient to produce cyclical performance even in rational 
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expectations setting. That is, insurance prices typically arc based on annual data which 
are not available for use until several months after the close of the "experience" period. 
Certainly, as technological advances in data base management occur, this delay is 
shortened. Nevertheless, delays arc currently experienced in tabulating and analyzing 
data, and the slow emergence of information on losses in long-tail lines dictate that 
projections are made based on lagged loss observations. 
The authors developed an alternative model that is consistent with observed profit cycles 
in insurance. Specifically, they showed that cycles in reported underwriting profits are 
consistent with a simple rational expectations model of insurance price determination, 
provided that institutional lags and reporting practices are taken into account. The 
rational expectations hypothesis implies that economic agents forecast economic 
variables without systematic error, i. e., that their subjective expected values of these 
variables are the same as the actual of objective expected values, conditional on all 
information available at the time the forecasts are made. 
A second-order process can be created by combining informational and regulatory lags 
with renewal lags and calendar-year reporting practices. Recall that rates are assumed to 
change at the beginning of each year and to remain in effect for one year. Also assume 
that policy terms are one year in length and that policies are renewed evenly throughout 
the year. The cycle is apparent in the sense that it has nothing to do with the underlying 
economic and statistical characteristics of insurance profits but rather reflects the 
institutional factors and accounting practices. 
While the empirical findings of Cummins and Outreville are consistent with the rational 
expectations /institutional intervention hypothesis, they also may be consistent with other 
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hypotheses such as Venezian's extrapolative expectations hypothesis. Information on 
ratemaking procedures, regulatory constraints, lengths of policy terms, and accounting 
procedures would be helpful for further development of the model. More precise and 
detailed information on actual rather than reported profits also would be useful. 
Regulatory lags arise in countries in which insurers are required to submit rates for 
approval prior to use. This requirement further extends the delay between the experience 
period and the effective use of revised rates. This delay can be shortened by simplifying 
the regulatory process; nevertheless, regulatory rate approval is required in varying 
degrees across countries and across lines of business. 
Policy renewal lags exist because the insurance price cannot be adjusted simultaneously 
to reflect information as it becomes available. Most property-liability insurance policies 
have a set premium for the entire policy period (e. g., for an entire year). Furthermore, 
when new rates are approved, typically a lag in changing to the new rate level occurs. 
Moreover, financial reporting practices may give rise to apparent underwriting cycles in a 
rational marketplace. Loss estimates for each year would reflect all information available 
at the end of that year. Nevertheless, calendar-year data are used typically in financial 
statement reporting of losses, and financial statement data are used in cycle studies. 
These data are reported on an incurred basis, meaning that losses are matched to the 
coverage period during the calendar year. Likewise, premiums are based on accrual 
accounting; earned premiums include premiums attributed to policies issued within the 
first day of the preceding year to the last day of the reported year. A mismatch exists 
between the informational content of the reported premiums and reported losses. 
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Cummins and Outreville (1987) also claim that Venezian's (1985) hypothesis implies a 
certain degree of irrationality on the part of insurers and is inconsistent wit the rational 
expectation hypothesis advocated by modern economic theory developed for other types 
of financial markets. Furthermore, Venezian's (1985) hypothesis may not be able to 
explain the presence of underwriting cycles in countries where extrapolative trending 
procedures are not used. 
Lamm-Tennant and Weiss (1997) also find results that support the rational 
expectations /institutional intervention hypothesis. They utilise a generalised least squares 
regression model to analyse the changes of premiums with respect to changes in lagged 
losses, interest rates, average stock price, real gross domestic product (GDP), 
concentration ratio, regulations, policy periods, and catastrophic losses of nine developed 
countries. Specifically, their results indicate that data collection, regulatory, policy renewal 
and accounting lags, interest rates, real GDP, and stock markets are closely related to the 
underwriting cycle. They find that the length of the cycle period is largely determined by 
interest rates, rate regulations, and catastrophic loss growth. 
In determining the presence of the underwriting cycle Lamm-Tennant and Weiss (1997) 
estimate equation (3.1) individually for twelve countries using the average loss ratio, the 
overall combined ratio, and by-line loss ratios for six lines of business as the dependent 
variables. A linear time trend is added to each equation to control for declining expense 
ratios over time. The equations are estimated using ordinary least squares. The period of 
the cycle, if a cycle is observed, is estimated from equation (3.2). 
After establishing the presence of underwriting cycles in the twelve countries, the 
rational expectations /institutional intervention hypothesis is tested empirically by 
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utilising a generalised least squares (GLS) model which controls for autocorrelation 
within countries and heteroscedasticity across countries. The specification of the GLS 
model is: 
n-t (3.3) 
AP1, 
=a+y+Z c1D; + eü 
i=t i=t 
AP;, are the changes in aggregate premiums for country i and time period t, 
Cit = eE,, ý-ý + µit 
11 it - N(O, ß2 
) 
, 
n The number of countries, and 
Di a dummy variable equal to one for country i and zero otherwise 
The independent variables (Ott) are lagged losses, interest rates, average stock price, real 
gross domestic product (GDP), concentration ratio, regulations, policy periods, and 
catastrophic losses of the sample countries. 
Furthermore, they regress the underwriting cycle period on the regulatory and market 
characteristics of the sample countries to identify the direct impact of the independent 
variables on the length of the underwriting cycle. The regression model is stated as 
follows 
CycPer; j = ao + ß, Dis; j + ß2Per;, + ß3Catij + ß4Reg; j + ß5Res; 1 (3.4) 
K 
+ ß(, CVLoss; 1 +Z ßkDijk + sij 
k=l 
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where the dependent variable is the cycle period in country i and line j, and the 
independent variables are averages for the interest rate, policy period, catastrophe loss 
growth, premium regulation, reserve discount, coefficient of variation of the loss ratio, 
and dummy variables for line (ocean and inland marine). A dummy variable is included 
for ocean and inland marine insurance, because these lines are less regulated and more 
international in scope than lines where the bulk of business is written on domestic risk. 
In their final analysis, Lamm-Tennant and Weiss (1997) attempt to predict the presence 
of cycles using market characteristics and institutional/regulatory features for the sample 
countries using a logit model. 
In general, their results suggest that underwriting cycles are present in all countries and in 
at least one line. Differences in the presence and length of the underwriting cycle are 
evident across countries and across lines of business. For example, when comparing a 
long-tail business such as liability insurance to a short-tail line of business such as fire 
and allied lines, the cycle is considerable longer for liability insurance. (8 years versus 5 
years). 
The changes in current aggregate premium levels are significantly related to changes in 
past loss levels. These results are consistent with Venezian (1985). Also, overall premium 
changes are related to the concentration measure, change in stock index, premium 
regulation, and policy as hypothesised, and are statistically significant. Finally, on the 
predictability of the cycle, the results of the logit regression model conform to the 
expectations. Liability lines are more likely than property lines to exhibit an underwriting 
cycle. 
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Niehaus and Terry (1993) used time series causality tests to examine hypotheses about 
the determinants of insurance premiums and causes of the underwriting cycle. Their 
results suggested that market imperfections play an important role in insurance pricing. 
Consistent with the capital market imperfection hypothesis, the evidence-suggested that 
past values of surplus affect premiums. 
Niehaus and Terry consider a time series regression where the dependent variable is 
premiums written in year t, and the independent variables are current and future loss 
payments on policies written in year t, past loss payments, past values of surplus, and 
other control variables: 
Premiums, 
= 
floss payments on policies written in year t, (3.5) 
past losses, past surplus, control variables) + et 
According to the perfect markets hypothesis, premiums on a pool of policies should be 
explained by the loss payments on those policies, but not by past losses or past surplus. 
The capital market imperfection hypothesis implies that past values of surplus help 
explain premiums, and Venezian's (1985) hypothesis suggests that past values of losses 
may help explain premiums. 
However, in order to measure loss payments on policies written in year t, we need a loss 
variable that associates losses paid to the year in which the policy was written. Such loss 
data are not publicly available. Therefore, the losses paid by insurers in a calendar year is 
used as a proxy. The losses paid in a calendar year are not all from policies written in the 
same year. For lines with a short claim tail, the losses paid in a calendar year are likely to 
be from policies written in the reporting year or the year before. For lines with a long 
79 
claim tail, losses paid could reflect losses written many years earlier. Thus, the losses paid 
variable includes measurement error, especially in lines with a long claim tail. 
Linear equations of the following form were estimated: 
Ni nM nM NI (3.6) 
P, 
=a+ ksI- +1 7iSL, + Ys, + ©, P, + ßR1 + Eý 
s=u s=t s=t s=t 
where P,: Premiums written in calendar year t, 
S,: Aggregate policyholder surplus at time t, 
L,: Losses paid in year t, 
R, : Annual return on treasury bills in year t, 
st : The error term 
Although most studies use aggregate data, Venezian (1985) and Fields and Vcnezian 
(1989) argue that individual lines should be examined separately. Two problems prevent 
examination of individual lines. First, losses paid can be calculated only for aggregate 
series because the change in the loss reserve is not reported by line. Second, surplus, 
which is central to the capital market imperfection hypothesis, is not allocated by line. 
Consequently, aggregate data are examined which tend to reflect the experience of the 
largest lines: auto and workers' compensation. 
Consistent with time series evidence, lagged values of premiums are included in the 
model as control variables. Including lagged values of the dependent variable on the right 
hand side of the equation is also consistent with the usual implementation of causality 
tests. To conserve degrees of freedom, a lead and lag structure of two years is assumed 
for all variables; that is, M=2 in equation (3.6). 
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Equation (2.6) is estimated using both first differences and percentage changes. The 
results suggested that the greatest weight should be placed on the percentage changes 
rather than the first differences of the series. Under the perfect market hypothesis, 
premiums would be positively related to current and future loss payments. Both 
approaches (first differences and percentage changes) provide little support for this 
prediction. The coefficients of future losses are insignificantly different from zero, and 
the coefficient on contemporaneous losses (Li) is significant at the ten percent level 
only when percentage changes are used. In these equations, the coefficients on lagged 
premiums are highly significant and have opposite signs, suggesting cyclical behavior. 
When lagged premiums are not included in the equations, the statistical significance of 
future losses increases. In addition, the coefficients of the future loss variables alternate 
in sign, suggesting that the future loss variables in these equations are capturing the 
cyclical effect that the lagged premium variables capture in the first equations. The 
negative coefficient on the one year lead loss variable (L, +, ), however, is inconsistent 
with the perfect market hypothesis. The lack of support for the perfect markets 
hypothesis may be due to the measurement error in losses. 
The perfect markets hypothesis also predicts that past information, such as past loss 
payments and past surplus, would not help predict premiums, but evidence to the 
contrary was presented by the authors. The coefficient on lagged losses is positive and 
statistically significant using first differences, suggesting that high losses are followed by 
higher premiums. This finding is consistent with imperfections in the rate setting process 
(\Tenezian, 1985). It is also consistent with the hypothesis that the future loss variables 
measure expected future losses with error and that this error is correlated with past 
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losses. When percentage changes are used, however, lagged losses are not statistically 
significant. 
3.3 Rational expectations theory 
A second explanation of the underwriting cycle builds on the fact that the "underwriting 
profit" represents a measure of the average price of the contracts traded. Insurance 
pricing models based on financial theory are unanimous in showing that competitively 
determined insurance prices are inversely related to interest rates and will therefore 
change as interest rates change. Using this model, together with the rational expectations 
and lag features of the Cummins and Outreville model, Doherty and Kang (1988) show 
that the intertemporal behavior of underwriting returns in insurance markets is quite well 
explained as a market clearing process in which equilibrium prices change in lagged 
response to changing interest rates. Their model considers both supply and demand, and 
the resulting prices and profits arise from the interaction of these two market forces. 
Relying on capital-asset pricing theory, supply is considered to be a function of interest 
rates and expected profits. The sign of the interest rates term is expected to be positive, 
i. e., insurers increase supply when interest rates rise in order to obtain funds to invest 
(known as cash-flow underwriting). The demand for insurance in the Doherty-Kang 
model is hypothesised to be a function of price (the inverse of the loss ratio) and 
aggregate economic activity (income), with the latter representing an index of the amount 
of insurable goods and services. The equilibrium price is determined in the model by 
equating the quantity demanded with the quantity supplied. 
82 
In estimating the structural system described by the supply and demand functions, 
Doherty and Kang use a three stage least squares (3LS) model. Due to secular trends in 
some of the series, the model was run on first differences. The structural equations were 
estimated for aggregate property liability insurance, automobile physic) damage and 
automobile liability. The results that Doherty and Kang report are supportive. The 
supply function results indicate a positive partial adjustment from previous output level 
that is determined by the degree of excess return. It shows the expected significant 
positive response to expected excess returns in the total industry result and for both auto 
lines. Evidence of price elasticity of demand was weak or absent. 
From their analysis Doherty and Kang showed that the cycle appears to have resulted 
from the market's continuing attempts to clear. This supports the view that the cycle is 
evidence of a rational economic response to prevailing economic circumstances. 
However, this explanation stands in contrast to the traditional professional explanation 
that the cycle is a disequilibrium phenomenon which reveals the inability of the market 
to converge on its clearing prices. 
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3.4 Capacity constrained theory 
A third explanation focuses on external shocks to the value of the insurer's equity and 
therefore to its underwriting capacity. These models sometimes are called "capacity 
constrained" models. 
Berger (1988) develops a model in which insurance capacity depends on the current level 
of equity that, through retained earnings, is determined largely by pricing decisions made 
in the previous period. The model developed excludes any consideration of expenses, 
taxes, investment income, interaction with the capital market, or ratemaking 
methodology; rather, the hypothesis is that the dynamics of the cycle derive from the fact 
that profits feed back into surplus with a lag. In order to derive Venezian's second order 
autoregressive equation in profits, Berger assumed two one-year lags in the structure of 
the insurance business. First, the firm is assumed to set its underwriting policy for the 
upcoming year on the basis of end-of-year surplus. The more financially secure the firm 
is, the more willing it will be to underwrite what would otherwise be considered marginal 
risks. Secondly, the profit and loss results of the firm's underwriting policy will also be 
assumed to follow with a one-year lag. The unearned premium reserve was considered to 
be a component of the firm's initial capitalization. 
The market for insurance was modeled by way of standard supply and demand analysis, 
in which equilibrium price and quantity result from the intersection of market supply and 
demand schedules. It was assumed that market supply is a function of prior period 
surplus, since at any given price firms will be more willing to underwrite marginal risks 
when surplus is high. 
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Given this assumption, the resultant market price and quantity will also depend on prior 
period surplus, since the position of the supply function will determine the intersection 
of the supply and demand functions. If P, 
, 
Q, 
, 
St and n, respectively represent market 
price, quantity, surplus and economic profits in period t, then: - 
ýPý'Q1) 
= 
f(S1) (3.7) 
It is also assumed that profitability is a function of price and quantity in the prior period: 
(3.8) 
_dP, 
-I 
Qt-I) 
= 
(f (St-' )) 
= 
h(s, 
-') 
Since S, = 7c, + S, 
-I, equation 
(2.8) implies 
7c, = h(h-'(7, 
_, 
) + ßt_2) (3.9) 
when h is invertible. This is a second order difference equation in profits. 
When h is linear (h 
= aS + b), equation (3.9) becomes 
71t = 7c, + an, (3.10) 
This equation will generate a cycle when a<- 1/4, with a period of 
21t/cos-' (1/2 
-a). The value a= -1 yields a period of six years. 
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The individual firm's problem is to maximize the following objective function: 
Max J(7c, e) = PQ - C(Q) - e(Q, S) (3.11) 
where costs C(Q) satisfy C', C" > 0, and e(Q, S) is an increasing function of the 
probability of ruin. This objective function simply embodies the trade-off which the firm 
faces between the expected profits which may result from increased volume, versus the 
increased probability of ruin which may also result. The function e(Q, S) is not the 
probability of ruin, but is only the "dollar equivalent" of it. 
The specification is essentially behavioral in nature; i. e., showing just how much the firm 
values expected profits relative to the possibility of bankruptcy. It is assumed that 
äP/aQ > 0, ae/as < 0, and a2 /aQas < 0. This means that the probability of ruin 
increases with volume, declines with surplus, and that the marginal increase in the 
probability of ruin due to an increase in volume declines as surplus increases. 
Differentiating the objective function with respect to Q, the first order condition is 
(assuming price-taking firms): 
P= C'(Q) + 
ae(Q, S) (3.12) 
aQ 
The marginal profit is P- C'(Q), which is positive since aPlaQ > 0. The term 
aP/aQ is seen to represent the risk premium, and the condition ate/öQas <0 means 
that the risk premium declines as surplus increases. The second order condition 
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C"(Q + ä'e/öQ2 >0 is always satisfied when ä2 P/äQ2 > 0, which is also be 
assumed to be true. This assumption of a convex ruin function is justified by the 
presence of selective underwriting in these markets, in that an increase in the quantity of 
insurance sold requires a loosening of underwriting standards, and therefore raises the 
marginal increase in the probability of ruin due to an additional unit of business. 
Equation (3.12) is the supply function of the firm, which aggregates to form the market 
supply function. Equation (3.7) is the intersection of market supply with demand. 
Recall again the usual "story" told about the cycle, that when profits are high firms 
loosen underwriting standards and take on less desirable risks. However, whereas it is 
often asserted that firms' expectations (apparently incorrect) regarding the profitability of 
the business leads to the cycle, in the model developed, it is the improved financial 
position of firms, coinciding with increased profitability, which leads to the cycle. Since 
profits over the cycle are zero, the market is in long run equilibrium, so that capital 
movements which normally are of a long-term nature will not serve to mitigate the cycle. 
Although historically short-term capital movements have not been a factor, future 
institutional changes could allow this to become prevalent, resulting in the eventual 
elimination of the cycle. 
Winter (1994), Gron (1992,1994), and Cummins and Danzon (1992) show that, given 
limited liability and costs to raising external capital, sudden shocks to insurers' liabilities 
can generate price and quantity effects such as those observed over the insurance cycle. 
The "capacity constraint" theory posits that cycles are caused by impediments to capital 
flows that result in alternating periods of excessive and inadequate capacity in the 
industry. 
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According to this scenario, the underwriting cycle is most prominent on long-tail lines 
(usually liability lines) because forecasting horizons arc longer and anticipated investment 
income is more substantial for these lines. 
By joining the interest rate and capacity constrained models, Doherty and Garven (1995) 
provide a different empirical approach. Absent capacity effects, interest rate changes 
should produce changes in underwriting returns of the opposite sign. However, the 
capacity effects of the same interest rate changes will affect insurers differently according 
to the interest sensitivity of their asset and liability portfolios and according to 
differences in their respective costs of raising new capital. 
The first cross-sectional difference can be measured by asset and liability durations and 
the second difference by organizational factors such as ownership structure, size, 
whether public or privately traded, and so on. 
Since evidence for the insurance cycle is usually presented as a time series for 
underwriting returns, Doherty and Garven use the expected underwriting return in order 
to check the sensitivity of underwriting returns to interest rate changes. 
They show that the time series of underwriting returns could be explained simply from 
the spot equilibrium prices required to deliver to the insurer a fair rate of return on 
equity. By showing this, the notion that the cycle is a purely monetary phenomenon 
would be evident. In order to test this hypothesis, Doherty and Garven estimate 
equation (3.13) by using generalized least squares (GLS). 
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They use as an independent variable the average settlement delay, k, times the weighted 
average of monthly spot Treasury-bill rates (rather than daily rates that were unavailable 
over the entire period of their analysis, 1939-1988). 
rU, = « + «, (kra) + E, (3.13) 
The estimated slope coefficient exceeds negative unity and that is consistent with the 
presence of capacity constraints. However, the interpretation requires some caution since 
the data available for estimating the average settlement delay, k, were not ideal. 
In order to establish further evidence of the capacity constraints, the authors include a 
squared term, (kr1)2 
. 
The inclusion of the squared term was made in order to predict the 
different (asymmetric) responses to rising and falling interest rates. Responses to rising 
and falling interest rates are unlikely to be symmetric. As interest rates rise and bond 
prices fall, insurers are faced with the question of whether to float new equity. Raising 
new equity involves explicit transaction costs (e. g., underwriting fees) as well as the 
adverse selection costs arising from information asymmetry between insurance 
management and external investors. Similar transaction costs arise if the insurer responds 
not by raising equity but by increasing its ceded reinsurance. 
If the insurer finds itself under-leveraged due to a fall in interest rates, it is less costly to 
adjust to its desired capital structure. The distribution of equity through dividends is less 
costly than the raising of new issues. Similarly, the reduction in the net value of 
reinsurance ceded is likely to be less costly than an increase. The extreme case of 
asymmetry is the case of mutuals where the cost of raising capital in the short run (i. e. 
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above immediate earnings) is, theoretically, infinite. However, the mutual is perfectly free 
to distribute equity to its policyholders whenever it sees fit to do so. 
Thus, this asymmetry can be detected by including the aforementioned squared term as 
follows: 
' (3.14) 
where a, <0 and a, > 0. The results show evidence of this predicted asymmetry, 
with underwriting profit being significantly more responsive to falling rates than to rising 
rates. 
To provide a more rigorous test the authors turn to individual firm data in order to see 
whether cross-sectional differences in the responses of different firms to changing 
interest rates correlate with differences in equity duration and access to external capital. 
A two-pass regression procedure was adopted. In the first pass, the GLS regression 
described by the following equation was estimated for each of the firms in the sample: 
r.,, = a, ti + a,. 
(kr<<) +s it (3.15) 
where r., t 
is the period t underwriting return for firm j, and the term kr1, corresponds to 
the period t product of the average settlement delay and the annualized weighted average 
of monthly returns on 1-year Treasury bills in the year surrounding time t. 
In the absence of capacity constraints, the a,, coefficients in the first pass should not 
differ significantly from negative unity. 
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With differences in duration and differences in access to capital and reinsurance markets, 
however, there should be cross-sectional variation in the ali coefficients. Accordingly, 
the parameter estimates al, were then used in a second-pass OLS regression in order to 
test for cross-sectional differences in the responsiveness of a,, to a number of firm- 
specific variables. 
The second-pass equation was specified in the following manner: 
_ 
(3.16) 
; =t 
where 
X1 
= 
SIZE, natural logarithm of firm j's size, measured in terms of 
admitted assets; 
X, j = QDURj mean value of equity duration for firm j during the period 
1980-86; 
Z; j = REINS the slope coefficient determined from the OLS regression of 
the reinsurance variable against returns on 1-year Treasury 
bills; 
X4 
=PUBLIC 1 if firm j or its parent is a publicly traded stock corporation, 
or 0 otherwise; 
X5 
= 
PRIVATE, 1 if firm j or its parent is a privately held stock corporation, 0 
otherwise; 
Z6i 
= 
GROUP, 1 if firm j is an insurance group, 0 otherwise; 
X7 
= 
GROUPREi the product of GROUP, and REINS. 
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The results of the cross-sectional tests support the model. The model predicts that those 
firms for which changes in capital structure are most costly will exhibit greatest difficulty 
in adjusting to equilibrium prices following changes in interest rates. Firms with high 
equity duration and more costly access to reinsurance and capital markets will show the 
greatest frictional disturbances in their insurance prices following a change in interest 
rates. 
Overall, the time-series analysis that the authors employ confirms that cycles do seem to 
be dampened from the equilibrium path, which points to the presence of capacity 
constraints. Asymmetric responses to rising and falling interest rates provide further 
support for the presence of capacity constraints. The cross-sectional analysis revealed 
that price disturbances are more pronounced in those firms for which leverage 
adjustments are most costly. Specifically, firms with more costly access to new equity, or 
with less flexible access to reinsurance markets, show more evidence of frictions in 
responding to changing capital market changes. These results support the general class of 
capacity constrained models of insurance cycles. 
Grace and Hotchkiss (1995) provide evidence of a long-run link between the general 
economy and the insurance underwriting cycle as measured by the combined ratio. Time 
series methods are employed to examine the property-liability insurance industry to 
determine effects on the insurance cycle of external factors such as shocks to real 
income, inflation, and the short-term interest rate. 
By using cointcgration techniques, they estimate the long-run relationship between the 
general economy as measured by real gross domestic product, the short-term interest 
rate, and inflation on the underwriting cycle. To test the theory that the combined ratio 
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(the sum of the ratio of expenses before taxes to premiums written and the ratio of 
losses and loss adjustment expenses to premiums earned) is tied to the general business 
cycle in the long run, they test whether the combined ratio and real gross domestic 
product are cointegrated. Finding that the real gross domestic period and The combined 
ratio are cointegrated would suggest that (economic) factors arc at work tying the 
movement of the combined ratio cycle to a more wide-ranging national business cycle. 
Cointegration as an indicator of long-run relationships was introduced by Granger and 
Weiss (1983) and has been used extensively to examine a variety of relationships. In 
order to determine whether economic series are cointegrated, each series must be 
stationary. A series X, is said to be integrated of order one, I(1), if it is stationary in its 
first difference. By using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (r1DF) test, Grace and Hotchkiss 
determine whether the series are cointegrated. The results from cointegrating regressions 
between the combined ratio and each of the other three series (real GDP, short-term 
interest rate, and Consumer Price Indes) indicate that the combined ratio is cointegrated 
with each of the other series as well as all four series being cointegrated. Consequently, in 
the long run, the real gross domestic product, the combined ratio, the short-term interest 
rate, and the consumer price index to be tied together as there exist forces that tie the 
movement of the combined ratio with the movement of the national business cycle, the 
movement of short-term interest rates, and the movement of prices. This determination 
of cointegration indicates that an equilibrium relationship exists between the four series 
and that a more structured model should take the form of an error-correction model to 
account for this equilibrium relationship. 
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Grace and Hotchkiss use vector autoregression to allow the data to determine the 
dynamic structure of the relationship. The resulting vector autoregression specification 
took the form of an error-correction model: 
Y, = FY1 + Om, 
_, 
+ Gý, 
_ 
(3.17) 
where m, is the cointegrating regression residual, which controls for the pertinent 
information regarding the ability of the series to achieve long-run equilibrium. 
The estimated parameters showed a number of important relationships. The majority of 
the non-lagged regression parameters were not significant since most of the behavior 
seemed to be explained by past behavior. The coefficient of the error-correction term 
(me) represents the short-run dynamic behavior of the dependant variable. Taken 
together, the error-correction term's coefficients imply that the combined ratio, the 
short-term interest rate, and the consumer price index all respond in the short run to 
changes in the long-run relationship described in the cointegration regression, while real 
gross domestic product does not. However, due to the fact that the vector 
autoregression estimates are often difficult to interpret, the authors turned to impulse 
response functions to describe the behavior of the system. 
The impulse response function is used to simulate the impact of a shock to one of the 
series on the outcome of the other series included in the vector autoregression. The 
response was measured in terms of combined ratio standard deviations. Grace and 
Hotchkiss find that a shock to the real gross domestic product of one standard deviation 
initially causes the combined ratio to decline and then to increase before eventually dying 
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out. Shocks to the short-term interest rate and the consumer price index increase the 
combined ratio, whose response remained positive before dying out. 
These responses of the combined ratio to shocks in external factors have a number of 
interpretations. First, there is a pure income effect when real gross domestic product 
experiences a shock. A positive shock to real gross domestic product is interpreted as an 
increase in total income, leading to increased demand for all normal goods, thus 
increasing the revenue and profits in the property-liability industry. Second, since in a 
competitive market insurance premiums will reflect discounted expected losses, there is a 
direct and positive relationship between the competitively determined combined ratio 
and the interest rate. This is consistent with theory and empiricism (Cummins, 
Harrington and Klein, 1992). 
Finally, the response of the combined ratio to a shock in the consumer price index 
illustrates a number of possible effects. First, there is the direct effect of an increase on 
claim costs once policies are sold. Second, an increase in prices of other goods competes 
with insurance for expenditures. It is likely that the inflationary impact on claims 
expenses dominates the effect of increasing prices of other goods as the short-run 
demand for insurance is relatively price inelastic. The negative impact of a positive shock 
implies that the income effect dominates the substitution effect when the price of other 
goods increases. 
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3.5 Methodology and econometric considerations 
The time series of the economic data will receive a great deal of attention, particularly in 
regard to the stationarity of the data. A variable is said to be stationary if its mean and 
variance are constant over time and its covariance are functions only of-the lag length 
and not of time alone. More mathematically, the sequence Yt, t=1,2,... is stationary if 
E(Yt) = µ, var(Yt), and cov(Yt, Yt-s) = 6< for s >- 1. 
We say that a series is integrated of order k if it needs to be differenced k times to 
become stationary. Thus, if a variable Y, requires differencing once in order to achieve 
stationarity, then Y, is intergrated of order one, which is denoted Y, - I(1). The first 
difference of Y, denoted AY, = Y, - Y, 
-,, 
is therefore stationary and we may write 
AY, 
- 
1(0). The process Y1 is then said to contain a unit root. 
The most popular empirical test to detect the presence of non-stationarity in a time series 
is the Dickey-Fuller (DF) test. This is a test of the hypothesis ß=0 against the 
alternative ß<0 in the equation 
AYE 
= 
ßY, 
_, 
+ u, (3.18) 
where u, is a stationary random disturbance. Clearly, if ß=0, then AY, = u, which 
is stationary, and hence Y, - I(1). If ß>0, the process Y1 is explosive, but ß<0 
ensures that Y, - I(0), since Y, = (1 + ß)Yý_, + u, and (1 + (3) <1 in this case. 
The statistic used for testing the null hypothesis H : (3 =0 against the alternative 
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H, :ß<0 in equation (3.18) is the ratio t= p/o(Ji), where o(ß) denotes the 
standard error of P. Because Y, is non-stationary under the null hypothesis, this statistic 
no longer has the conventional t-distribution, and so the critical values derived by Fuller 
(1976) must be used. The DF test can also be conducted with a constant term and a time 
trend in equation (3.18), which in turn constitutes a different set of critical values. The 
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test includes lagged dependent variables in equation 
(3.18) in order to "whiten" the residuals and is also based on the usual t-statistic using 
the appropriate critical values in Fuller (1976). 
An important concept that arises from the modeling of integrated time series is that of 
co-integration. Consider a vector Xt of n random variables, each of which has been 
found to be I(k). These variables are said to be cointegrated if a linear combination of 
these variables is integrated of a lower order than k, that is, if a'Xt - I(k - b), where 
b? 1. The n-vector a is known as the cointegrating vector and provides information 
about the stable (long-term) relationship between the non-stationary elements of X1. In 
empirical investigations many economic time series have been found to be I(1), and so 
tests for co-integration focus on whether there exists a linear combination of the 
variables which is 1(0) (stationary). 
The results of the unit root testing for each coverage line are presented in Table 3.1. The 
Bayesian information criteria were used to determine the order of each equation. The 
results of the unit root tests partition the general insurance industry into two 
components 
- 
stationary and non-stationary. 
97 
Table 3.1 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests 
for 8 lines of General Insurance 
Stationary variables t-value N Lags 
Accident 
-3.2235 17 Level 
Marine 
-6.0415 17 Level 
Miscellaneous 
-17.9140 17 Level 
Third party 
-3.9273 17 Level 
Transport 
-10.2794 17 Level 
Sector 
-4.1563 17 Level 
Non-stationa, y variables t-value N Lags 
Aviation 
-4.3995 17 1 
Motor 
-3.6298 17 1 
Property 
-4.6360 17 1 
The test and analysis of UK underwriting cycle is performed in two stages. First, tests are 
performed to determine whether the underwriting cycle exists in UK and in different 
lines of business. In the second stage, we analyze the relationship between premium 
changes and market/institutional features of the country and the relationship between 
cycle period lengths and these same features. 
The first stage consists of estimating equation (3.1) using the annual aggregate and by- 
line underwriting profit margins as the dependent variables. The equations are estimated 
using ordinary least squares. The fitted line measures the long-term equilibrium path that 
exists between the variables. The deviations from the line (error terms) represent the 
short-term movements about equilibrium. Further, a linear trend variable t will be added 
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to equation (3.1) to control for the downward trend in expenses over time. However, as 
in Cummins and Outreville (1987), the resulting coefficient of this trend variable will not 
be discussed because it is just a control variable. The time frame of the test will be from 
1980 to 1998, as permitted by data availability. 
The strength of this model is that it can provide a simple yet formal way to identify the 
underwriting cycle. A caveat to this model is that it can also be applied under the 
assumptions of the Venezian-type hypothesis. Therefore, significant results obtained 
from this model can only prove the existence of a cyclical behaviour. The causes of the 
behaviour cannot be distinguished. The period of the cycle, if a cycle is observed, is 
estimated from equation (3.2). Independent regressions are run for each line of business 
for which data are available. 
After establishing the presence of underwriting cycles in the market, we investigate the 
causes of the underwriting cycle under the rational expectations /institutional 
intervention hypothesis. We examine the relationship between premium changes and the 
variables associated with this hypothesis (Lamm-Tennant and Weiss, 1997). 
Underwriting cycles in the United States have been associated with wide swings in 
insurance prices or premiums from year to year. If losses really are exogeneous, then the 
manifestation of the underwriting cycle would be linked directly to premiums such that 
the variables hypothesized to determine underwriting cycles will act directly through 
premium changes. In fact, previous research on underwriting cycles attempts to 
determine whether cost-related factors can explain premium changes (e. g. Cummins, 
Harrington, and Klein, 1992). For example, premiums are affected by discount rates 
since discounted expected losses are incorporated in the premium. Premiums will be 
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directly affected also by the cost (and supply) of capital, while data used to determine 
premiums (specifically expected losses) incorporate directly any lags attributable to 
regulation, data collection, and accrual accounting (i. e., the smoothing of earned 
premiums and incurred losses over adjacent years). As such, a pooled cross-section time 
series will be estimated. 
The specification of the generalized least squares (GLS) equation is as follows: 
OP, 
=a+ß, OLoss,, + ß, OLoss,, + ß30L oss3 
,+s, 
(3.19) 
where 
AP'. ln(Premiums \vritten), 
- 
In (Premiums written), 
-I 
. 
ALoss, 
t: 
ln(Claims paid), 
_, 
- 
ln(Claims paid)1_2 
Loss, 
,: 
In(Claims paid), 
-, 
- 
ln(Claims pvd)t_3 
ALoss3, 
t: 
1n(Claims paid), 
-3 - 
1n(Claims paid) t-4 
st: a random error term 
All in all, equations (3.17), (3.18), and (3.19) will be estimated for the general insurance 
industry as a whole. The by-line results of each sector will also be estimated as they are 
essentially more meaningful and desirable (Lamm-Tennant and Weiss, 1997). 
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3.6 Empirical results 
Table 3.2 summarises the cycle periods for UK general insurance business and five major 
lines. The cycle periods estimated from the underwriting profits ranges from 4.1082 years 
for the third party liability lines to 5.1295 years for the accident & health lines. In general, 
the results suggest that the underwriting cycles are present in all lines. 
Table 3.2 
Cycle periods by line of insurance, 1980 through 1998 
Line a, a, a' + 4a, Period R-Bar-squared 
Sector 1.1770 
-0.7414 -1.5803 4.8694 0.69371 
(5.5819) (-3.3864) 
Accident & Health 0.8741 
-0.5051 -1.2563 5.1295 0.41718 
(3.3623) (-1.9664) 
Marine 1.4447 
-0.7470 -0.9007 4.2113 0.83802 
(7.1634) (-3.6742) 
Miscellaneous 1.1791 
-0.6318 -1.1370 4.6304 0.62393 
(4.7256) (-2.4065) 
Third party 1.1274 
-0.4319 -0.4567 4.1082 0.61406 
(4.0864) (-1.5369) 
Transport 1.3247 
-0.7093 -1.0822 4.4359 0.73540 
(5.6586) (-2.6935) 
To examine the causes of the underwriting cycle under the rational 
expectations/institutional intervention hypothesis, we performed the tests for the sector 
and for all lines separately. Table 3.3 presents the results of the generalized least squares 
regression analysis of equation (3.19) for years 1980 through 1998. The results are based 
on overall premium changes for the UK market and for the five lines of business. These 
lines were included in the analysis so that we can investigate whether the independent 
variables affect the premium changes of different lines differently. 
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Table 3.3 
Results of the Generalized Least Squares Regression Analysis 
Variable Expected 
sign 
Sector Accident Marine 111isc Third 
party 
Transport 
Intercept N. A. 
-0.1447 -0.2102 -0.1653 -0.19613 -0.0306 -0.077972 
(-7.7579) (-7.0337) (-4.5461) (-3.2135) (0.44083) (-3.2782) 
. 
Loss 
t 
+ 0.4048 0.3575 0.1121 
-0.02006 0.1588 0.15849 
(2.2904) (2.2969) (0.70233) (0.1024) (0.62685) (1.1120) 
OL. oss, t 
+ 
-0.2118 0.0529 0.0341 -0.00215 -0.2688 0.086289 
(-0.93153) (0.29964) (0.16211) (-0.0108) (-0.86276) (0.42497) 
ALoss31 + 0.2349 
-0.0216 0.6959 0.07920 -0.4802 0.27102 
(1.4332) (0.11855) (3.6712) (0.44616) (-1.5616) (1.4137) 
R-bar 0.3557 0.4669 0.6007 0.28547 0.3063 0.23196 
squared 
The results reported in Table 3.3 show that changes in the overall premium level are 
significantly related to the changes in one-year lagged losses. Similarly, the changes in the 
premiums of the Accident & Health business are significantly related to the changes of 
one-year lagged losses, while changes in the Marine premiums are only significantly 
related to the three-year lagged losses. The explanatory power of the model for the 
aggregate premiums is about thirty five percent and for the by-line premiums ranges 
from twenty five percent to sixty percent. 
Generally, the results of our study are rather different from the results of Lamm-Tennant 
and gleiss (1997). For example, variables like changes in the one- and two-year lagged 
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losses are significant in their study but are generally less so in our study. We use the 
underwriting profits from the UK general business to verify the correctness of the length 
of the cycle period calculated. Figure 3.1 plots the trend of the underwriting profits of 
the UK general insurance industry from 1980 to 1998. The cycles are 1980_to 1985,1986 
to 1991, and 1992 to 1996 respectively, which gives a cycle length of 5 years. This is very 
consistent with the cycle period of 4.8694 calculated for the market using equations (3.1) 
and (3.2). This proves that the methodology proposed by Cummins and Outreville 
(1987) to determine the existence of the cycle and cycle period is fairly accurate and 
acceptable. 
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Among the five major lines tested in UK, all of them exhibit a cycle (Table 3.3). The 
cycle length is very similar to that of the overall insurance business and ranges between 
4.1082 years (for Third Party Liability line) and 5.1295 years (for Accident & Health line). 
The explanatory power of the model based on the aggregate sector data and the 
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individual lines is good. The R-squared ranges from 0.417 for Accident & Health to 
0.735 for Transport. 
3.7 Conclusions 
The main objective of this study is to investigate the presence and causes of the 
underwriting cycle in the United Kingdom and reveals several interesting findings. 
First, the results of the second-order autoregressive model largely support the existence 
of the underwriting cycle in the UK because underwriting cycles are found in the 
aggregate sector and all the lines that were tested. 
Second, the analysis of premium changes provides some support for the rational 
expectations/institutional intervention hypothesis although it is not able to gather 
enough evidence for the hypothesis that composite data collection, regulatory, policy 
renewal and accounting lags (Cummins and Outreville, 1987) have caused the 
underwriting cycle. 
Third, the results generally differ from those found for the developed countries by 
Lamm-Tennant and Weiss (1997). This could be due partly to the fact that economic 
developments in these countries are different from the UK. It could also be due partly to 
the different level of regulatory control prevailing in these countries. 
As UK is deemed to continue as the largest insurance and reinsurance financial centre, 
our findings pertaining to the underwriting cycle in UK would be useful to the existing 
insurers as well as those seeking to invest in the UK insurance market. One of the 
important findings from this study for the existing insurers and prospective entrants is 
that although the underwriting cycle does exist in the UK, the causes of it are different 
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from those found in other countries. Therefore, they should take into account the 
differences when they enact measures to circumvent the detrimental effects of the 
underwriting cycle in the UK. 
One of the shortcomings of this study is that, due to the lack of data and information, 
the analysis of premium changes is not able to provide support for the hypothesis that 
the underwriting cycle is caused by the institutional lags as advocated by Cummins and 
Outreville (1987). Further, since only five lines of the insurance industry are included in 
this study, future research can extend the underwriting cycle test and analysis of premium 
changes to more lines when data are available. The cycle length of each line could be 
further analysed by using the cycle period analysis model proposed by Lamm-Tennant 
and Weiss (1997). Future research in this area could be particularly interesting if there are 
differences in the institutional structure and regulatory oversight of the industry in the 
UK. 
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CHAPTER 4 
COST OF CAPITAL AND CREDIT RISK 
IN THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY 
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4.1 Introduction 
Over the past decade, financial institutions have developed and implemented a variety of 
sophisticated models in order to capture the market risk in their transactions. Much more 
recently, important steps were taken towards the modelling of credit risk faced by these 
institutions. Many institutions have applied the tools of financial engineering to the 
problems of credit risk management. New and powerful techniques have been developed 
to estimate the credit exposures of individual financial transactions and of entire 
portfolios, to incorporate credit risk into the pricing of different instruments, and to 
manage credit risk efficiently by separating it from other risks and selectively transferring 
it to other institutions. 
Historically, credit risk analysis is an expert system that relies, above all, on the subjective 
judgement of trained professionals. However, the detection of company operating and 
financial difficulties is a subject which has been particularly susceptible to financial ratio 
analysis. Traditional credit scoring systems can be found in virtually all types of credit 
analysis. The idea is essentially the same: pre-identify certain key factors that determine 
the probability of default and combine or weight them into a quantitative score. In some 
cases, the score can be used as a classification system: it places a potential borrower into 
either a good or a bad group, based on a score and a cut-off point. 
Tools from statistics and operations research, such as survival analysis, neural networks, 
mathematical programming, deterministic and probabilistic simulation, and game theory, 
have all contributed to the progress in credit risk measurement. Financial and option 
pricing theories have been extensively used in the construction of appropriate models. 
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The ability to classify and identify financial distress is important to regulators, legislators, 
shareholders, auditors, and even the general public. Moreover, insolvency prediction and 
credit risk models can help in identifying whether a company is in danger of failing and 
can also help auditors and regulators decide whether the company is a "going concern". 
Classic credit analysis, a system carefully nurtured by banks over many years and at great 
expense, provides a model that non-bank financial institutions continue to emulate. To 
that extent, fund managers and insurance companies that lack core credit skills turn to 
bankers to supply the missing expertise. Moreover, insurance regulators, following the 
path of banking regulation, have established certain risk-based capital (RBC) standards in 
order to provide a cushion against unexpected increases in liabilities and decreases in the 
value of assets. 
Credit risk models are important today because they provide the decision maker with 
insight or knowledge that would not otherwise be readily apparent or that could be 
marshaled only at prohibitive cost. In a marketplace where margins are fast disappearing 
and the pressure to lower costs is unrelenting, models give their users a competitive edge. 
In any large financial institution that has a wide variety of exposures, operates in many 
geographic regions, and has a large and varied workforce, quantitative models can inject a 
useful degree of objectivity. Moreover, credit risk models are also used to assist in 
releasing the value of financial assets that would otherwise be hidden from equity 
investors. Since structured finance products reallocate credit risk in such a way that the 
subordinated pieces offer a combination of equity risk and equity return, credit risk 
models may be used in the stratification or construction of such portfolios. 
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4.2 Early credit risk research 
In recent decades, a number of objective, quantitative systems for scoring credits have 
been developed. In univariate accounting-based credit-scoring systems, the credit analyst 
compares various key accounting ratios. The univariate approach enables an analyst 
starting an inquiry to determine whether a particular ratio differs markedly from the 
norm for its industry. In reality, however, the unsatisfactory level of one ratio is 
frequently mitigated by the strength of some other measure. A firm, for example, may 
have a poor profitability ratio but an above-average liquidity ratio. Another limitation of 
the univariate approach is the difficulty of making trade-offs between such weak and 
strong ratios. 
Although univariate models are still in use today in many institutions, most academics 
and an increasing number of practitioners seem to disapprove of ratio analysis as a 
means of assessing the performance of a business enterprise. Many respected theorists 
downgrade the arbitrary rules of thumb (such as company ratio comparisons) that are 
widely used by practitioners and favour instead the application of more rigorous 
statistical techniques. In some respects, however, these latter techniques should be 
viewed as a refinement of traditional ratio analysis rather than as a radical departure from 
it. 
One of the classic studies of ratio analysis and bankruptcy was performed by Beaver 
(1967). Beaver found that a number of indicators could discriminate between matched 
samples of failed and non-failed firms for as long as five years prior to failure. In a 
subsequent study, Deakin (1972) utilised the same 14 variables that Beaver analysed but 
applied them within a series of multivariate discriminant models. Although Deakin 
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achieved a high classification accuracy in the development sample (more than 95 percent 
for the first three years prior to failure) there was substantial deterioration in the 
classification accuracy in the hold-out sample one year prior. The significance of this 
finding is that it is premature to conclude from test results from a development sample 
that a valid empirical relationship has been detected. 
In general, ratios measuring profitability, liquidity, and solvency appeared to be the most 
significant indicators in univariate studies. The order of their importance was unclear, 
however, because almost every study cited a different ratio as the most effective indicator 
of impending problems. An appropriate extension of the univariate studies, was to build 
upon the findings by combining several measures into a meaningful predictive model. 
Altman's Z-score model was a multivariate approach built on the values of both ratio- 
level and categorical univariate measures (Altman, 1968). These values are combined and 
weighted to produce a measure (a credit risk score) that best discriminates between firms 
that fail and those that do not. Such a measure is possible because failing firms exhibit 
ratios and financial trends that are very different from those of companies that are 
financially sound. 
The Z-score model was constructed using multiple discriminant analysis (NIDA), a 
multivariate technique that analyses a set of variables to maximise the between-group 
variance while minimising the within-group variance. This is typically a sequential 
process in which the analyst includes or excludes variables based on various statistical 
criteria. It should be noted that if the groups are not very different at the univariate level, 
a multivariate model will not be able to add much discriminatory power. 
110 
Discriminant analysis provides a procedure for assigning sample cases to predetermined 
populations and then determining the accuracy of the classification procedure. Assuming 
that the status of a firm is a function of multivariate normal variables allows tests for 
significance between group mean-profiles. Additionally, if the variances of the financial 
variables of the distressed firms equal the variances of the financial variables of the 
solvent firms, and if the covariances between the financial variables of both groups are 
also equal, a linear classification model is optimal. 
When discriminant analysis is used to classify companies into groups, correct 
classification may be due to three different factors: 
1. Real differences between groups; 
2. Sampling errors; and 
3. Intensive search for the variables that give the best results for the sample used. 
The objective of validating the discriminant model is to determine that the results are 
due to real differences between group means. Initially a discriminant function is 
constructed which combines a set of variables in such a manner as to maximise the 
differences between two group means, and that minimises the likelihood of 
misclassification. The original discriminant function is: 
Z= V1X1 + Vet, + 
... 
+ VXn (4.1) 
where V1, V2,..., VV, are the discriminant coefficients and 1,, X2,..., 1,, are the 
independent variables. 
To arrive at a final profile of variables, the following procedures are utilised: 
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(a) Observation of the statistical significance of various alternative functions, including 
determination of the relative contributions of each independent variable; 
(b) Evaluation of inter-correlations among the relevant variables; 
(c) Observation of the predictive accuracy of the various profiles; and 
(d) Judgement of the analyst. 
From the original list of 22 variables, the final Z-score model chosen was the following 
5-variable model: 
Z=1.21, + 1.41, + 3.3X3 + 0.6X4 + 0.9991; (4.2) 
where 
_ 
Working Capital 
X' 
Total Assets 
X, 
Retained Earnings 
Total Assets 
_ 
Earnings before interest and Taxes ý; 
Total Assets 
Market value of equity 
and 4 Book value of total liabilities 
Sales 
X5 
= Total Assets 
The Z-score model's overall classification accuracy was 95 percent one year before 
bankruptcy on the development sample, and 82 percent two years before. Classification 
accuracy is one of the outputs examined in ascertaining whether a model will perform 
well in practice. This accuracy is expressed as Type I error (the accuracy with which the 
model identified failed firms as weak) and Type II error (the accuracy with which the 
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model identified healthy firms as such). Overall accuracy is a combination of Type I and 
Type II errors. Generally, Type I error is viewed as more important than Type II error, 
because the inability to identify a failing company will cost far more than the opportunity 
cost of rejecting a healthy company as a potential failure. 
Because the results based on the development sample suffer from sample bias, secondary 
sample testing is extremely important. One type of testing is to estimate parameters for 
the model using only a subset of the original sample and then classify the remainder of 
the sample based on the parameters established. A simple t-test is then applied to test the 
significance of the results. Five different replications of the suggested method of 
choosing subsets (16 firms) of the original sample were tested. The five replications 
include: 
(a) Random sampling; 
(b) Choosing every other firm, starting with the first firm; 
(c) The same test, but starting with the second firm; 
(d) Choosing firms 1 through 16; and 
(e) Choosing firms 17 through 32. 
All the results showed that the discrimination function was statistically significant. 
Additional tests using secondary samples (completely independent of the development 
sample) were performed. Type II errors ranged from 15 to 20 percent in the secondary 
samples. 
In order to score privately held companies, Altman (1993) revised the original Z-score 
model by substituting book value for market value when calculating the ratio X4. He 
arrived at the following Z' 
-score model: 
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Z' 
= 
0.717X1 + 0.847X, + 3.107X3 + 0.42014 + 0.998X5 (4.3) 
The univariate F-test for the book value of X4 is lower than the level of the market 
value, but the scaled vector results show that the revised book value measure was still the 
third most important contributor. Indeed, the order of importance (i. e., X 1)1, , X5 , X4 , 
and 1, ) was retained in the private firm model. 
In 1977, Altman, Haldeman, and Narayanan (1977) presented a second-generation model 
with several enhancements to the original Z-score approach. Their purpose was to 
construct a measure that explicitly reflected recent developments involving business 
failure. Because the average size of bankrupt firms has increased dramatically, the new 
study focused on larger firms, with an average of $100 million in assets two years prior to 
failure. In addition, the new study reflected the most recent changes in financial 
reporting standards and accepted accounting practices. It also incorporated refinements 
in discriminant statistical techniques. 
The new model, which was named ZETA, was effective in classifying bankrupt 
companies up to five years prior to failure, with over 90 percent accuracy one year prior 
and over 70 percent accuracy up to five years prior to failure. The inclusion of retailing 
firms in the same model as manufacturers did not appear to affect the results negatively. 
Twenty seven variables were selected for inclusion in the analysis, based on their 
widespread use in credit analysis. The variables were classified as measures of 
profitability, coverage and other earnings relative to leverage, liquidity, capitalisation 
ratios, earnings variability, and miscellaneous. 
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The model not only classified the test sample well but also proved the most reliable in 
various validation procedures. These are its seven variables: 
¢ Return on assets, measured by earnings before interest and taxes / total assets. 
¢ Stability of earnings, indicated by a normalised measure of the standard error of 
estimate around a 5- to 10-year trend in X1. 
Debt service, measured by the familiar interest coverage ratio, that is, earnings before 
interest and taxes / total interest payments. 
i Cumulative profitability, measured by the firm's retained earnings (balance sheet / 
total assets). 
Liquidity, measured by the familiar current ratio. 
Capitalisation, measured by common equity 7 total capital. 
. Size, measured by the logarithm of the firm's total assets. 
When ZETA was developed, the ratios that were included in the model were carefully 
chosen as ones that would not be expected to change over time. With respect to their 
ability to identify distressed companies, table 4.1 shows the means and F ratios of the 
model variables in the development sample, and the same ratios for 480 bankruptcies 
over the period 1981-1993 compared with randomly paired companies that did not fail. 
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Table 4.1 
ZETA Ratio Statistics 
Development Sample (1977) and 1981-1993 Sample 
1977 data 1981-1993 data 
Non- Non- 
Bankrupt bankrupt Bankrupt bankrupt 
group group group group 
Variable mean mean F ratio mean mean F ratio 
Return on assets 
-0.0055 0.1117 54.3 -0.08223 0.09253 316.36 
Stability of earnings 1.6870 5.7840 33.8 0.88471 3.83302 247.28 
Debt service 0.9625 1.1620 26.1 0.87261 1.09928 156.72 
Cumulative 
profitability 
-0.0006 0.2935 114.6 -0.21484 0.21139 559.55 
Liquidity 1.5757 2.6040 38.2 1.13783 2.20532 190.48 
Capitalisation 0.4063 0.6210 31.0 0.47803 0.58502 44.69 
Size 1.9854 2.2220 5.5 1.63024 2.01598 40.07 
Source: ZETA Services, Inc. 
It is seen that the ratios continue to demonstrate consistency and contrast between failed 
firms and non-failed firms. The ratio means are of the same order of magnitude, and the 
F ratio continues to be statistically significant at the 0.001 level for all of the variables. F 
ratios in the latter period are much higher, which reflects the much greater sample size 
(480 vs. 53 in 1977). 
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4.3 Credit risk research in the insurance area 
Early studies on financial distress in the property-liability industry lacked methodological 
and statistical verification and were mostly descriptive (Denenberg, 1967; Evans, 1968; 
Nelson, 1971). Also, Kenny's (1967) tests, such as the surplus ratio ("2 for 1" rule) and 
other measures of performance, were criticised as "rules of thumb". 
Following the path of studies in the other types of corporations, a number of empirical 
studies have compared statistical models that use insurers' financial data to predict 
insolvencies in the property-liability insurance industry. 
Trieschmann and Pinches (1973), using MDA, performed the first study on predicting 
financially distressed property-liability insurers. In the case of property-liability insurance 
firms, the objective is to classify them by using a set of reasonably independent financial 
variables into groups called distressed and solvent. In their study, discriminant analysis 
was employed to classify property-liability insurance firms into one of two groups 
- 
distress or solvent 
- 
based on their financial characteristics. In this study, the 
discriminant model identified that the variables which discriminate and identify the 
insurance firms with a high potential for financial distress were: 
i The Agents Balances / Total Assets ratio 
i The Stocks-Cost (preferred and common) / Stocks-Market (preferred and common) 
ratio 
i The Bonds-Cost / Bonds-Market ratio 
The Loss Adjustment Expenses Paid + Underwriting Expenses Paid / Net 
Premiums Written ratio 
The Combined ratio 
117 
The Premiums Walritten Direct / Surplus ratio 
In order to determine the relative contribution of each variable to the final multivariate 
model, they adjusted the discrminant coefficients for differences in the units of measure 
of the original variables. This analysis showed that the Agents Balances / Total Assets 
ratio was the most important variable followed by the Premiums Walritten Direct / 
Surplus ratio. 
Pinches and Trieschmann (1974) used the same sample to examine the efficiency of 
univariate versus multivariate financial ratio models for solvency surveillance. The MDA 
outperformed the univariate models in identifying financially distressed insurers. Cooley 
(1975), using prior probabilities for populations of solvent and insolvent firms, as well as 
the relative misclassification costs in prediction, found the impact of both to be 
substantial. 
In a subsequent study, Pinches and Trieschmann (1977) examined the impact of three 
separate factors influencing classification results obtained from discriminant analysis 
- 
multivariate normality, equality of the variance/ covariance matrices and misclassification 
error rates 
- 
by using data from their previous study (1973). They also illustrated that 
many different results are possible from the same hIDA model. They examined the six 
variables that found they discriminate and identify the insurance firms with a high 
potential for financial distress for both univariate and multivariate normality. They found 
that the distributions for five of the six variables employed were skewed to the right, and 
all six of the variable distributions are leptokurtic (more peaked with higher tails than a 
normal distribution). Since the data were not univariate normal, they obviously could not 
be considered to be multivariate normal. 
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Furthermore, in order to test for the equality of the variance/covariance matrices, a 
x2 statistic was employed. The conclusion was that the two dispersion matrices were not 
equal. The next step was to employ a quadratic classification procedure instead of the 
linear rule. The result was that the linear rule did slightly better overall. The result was 
that linear and quadratic rules could produce significantly different classification results 
that are directly related to the differences in the dispersion matrices, the number of 
predictor variables, and the separation between the two groups. 
Finally, in order to test for any classification error rates, they employed the jack-knife 
procedure. The essence of this procedure is to omit each observation sequentially, 
calculate a classification function based on the remaining N-1 observations, and then 
classify the omitted observation. They found that the percentages for both the linear and 
the quadratic rule dropped, but the results from their previous analysis were also upward 
biased, so the actual probability of misclassification should have been between 
reclassification results and jack-knife results. 
The Best's ratings were also viewed as surrogates for degrees of insolvency. Harmelink 
(1974) used MIDA to predict the degree of insolvency among property-liability firms as 
measured by a decline in Best's policyholder's ratings. After eliminating the highly 
correlated variables and classifying the financial ratios into groups such as performance 
ratios, debt-related ratios, asset-liquidity ratios and turnover ratios, he found that a 
combination of seven variables was discriminating better than any larger set of variables. 
The seven variables were: 
1. Net income to total assets 
2. Combined loss and expense ratio 
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3. Cash and investment assets to total liabilities 
4. Net worth to net premiums earned 
5. Total assets to net premiums earned 
6. Investment income to total assets 
7. Organization type (stock or mutual) 
The reported results indicated that multiple discriminant analysis was an effective 
technique in predicting the event of interest, at least up to 4 years in advance of the event 
(by the fifth year prior to the decline in rating, the results were no longer significant). 
Ambrose and Seward (1988) incorporated Best's general policyholder rating and financial 
size rating with variables created from a firm's readily available financial information. The 
rating variables were then used to alter the prior probabilities of classification under 
multivariate linear discriminant analysis. They found that the insolvency prediction 
abilities of Best's ratings and sets of financial ratios were statistically equivalent. Their 
results validated the practice of evaluating insurer health using Best's ratings. They also 
found that the predictive ability could be improved by using a two-stage prior probability 
approach. In the first stage, MDA analysis based on Best's ratings is used in order to 
determine the levels of Type I and II errors. In the second stage, these levels are used as 
the prior probabilities of solvency when classifying the same sample on the basis of the 
set of financial ratios. 
However, a number of issues need to be raised here. Most studies in the property-liability 
industry have used MDA while ignoring its potential problems, which include violation 
of the normal distribution assumptions on the variables, unequal covariance matrices, 
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and the lack of a screening-out procedure for insignificant variables through significant 
tests on the single-univariate coefficients (thus, standard t-tests of significance are not 
applicable). 
Moreover, the model is linear whereas the path to bankruptcy may be highly non-linear 
(the relationship between the Xi's is likely to be non-linear as well). Second, the model is 
essentially based on accounting ratios. In most countries, accounting data appear only at 
discrete intervals (e. g., quarterly) and are generally based on historic or book value 
accounting principles. It is also questionable whether such models can pick up a firm 
whose condition is rapidly deteriorating (e. g., in the recent Asian crisis). Indeed, as the 
world becomes more complex and competitive, the predictability of simple Z-score 
models may worsen. A good example is Brazil. When fitted in the mid-1970's the Z- 
score model did a quite good job of predicting default even two or three years prior to 
bankruptcy (Altman, Baidya, and Dias, 1977). However, more recently, even with low 
inflation and greater economic stability, this type of model has performed less well as the 
Brazilian economy has become more and more open (Sanvicente and Bader, 1996). 
The insurance regulatory information system (IRIS), developed by the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) during the 1970s, classifies insurers 
with four or more of eleven financial ratios outside of specified ranges as priority firms 
for immediate regulatory scrutiny. Thornton and Meador (1977) concluded that the IRIS 
tests were not reliable indicators for insolvency prediction. Hershbarger and Miller 
(1986) used MDA to examine the ability of the IRIS ratios to discriminate between 
sound, priority, and insolvent insurers. They concluded that the IRIS test includes a 
121 
number of ratios that have very little ability to distinguish between solvent and insolvent 
companies. 
The NAIC also calculates a broader set of ratios known as the Financial Analysis and 
Tracking System (FAST) and recently adopted risk-based capital standards for both 
property-liability and life insurers. This system consists of a series of ratios that are 
multiplied by various balance sheet and income statement variables to compute risk- 
based capital "charges" for the principal risks facing insurers. The sum of the charges, 
reduced by a covariance adjustment, equals the insurer's risk-based capital. Grace, 
Harrington, and Klein (1993) find that, although the ratio of actual capital to RBC is 
negatively and significantly related to the probability of subsequent failure, relatively few 
companies that later failed had ratios of actual capital to RBC within the NAIC's ranges 
for regulatory action. Cummins, Harrington, and Klein (1995) confirm that the predictive 
accuracy of the RBC ratio is very low, even when the components of the ratio, rather 
than the overall ratio, are used as predictors. They have also reported that predictive 
power can be significantly improved by adding controls for insurer size and 
organizational form. 
Eck (1982) employed a regression model in order to detect the financial distress of 
insurance firms. The regression results pointed out that the failed firm was characterised 
by high commissions, salaries, and dividends, low underwriting expenditures, poor 
receivables management, and underwriting losses. The test for the 
relative importance of the variables that were used in the analysis, showed that the 
combined ratio was the most important variable and the written premiums / net worth 
ratio was the least important. This reinforces the idea that loss reserve should not be 
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disregarded but that other financial factors (such as underwriting expenses and agents' 
balances) should also be considered. 
Harrington and Nelson (1986) employed another regression-based methodology to 
detect firms in financial distress. The procedure was based on the notion that equilibrium 
in the property-liability insurance market is likely to involve a tradeoff between the 
amount of insurance written relative to surplus and the risk of insurer investment and 
underwriting activities. If so, a systematic relationship is likely between premium-to- 
surplus ratios and insurer asset mix, product mix, and other charactcris tics. If a 
systematic relationship exists between premium-to-surplus ratios 
and insurer operating and financial characteristics, insurers that deviate from the 
estimated relationship may have higher or lower default probabilities than the average 
firm with similar characteristics. The regression results showed a significant positive 
relationship between premium volume and premium-to-surplus ratios and a strong 
negative relationship between preMiUm-to-surplus ratios and the proportion of admitted 
assets represented by common stocks. However, the small number of insolvent insurers 
analysed obviously prevents firm conclusions concerning the potential value of the 
method as a solvency surveillance tool. 
Powers (1995) employed a diffusion process to model insurer net worth and replaced the 
traditional emphasis on the probability of ruin with the use of a more general concept, 
the expected discounted cost of insolvency (EDCI). The EDCl is applied to the problem 
of constructing the regulator's objective function, where it represents a component of 
the expected present value of all future flows of funds for the equity owners and policy 
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owners of the insurer. This objective function is then used to solve for the optimal rate 
of return and the optimal loss-to-net worth ratio. 
Kim, Anderson, Amburgcy, and Hickman (1995) used event history analysis to examine 
insurer insolvencies. The rate of insolvency of prop erty-fiability insurers specified by 
using an exponential model. For prop crty-liability insurers, statistically significant factors 
with consistent signs in various versions of the exponential model included 
organizational age, premium growth, investment yields, underwriting results, expense 
ratios, loss reserve exposure, and realized and unrealized capital gains. 
4.4 Recent developments in credit risk research 
Arguably, the recent application of non-linear methods such as neural networks to credit 
risk analysis shows promise of improving on the older vintage credit-scoring models. 
Rather than assurning there is only a linear and direct effect from the Xi variables on Z 
(the credit score), or, in the language of neural networks, from the input layer to the 
output layer, neural networks allow for additional explanatory power via complex 
correlations or interactions among the Xi variables (many of which are non-linear). 
Yet, neural networks pose many problems to financial economists. How many additional 
hidden correlations should be included? It is entirely possible that a large neural network, 
including large N non-linear transformations of sums of the Xi variables, can reduce 
Type I and II errors of a historic loan database close to zero. However, as is well known, 
this creates the problem of "over- fitting": a model that explains well in-sample may 
perform quite poorly in predicting out-of-sample. Finally, the issue of economic meaning 
is probably what troubles financial economists the most. For example, there is a problem 
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raised when trying to explain the economic meaning of an exponentially transformed 
sum of the leverage ratio and the sales-to-total-assets ratio. 
The option pricing work of Black, Scholes, and Merton neatly has also been extensively 
used in the credit risk modelling area. junior and senior capital structure- claims can be 
understood as options. Thus, one can determine the value of a firm's equity by reference 
to the underlying market value of the firm. 
KNIA" Corporation (1995) has created an approach for estimating the default probability 
of a firm that is based conceptually on Merton's (1974) approach. In three steps, it 
determ. mes the expected default frequency (EDF) measure for a company. In the first 
step, the market value and volatility of the firm are estimated from the market value of its 
stock, the volatility of its stock, and the book value of its liabilities. In the second step, 
the firm's default point is calculated from the firm's liabilities. Also, an expected firm 
value is determined from the current firm value. Using these two values plus the firm's 
volatility, a measure is constructed that represents the number of standard deviations 
frorn the expected firm value to the default point (the distance to default). Finally, a 
mapping is daermined between the distance to default rate, based on the historical 
default experience of companies with different distance-to-default values. In the case of 
private companies, for which stock price and default data are generally unavailable, KAIV 
uses essentially the same approach by estimating the value and volatility of the private 
firm directly from its observed characteristics and accounting data. These estimates, 
however, are based on public company data. 
Because an EDF score reflects information signals transmitted ftom equity markets, it 
might be argued that the model is likely to work best in highly efficient equity markets 
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conditions and might not work well in many emerging markets. This argument ignores 
the fact that many thinly traded stocks are those of relatively closely held companies. 
Thus, major trades by "insiders", such as sales of large blocks of shares (and thus, major 
movements in a firm's stock price), may carry powerful informational signals about the 
future prospects of the firm. 
In sum, the option pricing approach to bankruptcy prediction has a number of strengths. 
First, it can be applied to any public company. Second, by being based on stock market 
data rather than "historic" book value accounting data, it is fonvard-looking. Third, it has 
strong theoretical underpinnings; because it is a "structural model" based on the modern 
theory of corporate finance and options, where equity is viewed as a call option on the 
assets of a firm. 
Against these strengths are some weaknesses. First, it is difficult to construct theoretical 
EDFs without the assumption of normality of asset returns. Second, private firms' EDFs 
can be calculated only by using some comparability analysis based on accounting data 
and other obsenable characteristics of the firm. FinaUy, it is "static" in that the Merton 
model assumes that once management puts a debt structure in place, it leaves it 
unchanged 
- 
even if the value of a firm's assets has doubled. As a result, the Merton 
model cannot capture the behaviour of those firms that seek to maintain a constant or 
target leverage ratio across time. 
Another approach in identifying and quantifying the credit risk that is faced by a firm is 
J. P. Morgan's CreditMetrics (1997). CrcditNlctrics was introduced in 1997 as a value at 
risk (VAR) framework to apply to the valuation and risk of non-tradable assets such as 
loans and privately placed bonds. While RiskMetrics, which was developed by the same 
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company, seeks to answer the question: "If tomorrow is a bad day, how much will I lose 
on tradable assets such as stocks, bonds, and equities? ", CreditMetrics asks: "If next year 
is a bad year, how much will I lose on my loans and loan portfolio? ". This methodology 
can be extended to any type of financial claims as recelVables, loan commitments, 
financial letters of credit for which we can derive easily the forward value of the risk 
horizon, for all credit ratings. 
However, because loans are not publicly traded, we observe neither the loan's market 
value nor the volatility of the loan value over the horizon of interest. By using available 
data on a borrower's credit rating, the probability that the rating wiH change over the 
next year (the rating transition inatrix), recovery rates on defaulted loans, and credit 
spreads and yields in the bond (or loan) market, it is possible to calculate a hypothctical 
loan's market value and the volatility for any non-traded loan or bond, and, thus, a VAR 
figurc for individual loans and the loan portfolio. 
CreditMetrics methodology applies to portfolios and the primary reason to have a 
quantitative portfolio approach to credit risk management is that it addresses 
concentration risk more systematically. Concentration risk rcfcrs to additional portfolio 
risk that results increased exposure to one obligor or groups of correlated obligors. The 
changes in the portfolio's value are related to the eventual rmgrations in credit quality of 
the obligor, both up and downgrades as well as default. 
In comparison to RiskMetrics, CreditMetrics poscs two challenging difficulties. First, the 
portfolio distribution is far from being normal, and second measuring the portfolio 
effect due to credit diversification is much more complex than for market risk. While it is 
legitimate to assume normality of the portfolio changes due to market risk, it is no longer 
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the case for credit returns which are by nature highly skewed and fat-tailcd as shown in 
the Figure 4.1 
Figure 4.1 Credit vs. Market returns 
Typical Market 
0ý Typical Credit 
Returns 
0\0 \ 
Returns 
Losses 
Source: CreditNIctrics (1997) 
Gains 
The long downside tail of the distribution of credit returns is caused by defaults. Credit 
returns are characterised by a fairly large likelihood of earning a (rclatively) small profit 
net interest earnings (NIE), coupled with a (relatively) small chance of losing a fairly large 
amount of investment. Across a large portfolio, there is likely to be a blend of these two 
forces creating the smooth but skewed distribution shape above. 
Another problem is the difficulty of modelling correlations. For equities, the correlations 
can be directly estimated by obsenring high-ftequency liquid market prices. For credit 
quality, the lack of data makes it difficult to estimate any type of credit correlation 
directly from history. CreditMetrics bases its evaluation on the joint probability of asset 
returns, which itself results from strong sUnplifying assumptions on the capital structure 
of the obligor, and on the generating process for equity returns. 
128 
A number of issues arise when we use the rating transitions assumed in the transition 
matrices in order to calculate the probabilities of moving to different rating categories (or 
to default) over the one (or more than one) year horizon. 
The calculation of the transition numbers, which involves avcraging one year transitions 
over the past data period, i. e. 20 years, is an important assumption about the way defaults 
and transitions occur. Specifical1y, CreditMetrics assumes that the transition probabilities 
follow a stable Markov process, which means that the probability that a bond or a loan 
wiH move to any particular state during this period independent of (not correlated with) 
any outcome in the past period. However, there is evidence that rating transitions are 
auto-correlated over time. For example, a bond or loan that was downgraded in the 
previous period has a higher probability (compared to a loan that was not downgraded) 
of being downgraded in the current period (Nickell, Perraudin, and Varotto, 1998). This 
suggests that a non-Markov process may better describe the rating transitions over time. 
Another issue involves the transition matrix stability. The use of a single transition matrLx 
assumes that transitions do not differ across borrower types (e. g., industrial firms versus 
banks, or the United States versus Japan) or across time (e. g., peaks versus troughs in the 
business cycle). Indeed, there is considerable evidence to suggest that important industry 
factors, country factors, and business cycle factors have an impact on rating transitions 
(Nickell et al., 1999). For example, when we examine a loan to a Japanese industrial 
company, we may need to use a transition matrix built around data for that country and 
industry. 
A final issue relates to die portfolio of bonds used in calculating the transition matrix. 
Altman and IsCishore (1997) found a noticeable InIpact of bond "ageing" on the 
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probabilities calculated in the transition matrix. A material difference is noted, depending 
on whether the bond sample used to calculate transition is based on new bonds or on all 
bonds outstanding in a rating class at a particular moment in time. 
Finally, quite recently ideas coming from insurance found their way into. the new tools 
for credit risk measurement and management. Credit Suisse Financial Products (CFSP) 
has developed a model, called Credit Risk Plus (1997), similar to the one a property 
insurer selling household fire insurance might use when assessing the risk of policy losses 
in setting premiums. The idea is very simple, based on a portfolio of loans or bonds and 
their historic default experience, develop a table that can be used in a predictive sense for 
one-year, or marginal, mortality rates and for multiyear, or cumulative, mortality rates. 
Combining such calculations with loss given defaults can produce estimates of expected 
losses. 
The model developed by CFSP stands in direct contrast to CreditINIctrics in its objectives 
and its theoretical foundations. CreditMetrics seeks to estimate the fuH'\TAR of a loan or 
loan portfolio by viewing rating upgrades and downgrades and the associated effects of 
spread changes in the discount rate as part of the VAR exposure of a loan. Credit Risk 
Plus views spread risks as part of market risk rather than credit risk. As a result, in any 
period, only two states of the world are considered 
- 
default and non-default 
- 
and the 
focus is on measuring expected and unexpected losses rather than expected value and 
unexpected changes in value (or VAR) as under CreditMetrics. Thus, CreditMetrics is a 
mark-to-market model; Credit Risk Plus is a default mode model. 
The second major difference is that, in CreditMetrics, the default probability in any year 
is discrete (as are the upgrade/downgrade probabilities). In Credit Risk Plus, default is 
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modelled as a continuous variable with a probability distribution. An analogy from house 
fire insurance is relevant. When a whole portfolio of homes is insured, there is a small 
probability that each house will burn down, and (in general) the probability that each 
house will burn down can be viewed as an independent event. Sin-fflarly, snany types of 
loans, such as mortgages and small business loans can be thought of in the same way, 
Nvith respect to their default risk. Thus, under Credit Risk Plus, each inclixidual loan is 
regarded as having a small probability of default, and each loan's probability of defitult is 
independent of the default on other loans. This assumption makes the distribution of 
default probabilities of a loan portfolio resemble a Poisson distribution. 
4.5 Insurance ratings and the cost of capital 
Insurance company ratings provided by private rating agencies are vitally important to 
investors, regulators, consumers, insurers, and insurance agents/brokers. Insurers use 
ratings in their advertising to assure buyers of the firm's strength. Insurance buyers use 
them in choosing their insurance companies and/or deciding how much they arc willing 
to pay for insurance from particular firms. Brokers and agents often will not recommend 
coverage with non-rated insurers or insurers with ratings below some threshold of 
financial strength (Moody's, 1998), and many corporate insurance buyers require that A 
their insurers be highly rated. Strong financial ratings give insurers better access to capital 
markets. Ratings also provide a valuable tool for regulators in assessing the financial 
strength of insurers (Schwartz, 1994). 
It should be noted that despite similarities, insurer ratings are quite different from 
corporate bond ratings. First, financial strength ratings are entirely optional in that there 
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are no regulatory requirements to obtain a rating and agencies will not issue a full rating 
unless requested to do so by the insurer (with the exception of Standard & Poor's which 
does issue a type of purely quantitative rating even on insurers that do not apply for a 
rating). In addition, a bond rating applies to a particular debt issue, whereas an insurer 
rating applies to the entity itself and assesses the overall claims-paying ability of the 
insurer, since policyholder obligations must be met before payments are made to any 
other creditors or shareholders. Insurer ratings are particularly complex in that, unlike 
bond issues, which have fixed payments that are to be made at fixed times, claims 
payments involvc financial obligations that are uncertain in both timing and amount. 
The purposes of insurer ratings are also very different. Corporate bond ratings are used 
almost exclusively by investors and regulators, while the primary users of insurer 
financial strength ratings are insurance companies and insurance consumers and the 
agents/brokers who market insurance to consumers. This point is illustrated by the fact 
that the majority of insurers rated by A. M. Best are either mutual companies or privately- 
held stock firms. AdditionaUy, the fact that many insurers with rated debt stiU choose to 
obtain one or more insurer financial strength ratings, and that these ratings often differ 
from their debt ratings, again illustrates the fact that bond ratings and insurer financial 
strength ratinas do not serve the same purpose or measure precisely the same risk. 
One interesting practical distinction between bond ratings and insurer ratings is that the 
bond rating agencies that rate a smaHer proportion of bonds tend to issue higher ratings 
than the agencies that rate almost A bonds (Cantor and Packer, 1997), whereas the 
agencies (Moody's, S&P) that rate a smaller proportion of insurers tend to issue lower 
ratings than the agency (A. M. Best) that rates most insures. Another distinction is that 
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there appears to be a greater divergence of opinion among rating agencies regarding 
insurer financial strength ratings than bond ratings (Ederington, 1986). Ahnost 90 
percent of eligible prop erty-liability insurers in 1995 applied for a rating from A. M. Best, 
while only about 18 percent applied for a rating from S&P and only 10 percent applied 
for a rating from Moody's. Given the overwhelming proportion of insurers that receive 
Best's Ratings, it appears that insurers consider obtaining at least one rating essential. 
The literature on the determinants of insurer financial strength ratings is very limited. 
Pottier (1997) exarnines the determinants of Best's life insurer ratings and finds casual 
evidence suggestive of selection bias, but does not perform any formal tests for it or 
control for it econometrically. In addition, insurer ratings have been widely used as 
measures of insolvency risk and financial quality (Adiel, 1996; Anthony and Petroni, 
1997; Cummins and Danzon, 1997; Potticr, 1998). These studies have only used Best's 
ratings. 
Insurer ratings also have a direct impact on the cost of capital, since the primary source 
of debt capital to insurers is policy liabilities, and lower rated firms will likely havc to sell 
their policies at lower prices compared to higher rated firms (Doherty and Tinic, 1981; 
Berger, Cummins, and Tennyson, 1992). 
Since the cost of capital is a long-term concept, the intention would be to produce a 
figure that compensates equity investors over a long period of time. Although a 
company's cost of capital will change over time, the cost of capital for a company or an 
industry should be relatively stable from period to period unless there has been some 
dramatic structural reasons for the change. 
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An indirect way to determine the cost of capital would be to link the credit spreads of 
corporate bonds with the associated credit ratings for these bonds. As the credit spread 
compensates the holder of the debt instrument for expected losses, there should be a 
link between the credit spread and the credit rating class, given the fact that there e. xist 
ample evidence that rating categories indeed entail an indication of relative credit risk. 
Researchers have indeed shown that there exists a close relationship between credit 
rating classes and subsequent default experience. This is mittored in empirical studies 
where it is always found that the credit spread widens at an increasing rate as credit rating 
worsens. This can for instance be seen in Duffee (1998) for US investment grade 
corporate bonds. However, the standard deviation of individuals bonds' credit spreads 
within a gl'%Ten rating category increases as the credit rating worsens. This indicates that 
not all bonds within the same rating class are assumed to bear the same credit risk. 
Apparently, the higher cross-sectional standard delviation in the lower rating classes 
indicates that rating agencies allow for more heterogeneity in these classes. 
Theoretically, there is a relation between the term to maturity of the bond and its credit 
spread, which is also known as the term structure of credit spreads or credit spread curxýe 
(Merton, 1974; jarrow, Lando, and Turnbull, 1997; Longstaff and Schwartz, 1995; 
Tychon, 1998). This relationship is not necessarily upward sloping. It can also be 
downward sloping or humped-shaped. The intuition behind the latter is that highly rated 
companies can hardly become better rated, but can get down-rated. The longer the term 
to maturity, the higher the probability that the credit rating of such a company increases. 
This explains that the credit spread can be lower for longer maturity bonds. Empirical 
evidence is available for this phenomenon (Sarig and Warga, 1989; Fons, 1994). 
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However, Hclwegc and Turner (1997) indicate that the downward sloping credit spread 
curve might be a consequence of using average credit spreads of bonds in a given credit 
rating class. A bias would be introduced when using sets of bonds with the same credit 
rating. 
Both the seniority of a bond or loan and the collateral attached as security to it, have an 
impact on the credit spread because, arguably, both kinds of provisions will increase the 
recovery rate in case of default. Indeed, Izvorski (1997) finds that for defaulted US 
bonds debt seniority is one of the most important determinants of the recovery ratio, 
thus implying a lower yield for senior issues. 
In general, the credit spreads on coupon bonds are not equal to credit spreads on zero- 
coupon bonds because of either a non-flat term structure or a non-flat credit spread 
structure. To the extent that the credit spread curve is upward sloping, higher coupon 
bonds will have lower credit spreads than lower coupon bonds with the same maturity 
(Litterman and lben, 1991). Likewise, if the bond's duration shortens, e. g. because of an 
interest rate increase, the credit spread wiH decrease if the credit spread curve is upward 
sloping. 
Other factors like the caUability or other option features may be important to take into 
account. In efficient markets the value of these options is embedded in the bond's price 
and thus in the credit spread. The results in Duffee (1998) clearly indicate that the 
caUability feature can dramaticafly change spread behaviour. Duffee finds that spreads are 
negatively related to changes in risk-free rates. 
Also differences in liquidity may be important. To the extent that the riskless reference 
bond is more liquid than the risky bond, the spread between the two will -also include a 
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liquidity premium. When liquidity is measured as the issue's size, many authors find a 
negative relation between spread and size: the larger the size, the larger the issuer's 
liquidity, the lower the requited yield and therefore the spread. Boardman and McEnally 
(1981) find a negative relation between size and yield for Baa or bettcr-ratcd US 
corporate bonds. Also for highly levered transaction loans do Angbazo, Mei and 
Saunders (1998) find a negative relationship between size and their spread. 
Finally, there arc strong theoretical arguments to assume that there is a relation between 
credit spreads and the risk-free interest rate level. Duffec (1998) studies the relation 
between interest rate variables and credit spreads on non-callable corporate bonds. To 
this end he regresses monthly changes of credit spreads on changes in the three-month 
Treasury bill yield and changes in the slope of the term structure, as measured by the 
difference between the thirty-year constant-maturity Treasury yield and the three-month 
bill rate. Duffee finds significantly negative slope coefficients for both variables. For long 
maturities, the slopes of both variables are similar, thus canceling the influence of the 
three-month bill rate, leaving a negative association with long-term interest rate changes. 
Arak and Corcoran (1996) also find a negative relation between yield spreads on privately 
placed issues and risk-frees rate when all variables are measured in levels. Fridson and 
jonsson (1995), however, report that they did not find any relation between the level of 
Treasury rates and the spread on high-yield bonds, which are also below-investment 
grade. 
Nearly all known credit risk management tools use data calibrated to the US situtation. 
Not only default rates, credit mitigation probabilities and recovery rates pertain to US, 
also empirical modeling of credit spreads is to a large extent confined to the US market. 
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Nevertheless, as markets become more global -and corporate bond markets develop in 
other parts of the world, non-US data may be useful to ascertain the robustness of 
known results. 
We obtained bond index data constructed by Lehman Brothers via their Fixed Income 
Database. Its indices are based on secondary market prices of bonds issued in the 
Eurobond market or in ENIU-zone domestic markets and denominated in euro-or one 
of the currencies that joined the EMU. Besides direct government bond indices also 
investment grade corporate bond indices were used. The latter are based on publicly 
traded bonds, issued by companies domiciled in the European Union excludes 
convertible securities. 
We want to focus on the behavior of credit spread through time for different ratings so 
we will work with the respective sub-indices produced by Lehman Brothers. AR these 
indices are based upon the composite rating of Moody's and Standard & Poor's, if the 
issue is rated by both. If ratings do not coincide, an average rating is used which is 
'roundcd' downwards. The composition of each index is determined on the last business 
day of the prcN"Ious month. During the month, each bond wiU stay in the index, 
regardless whether or not the bond is downgraded or upgraded. Also when bonds are 
called during the month, they are not removed from the index until the end of the 
month. A similar rule holds for changes in the amount outstanding during a month: face 
values are kept constant and are adjusted at the start of a new month. 
Monthly data are available for the period 7/88 
- 
12/97. We computed the spread as the 
difference between the yield to maturity as reported by Lehman Brothers and a 
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comparable government bond yield. The government bond yield is computed relative to 
the contemporaneous Benchmark Treasury yield curve as provided by Datastream. 
In the next table summary statistics for changes in credit spreads are presented. To some 
extent these are more important in a risk management context, as it is. important to 
understand how credit spreads behave through time. 
Table 4.2 Summary statistics of yield spreads 
Average Standard First Second Third Liting- 
spread deviation order order order Box 
(%) (%) auto auto auto Statistic at 
correlation correlation correlation 20 lags 
1-3 yrs AAA 0.167 0.056 0.835 0.815 0.812 2876.3 
AA 0.279 0.029 0.853 0.784 0.740 2139.7 
A 0.381 0.080 0.642 0.517 0.481 851.5 
BBB 0.726 0.197 0.947 0.899 0.846 2835.1 
3-5 yrs AAA 0.184 0.051 0.937 0.915 0.897 4005.8 
AA 0.343 0.070 0.944 0.934 0.920 4804.5 
A 0.481 0.086 0.977 0.970 0.965 5255.1 
BBB 0.726 0.142 0.934 0.918 0.900 3844.1 
5-7 yrs AAA 0.230 0.048 0.934 0.919 0.898 3750.6 
AA 0.325 0.061 0.924 0.904 0.897 4321.5 
A 0.504 0.083 0.923 0.887 0.847 3442.5 
BBB 0.701 0.120 0.974 0.957 0.943 4375.3 
7-10 yrs AAA 0.311 0.081 0.975 0.964 0.951 4824.0 
AA 0.443 0.109 0.983 0.975 0.968 5273.6 
A 0.635 0.145 0.988 0.985 0.981 5506.7 
BBB 1.105 0.502 0.984 0.970 0.957 5609.9 
10 + yrs AAA 0.276 0.057 0.902 0.879 0.849 3056.4 
AA 0.420 0.095 0.971 0.952 0.943 4980.3 
A 0.733 0.187 0.991 0.987 0.984 5623.1 
Note: Yield spreads are spreads relative to government bond yields with similar duration. Ratings are composite 
Moody's and Standard & Poor's ratings. Maturity buckets include the lower boundary and exclude the upper 
boundary. Statistics are computed from daily data over the period July 1988 through Dec 1997. 
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From Table 4.2, average spreads increase monotonically the lower the credit rating. This 
is also summarized in Figure 4.2. The relation is clearly not linear: the difference between 
the BBB-rated indices and AA-ratcd indices is generally much higher than between other 
adjacent rating classes. Remarkably, the spreads are considerably lower than the spreads 
reported by Duffee (1998). For AAA-rated bonds, out spreads vary between 17 basis 
points (bp) and 31 bp, whereas Duffee finds at least 67 bp. The picturc is similar for the 
other rating categories. Of course, the sample used here covers a much sorter period 
than Duffee's. The average spreads do seem consistent Nvith the findings of Pendrosa 
and Roll (1998) for US investment grade spreads covering the period 1995-1997. 
Unfortunately, they do not provide an estimate of the average spread on the US market, 
but the graphs they present, show spread levels similar to our data. 
As far as the relation between spread and maturity is concerned, we generally find an 
upward sloping credit curve, as was also the case for the Duffee series (1998). 
Nevertheless, in some cases the relation is not monotone, e. g. '10 and more years' bucket 
for AAA and AA-rated bonds which can be -assigned to a liquidity effect. In -addition, it 
may be the case that relatively less credit risky issuers issue longer dated bonds. 
Furthermore, as in Longstaff and Schwartz (1995b), the standard deviation of spreads is 
also increasing when credit rating deteriorates. No clear relation with maturity can be 
obsen, ed. Fmally, the first lag autocorrelation cocfficient of all spread series is relatively 
large, and often near 0.95 or higher. We do not present stationarity tests because of the 
reported low power of umt root tests on observation periods as short as this one. If we 
accept on economic grounds that the credit spreads series are stationary, it is clear from 
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the high auto correlation coefficients that they revert only slowly to their long-run 
average. 
Figure 4.2 Average Credit Spreads by Rating Class and 
Maturity Bucket 
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In Table 4.3 summary statistics for changes in credit spreads are presented. It can be 
noticed that average changes in spreads are very small and insignificantly different from 
zero. This could have been expected as they measure the trend of credit spreads over the 
time period investigated. 
The first three order autocorrelation coefficients of the spread changes are also shown. 
Without any exception, all first order coefficients are negative and usually significantly 
different from zero. This is in contrast to Duffee (1998) who uses monthly data and 
mostly finds positive auto correlations. The negative autocorrelation may be a reflection 
of poor liquidity in the European corporate bond market. By frequently bouncing 
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Maturity 
. f- Iv Yrs 10 + yrs 
between the bid and the ask quote, negative autocorrelation may be introduced. High 
order autocorrelation does hardly seem present in the series. 
Table 4.3 Summary statistics of yield spreads changes 
Average Standard Skewness First Second 
- 
Third 
spread deviation order order order 
change auto auto auto 
(%) correlation correlation correlation 
1-3 yrs AAA 0.028 3.240 
-0.829* -0.437' -0.057 0.075 
AA 
-0.020 1.587 0.629* -0.266* -0.086 -0.109 
A 
-0.060 6.758 -0.068 -0.33 1* -0.105 0.031 
BBB 0.255 6.391 2.966* 
-0.068 0.040 -0.049 
3-5 yrs AAA 0.022 1.815 0.101 
-0.319* -0.048 -0.100 
AA 0.027 2.360 
-0.116 -0.412* 0.026 -0.091 
A 0.033 1.861 
-0.054 -0.359* -0.026 -0.039 
BBB 0.093 5.131 
-0.788* -0.375* 0.009 0.095 
5-7 yrs AAA 0.011 1.762 
-0.363* -0.386* 0.044 -0.048 
AA 0.030 2.402 0.101 
-0.371* -0.081 -0.012 
A 0.032 3.239 
-0.873* -0.262* 0.015 -0.077 
BBB 0.086 2.766 
-0.921 * -0.193* -0.040 -0.049 
7-10 yrs AAA 0.033 1.820 
-0.173 -0.283* 0.037 -0.026 
AA 0.047 2.003 
-0.449* -0.262* -0.026 -0.029 
A 0.081 2.217 0.009 
-0.350 0.022 -0.035 
BBB 
-0.246 5.667 -1.446* -0.200* 0.060 -0.054 
10 + yrs AAA 0.026 2.534 
- 
1.050* 
-0.383* 0.035 -0.042 
AA 0.062 2.290 
-0.611 * -0.171* -0.182* -0.023 
A 0.123 2.555 0.329* 
-0.293* -0.044 0.054 
Note: Yield spreads are spreads relative to government bond yields with similar duration. Ratings are composite 
oody's and Standard & Poor's ratings. Maturity buckets include the lower boundary and exclude the upper MP 
boundary. Statistics are computed from daily data over the period 1 April 1998 through 17 May 1999. Asterisks 
denote autocorrelation, skewness or kurtosis coefficients more than two standard deviations away from zero. 
From the skewness and kurtosis coefficients it is clear that spread changes arc not 
normaHy distributed. This is both due to skewness and kurtosis. The skewness 
coefficients are statistically different from zero, and the kurtosis coefficients arc 
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significantly in excess of three, the value a normal distribution will show. Most skewness 
coefficients are ncgati,., c. AR kurtosis coefficients are significantly higher than three, 
which implies that the distributions have higher peaks and thicker tails than the normal 
distribution does. 
4.6 Methodology and econometric considerations 
We assume that the change in the spread Spread,, at time I of a bond in maturity group 
1w can be attributed to the rating component RATE, and a unique component F,: 
Spread,,, 
=a+ bRA TE, 
where RATE = AAA,. tVA, A, or BBB, m= 1-3 yrs, 3-5 yrs, 5-7 yrs, 7-10 yrs, 10+ yrs. 
Table 4.4 Relation between credit spreads and credit ratings 
Maturity groups 
1-3 yrs 3-5 yrs 5-7 yrs 7-10 yrs 10+ yrs 
Intercept 22.44 15.67 25.56 23.65 28.42 
(4.55) (5.45) (6.71) (4.55) (7-45) 
Rate 
-15.46 -16.87 -17.81 -18.34 -26.66 
(-6.71) (-5.19) (4.20) (-7.45) (-7.49) 
Adjusted R2 0.43 0.45 0.59 0.62 0.57 
From the above analysis, there is a clear relation between the credit spreads of corporate 
bonds and credit ratings. Since we have established this argument, the analysis can move 
forward in determining the appropriate financial ratios that convey important 
information about insurance companies to investors. 
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Different ratios can be easily computed for a public or a private company from the data 
in the company's balance sheet and income statement. It is often useful to have a model 
that combines all the relevant financial information about a company into a single 
number representing its credit quality. For example, such a model can be used to rate 
private companies in which a potential equity investment is considered. Using the samc 
quantitative model for evaluating different companies provides us with an objective 
comparison of these companies. 
A set of financial variables is used in order to identify the financial ratios that affect the 
rating of an insurance company. These ratios -are hypothesised to influence the decision 
by the firm to obtain a rating or multiple ratings. According to the theory of financial 
intermediation, the principal role of credit rating agencies is the reduction of ex ante 
uncertainty or informational asymmetry about a firm's economic value and probability of 
financial distress (Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1984; Millon and Thakor, 1985). Thus, the 
more likely investors, consumers, and regulators are to have different opinions about the 
true insolvcncy risk of an insurer, the greater the demand for and value of a financial 
strcngth rating. 
Numerous variables are included in the model to proxy for the level of uncertainty about 
the firm's risk. Cantor and Packer (1997) argue that relatively high levels of underwriting 
profitability and leverage may be associated with greater uncertainty and thus a higher 
probability of obtaining an optional rating. Therefore, the model includes a leverage 
measure and a profitability measure. A measure of premiums is also Included. While 
strong premium growth may be very positive for the financial health of the firm, growth 
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sometimes is due to lower underwriting standards or under-pricing (Harrington and 
Danzon, 1994). 
The loss rcsene is probably one of the most common vehicles used to conceal the true 
condition of a financially troubled company. The loss reserve is an estimate of the 
amount that will ultimately be paid when the aggregate claims arc settled; because it is an 
estimate, it is easy to understate it, thereby overstating the surplus. Moreover, in timcs of 
inflation, the losses may increase at a greater than anticipated rate, and the loss rcser-%, c 
may be understated in order to give the appearance of solvency until rates can be 
increased to rectiý, the situation. Therefore, a measure of the reserves is included in the 
model. 
Cantor and Packer (1997) include the natural logarithm of long-term debt outstanding as 
a measure of the potential benefit of an additional rating. A variable is included in the 
model because the major benefit of obtaining a positive rating is a lower cost of debt, 
which should accrue in direct proportion to the amount of debt issued. Since in the 
present context ratings are for claim-paying ability on policies written rather than for 
long-term debt, the natural logarithm of net claims over net premiums is included 
following the same rationale. We expect that the higher this ratio is, the greater the 
likelihood of obtaining a negative rating. 
The rest of the variables included represent factors that previous theory has indicated as 
important in determining insurer solvency risk. These include variables reflecting 
capitalisation (Kahane et al., 1986; CumMMs and Derrig, 1989; Doherty, 1989), asset and 
liability risk (Kahane et al., 1986; Cummins and Derrig, 1989), liquidity 0,, ahane et al., 
1986), size (Cummins et al., 1993; Cummins and Sommer, 1996), diversification 
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(Sommer, 1996), and reinsurance usage (Borch, 1974; Berger et al., 1992). Many of the 
variables are similar to measures used in articles studying the determinants of bond 
ratings, while others are explicitly stated as determinants of insurer ratings by the rating 
agencies themselves. Specifically, the variables include measures of liquidity, investment 
risk, use of reinsurance, leverage, and profitability. 
We gathered financial information on 87 general insurance companies for years 1992-98. 
For each of these companies, we obtained the S&P credit ratings given in January of 
years 1992-1999, associating each rating number with the financial data for the prior year. 
Table 4.5 Transformation of S&P's codes 
S&P rating Code 
AAA 2 
AA+ 4 
AA 5 
AA- 6 
A+ 7 
A 8 
A- 9 
BBB+ 10 
BBB 11 
BBB- 12 
BB+ 13 
BB 14 
BB- 15 
B+ 16 
B 17 
B- 18 
CCC+ 19 
ccc 21 
ccc- 21 
Standard & Poor's has developed credit ratings that may apply to an issuer's general 
creditworthiness or to a specific financial obligation. Standard & Poor's Insurance ratings 
provide financial strength ratings that arc prospective evaluations of an insurer's financial 
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security to its policyholders. Long-term credit ratings range from 'AAA', reflecting the 
strongest credit quality, to 'D', reflecting the lowest. Long-term ratings from 'AA' to 
'CCC' may be modified by the addition of a plus (+) or minus (-) sign to show the 
relative standingwithin. the major rating categories. The S&P ratings were converted to a 
numerical credit code using the conversions given in the previous table (Table 4.5) 
Data for financial ratios and other firm-specific variables are used from the A. I\L Best's 
Insipbt database. In order to be included in the sample, an insurer must have financial data C!: 1 
available on the InsiTlif database necessary to calculate the various explanatory variables. 
Since the data set represents cross-sectional and time-series data, we use the regression 
equation 
Yi, 
--= 
Xi, p + )li + vi, 
,I=N, t=T (4.4) 
where the subscripts i and t refer, respectively, to company number and year, Yj, are the 
credit codes, Xj, are the financial ratios, -qj is fixed or random individual effects, and v,, 
is the error term independently and idcnticafly distributed over i and t with zero mean 
and variance cY2. We ornit time dumnlies for simplicity although they may capture V 
unobsen, ed aggregate effects. 
In the case where observations on Yý, and Xit for I=1,..., N and t=1,..., T are 
available, an aggregate time series regression would threat Yli as part of the constant and 
thus unidentified, whilst a cross-section regression wiH yield a biased esdmator of P if -ji 
is correlated with Xit across 1. 
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In the case of the presence of fixed effects, P and Y)i can be estimated consistently and 
efficiently by the f6flowing estimators which can be obtained by ordinary least squares 
(OLS) after the data are transformed by subtracting group means from each observation 
(Hslao, 1986): 
NT 
i)(x 
NT (4.5) 
it 
J (x 
it 
(Yit 
i=l t=l 
and 
Yj 
- 
P"F-Rj 
'i 
(4.6) 
1 
-r IT 
where yj 
-Z yj,, -], ýj -Z xit T 
=i T t=i 
Because 71i is treated as a ffixcd constant, the estimator of P is called least-squarcs 
dummy-variable. This estimator is known also as the "within-groups estimator" or 
"covariance estimator", because it can be obtained using an appropriate transformation 
in the form of the orthogonal projection 
Q1 NT (4.7) 
where P IN 
-1i A], with I as the identity matrix and ia column vector of T 
ones. If we re-writc (4.4) in d-ic form 
XP + 
-q (4.8) 
where Y, X, -1, and v denote the (rNxl), (TNxk-), (TNxl), and (TNxl) matrices 
respectively, we can pre-multiply (4.8) by Q yielding 
QY = QXP + Qv (4.9) 
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since Qj = 0. Given that X,, is uncorrelated with vi, for each s, t, then in the 
transformed specification QX and Qv are uncorrclated and thus we can apply OLS 
giving rise to the estimator 
P%vg = (X, Qx)-' XQy (4.10) 
which coincides with (4.5) above. 
In the random effects case -ji is assumed to be a random variable such that 
Ui, 
-` 
Ili + vit (4.11) 
where we suppose that E(-ji) = E(vij =0 and E(Xi, -Ii) = E(X'i, vi, ) = 0. Under 
these conditions the OLS regression of YA on Xj, (in levels) gives a consistent estimate 
of P. 
However, the specification (4.11) generates autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in uit 
even if it is absent in vi, 
, 
This suggests that we seek a more cfficient estimator than OLS. 
The appropriate GLS estimator of P, under these assumptions turns out to be a 
weighted avera e of the above within-groups estimator and the so-cafled "between- 9 
groups" estimator 
pbg 
= 
(Xlpx)-, Xlpy (4.12) 
that is 
ý(, 
I_s -= 
Dýbg + Ok 
- 
D)5,,,; (4.13) 
where D= 
(Vb,,; 
+ Vj-'V 
, 
Vb,, 
and V are the covariance matrices of ýb,, and Nv9 Wg 
respectively, and where the estimator K. can be obtained by applying OLS to the 
transformed model (Maddala, 1971) 
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PY = PXP + P-q + Pu (4.14) 
This GLS estimator is often known in the literature as the Balestra and Ncrlovc (1966) 
estimator, (xvith ýBN '-": ýGl-', )* 
Hausman and Taylor (1981) show that if iid(O, cy 2) and vi, - fid(o, (; 2 ), a GLS 
transformation of (4.3) is given by 
=pNg Fx + (4.15) yi, 
- 
(i 
- 
9)yl J il + '91i 
where 8 and Ri are once again the time means of the variables. 
+ TCJ, -,, I 
2 Estimates of cj, -. and cy can be obtained as follows (Hausman and Taylor, 1981) v 71 
2 (4.16) 
iq-T 1) tEI 
and 
a2 
=1Nr 
;i1-, (4.17) ý"g; ýi]2 
- 
civ 
71 NT 
where Ri, 7- Xj, 
- 
Xi and V(j, = Yj, 
- 
: Sý. The feasible GLS estimator can then be 
obtaincd by applying OLS to (4.15), having (4.16) and (4.17), to construct an cstimate of 
Iq 
When i1i is treated as a fixed constant, the model is referred to as a fixed effects model, 
whilst when -ji is treated as a random variable, it is called a random effects model. Nlorc 
generally, we can uniý, these two formulations, and we may assume from the outset that 
the effects are always random. What is crucial, however, is to investigate if -ji is 
correlated or not with the observed variables X,,, If -ji is correlated with Xj, the fixed 
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effects model is viewed as one where investigators make inferences conditional on the 
effects that are in the sample. Whilst if )jj is not correlated with Xj, the random effects 
model is viewed as one where investigators make unconditional or marginal inferences 
with respect to the population of all effects. 
Therefore, we have to compare the estimates in levels and deviations. Significant 
differences between the two indicate that correlated individual effects are on-utted from 
the regression in levels. It is worth noting that this is eqw, *,, alent to testing whether the 
effects are correlated or not with Xit 
* 
To perform this experiment, we can use the traditional Hausman test (1978) based on 
the comparison between the within-groups estimator and the Balestra and Nerlove 
estunator: 
f [va4,,,, ) 
- 
varý(, -1 [ý(, 
(4.18) hý [ýGUS 
- 
ýWG, 
', 
S)] 
'le, 
KA191 
Under the null hypothesis that the effects are not correlated with the regressors, the 
Plimýc 
- 
ýxx 2 
X) with k degrees of freedom. 
'I'; -C 
0 and h is distributed as (k 
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4.7 Empirical results 
Table 4.6 shows the parameter estimates obtained when we estimate our model. The 
variables that appear in the model include: 
X, 
Statutory capital 
Total assets 
X2 
Net income 
Total assets 
X3 
Net premiums written in long 
- 
tail business 
Total net pren-ýiumswnttcn 
X4 
= 
X5 
= 
Net reserves 
Shareholder funds 
Net claims 
Net premiums written 
Net rommiqqinn-. q X6 
-I 
Net premiums written 
Reinsurance ceded X7 
= Net premiums 'Written 
Stocks in common stock investments X8 
= 
Total invested assets 
Because of the large number of variables found to be significant indicators of agency 
rating in past studies, a list of twenty-five variables (ratios) was compiled for evaluation. 
From the original Est of variables, eight variables were selected as doing the best overall 
job together in determining the overaU rating of an insurance company. 
The coefficient on the inverse measure of leverage (capital to assets) is negative and 
significant both in the fixed effects and the random effects estimations. The significantly 
negative results are consistent with the hypothesis that higher leverage is associated with 
greater uncertainty, which in turn is associated with a negative impact on the ratings. 
Moreover, the rating reflects the fact that insurance companies have been punished for 
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assigning too much capital in their books that has minimized the available funds for 
invcstment. 
Also consistent with the uncertainty hypothesis is the positive and significant sign of the 
coefficient on the profitability variable. In this case the ratings have compensated the 
insurers that showed a better level of profitability overall. The assessment of a company's 
profitability performance is an integral part of the overali rating analysis. Although return 
on equity (ROE) is a vital performance benchmark, it can be easily influenced by the 
company's capital structure. Arguably, the key driver of profitability is the profit margin 
of the company is able to produce on its operating revenues. Furthermore, return on 
rex, cnuc (ROR) includes both an undcnvriting and an investment component and, hence, 
captures both sources of an insurance company's earnings. Although return on revenue 
is useful as a broad measure of earnings adequacy, it has its drawbacks. It does not 
differentiate between various product lines that often have different risks, some of which 
require higher levels of ROR for a certain standard performance than others. 
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Table 4.6 Fixed effects vs. random effects model 
Variable Fixed effects Random effects 
xi 
-0.02875 -0.035291 (-1.883270) (-1.798458) 
X, 0.073896 0.110796 
(1.68225) (1.69324) 
X3 
-0.010776 -0.017390 (-0.219611) (-0.386984) 
X4 
-0.033870 -0.021098 (-1.25823) (-0.860464) 
x5 
-0.048672 -0.042756 (-2.79806) (-2.81829) 
x6 
-0.137429 -0.114145 (-3.78026) (-3.31443) 
X7 0.294564 0.293232 
(5.16532) (5.23716) 
Xß 0.122471 0.102669 
(2.91294) (2.67139) 
t-statistics in hrackets 
The reported p-value of the Hausman test is 0.1415 which supports the nuH hypothesis 
that the two vectors of coefficients (fixed and random effects) are identical. In this 
situation the fixed effects and random effects models become indistinguishable for all 
practical purposes. 
The coefficient on stocks in common stock investments is positive and significant in 
both cases. Asset quality and investment performance are taken into account when the 
rating of a company is determined since premiums and deposits invested today must 
provide a yield sufficient to cover tomorrow's claims. A review of the insurer's asset 
allocation strategy among investments such as bonds, mortgages, preferred stock, real 
estate, common stock, collateralised mortgage obligations (CI\10s), derivative 
instruments, and other invested assets, can highlight the quality of the company's 
investments. The assets are evaluated for credit quality and diversification. Of concern 
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are asset concentrations by type and maturity, low credit quality, industry, geographic 
location, and within single issuers. An insurer's asset allocation is also important to 
determine how appropriate it is to support policyholder liabilities. Different asset classes 
have customary risk profiles and accompanying returns; thus, by choosing which asset to 
emphasize, a company preordains a large part of the return on its portfolio. The essence 
of this particular ratio is closely related with issues that nught not look correlated, but in 
fact are, such as common and preferred stock issued by the same entity and perhaps 
convertible debt also issued by the same entity or a closely related family member. In this 
case, for instance, the nominal issuer might not be the same company, but if they are all 
part of the same family and control, a clear concentration can be developed. 
Moreover, the predicted sign on the reinsurance variable can be ambiguous, depending 
on whether the use of reinsurance is seen as reducing uncertainty by shifting risk, or 
increasing uncertainty by making the insurer's financial health dependent on the financial 
health of its reinsurers. Although prudent use of reinsurance is often advisable, it can be 
misused in many fashions. Reinsurers' creditworthiness is always a concern since the 
deterioration of their financial strength will affect the financial stability of insurers that 
depend on them for extra financing. The results support the first -argument since the 
coefficient on the variable measuring the percent of business ceded to reinsurers is 
positive and significant. 
The coefficient on the variable measuring the percentage of business in long-tail lines 
(variable X3) is not significant. The time value of money is significant component of the 
over-all rating. This realigns writers of long-tail business with writers of short-tail business 
to the timing of payments of losses and associated capital needs. Adding short-tail 
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business in the company's books can increase the level of capital needed in the short 
term due to short-term claim fluctuations. 
Surprisingly, the variable representing the percent of net reserves is also negatively 
related and not significant. The reserve risk is the risk that past busineas will be less 
profitable than expected as the result of additional variability in estimating frequency and 
severity trends, as well as changes in economic, legal, and social conditions that can add 
further variability to claim costs. Furthermore, it measures the variability a company 
would expect to encounter in its reserve levels, given its lines of business, by comparing 
the present value of the actual claim runoff that has emerged to the reserves originally 
established for those claims by industry. However, in line with the negative relationship 
of the capital requirements, the percent of net reserves is negatively related to reflect the 
good economic conditions of the recent years. 
The ratio of net commissions to net premiums written determines the percentage of 
direct written premiums that is paid to salespersons. A high ratio would show a high 
commission rate, which may be the result of an affiliate agency, or at least the payment 
of commissions higher than those normaRy paid in the industry. The variable is 
negatively related to the overall rating of the insurance companies. This is consistent with 
the expectation of a lower rating due to excessive coninussions to agencies or 
salespetsons. 
Finally, the variable representing the amount of net clainis as a percentage of the net 
premiums written is significantly negative in line with the stated expectation. The trend 
of this ratio from calendar year to calendar year helps determine whether the estimates 
originally made by management were accurate, high, or low. If the ratio has increased or 
155 
fluctuated, original estimates were too high or too low. The accuracy of previous 
estimates proxides a foundation for confidence in current estimates. 
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CHAPTER5 
SECURITISATION AND CAPITAL IN 
THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY 
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5.1 Introduction 
Securitisation in its %videst sense implies every such process which converts a financial 
relation into a transaction. History of evolution of finance and corporate Iaxv is replete 
with instances where relations have been converted into transactions. Examples of 
securitisation of relationships are cash flows frorn illiquid assets, such as car loans, 
mortgages, receivables, and leases, which are transformed into tradeable securities. This 
practice was introduced by Bank of America in 1977 and has been popularlsed through 
the issuance of mortgage-backed securities, which had a total volume of over $1 trillion 
outstanding in 1992. 
In the sense in which the term is used in present capital market activity, securitisation has 
acquired a typical meaning of its own, called asset securitisation. It is taken to mean a 
device of structured financing where an entity seeks to pool together its interest in 
identifiable cash flows over time, transfer the same to investors either with or without 
the support of further collaterals, and thereby achieve the purpose of financing. 
Although the result of securitisation is financing, the entity securitising its assets it is not 
borrowing money, but scHing a stream of cash flows that was otherwise to accrue it. 
Thus, the meaning of securitisation is a blend of txvo forces: structured finance and 
capital markets. Securitisation leads to structured finance as the resulting security is not a 
generic risk in entity that securitises its assets but in specific assets or cash flows of such 
entity. Moreover, the idea of securitisation is to create a capital market product. The 
economic logic for securitisation is extremely powerful and the trend towards 
securitisation knows no limits. Capital markets are today a place where everything is 
traded: from claims over assets, to risks, and rewards. 
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The growing significance of securitisation to banks and other financial institutions has 
been attributed to several factors that fall into two major categories. First, sale of 
mortgages through sccuritisation is a form of regulatory arbitrage (Pavel, 1986; 
Greenbaum and Thakor, 1987, Pavel and Phillis, 1987; Kopff and Lent, 1988). 
Securitisation allows banking institutions to scH mortgages in capital markets and thereby 
frees up banks' capital for more lending. As a result, banks are able to originate loans (to 
earn fees) without permanently funding thcrn. 
Second, sccuritisation enables banks to sell mortgages at competitive prices and to re- 
deploy the sale proceeds in assets, which allows more effective management of interest 
rate risk and better diversification of asset portfolios (I-Copff and Lent, 1988; Harvey, 
1991) 
Although the amount of securitisation is tremendous in banking and some other parts of 
the financial sector, it is rate in the insurance industry. Indeed, Prudential's sale of 
policyholder loans (PHLs), Cananwill's sale of premium loans, and Hanover Rc's 
earthquake and wind and USAA's hurricane catastrophe bonds. 
Furthermore, the introduction of catastrophe options, known as "cat" options, by the 
Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), provides a new asset class to the potential investors. 
The characteristics of this new asset class, expected positive excess returns and portfolio 
diversification benefits, can provide an incentive to investors that Nvill be able to earn a 
return in excess of the risk-free rate. 
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5.2 The securitisation process 
In a sccuritisation transaction, at least four parties arc involved: borrowers, originators 
(or sellers of assets), buyers of the assets, and investors in securities backed by the assets. 
The buyer can be a special purpose vehicle (SPNO, established solely to purchase assets 
and to issue securities against the assets to investors. In this way, the underlying assets 
are isolated ftom the originators' other assets and liabilities. The originators usually act 
(and are compensated) as servicers of the sold assets for collecting and distributing 
interest and principal payments (Schwarcz, 1993). 
An asset-backed security (ABS) can be structured as a pass-through or a pay-through. A 
pass-trough structure features equity financing with a trust passing interest and principal 
payments from the original borrowers to ABS investors. A pay-through transaction, 
however, raises capital by issuing both bonds and stocks, allowing active management of 
cash flows ftom the underlying assets to provide bondholders with stable cash flows. 
Guaranteed investment contracts (GICs), issued by banks or insurers, are commonly 
used for stabilising cash flows by guaranteeing the rate of return on unscheduled 
principal payments (Pavel, 1986). 
To improve their marketability, most ABS issues have credit enhancement to protect 
investors against normal losses on the underlying assets. Credit enhancement takes one 
of the foHoNving forms: 
1. a letter of credit issued by a bank; 
2. a surety bond issued by an insurer; 
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3. reserve accounts established to collect the excess cash flows (the gross cash flows 
from the underlying assets minus the coupon payments to investors and servicing 
fces); and, 
4. guarantee by the originator. 
Greenbaum and Thakor (1987) purport that the originator possesses sufficient 
information about the borrower's quality to design an appropriate schedule of guarantee. 
This may be one reason why many ABS issues are guaranteed directly or indirectly by 
originators. Since investors Prefer bonds with a fixed payment schedule (holding other 
factors, such as expected return, constant), many pay-through bonds (e. g., collaterized 
mortgage obligations) are structured into several "tranches" to provide more predictable 
cash flows and maturities. 
In structuring a securitised transaction, the originator needs to decide whether to 
structure it as a sale of assets or as a loan from investors. For regulatory purposes, the 
assets arc considered sold if the originator transfers to the buyer substantial "incidents" 
of ownership of the assets, which include the risks and benefits of owning the assets. If 
the assets are sold without resource, the risks and benefits of owning the assets are 
entirely transferred to the buyer. If some risks and benefits are retained by the originator, 
depending on the magnitudes of the retention, the transaction may be considered a loan 
from investors (Adelman and Lorencc, 1989). 
Sales recognition is important for two reasons. First, it allows realisation of gain or loss 
for tax purposes. This is particularly critical for transactions aimed at realising book loss 
of assets, such as Prudential's sale of policyholder loans. Second, it allows removal of the 
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assets from the originator's balance sheet, and that removal frees up the originator's 
equity capital to support more lending. 
5.3 Literature review 
Although several professional books have dealt with the topic of securitisation, the 
academic literature on securitisation is not well developed. A general review of the 
reasons for securitisation is found in Calstrom and Samolyn (1993). Their analysis is 
based on a markct-based rationale for loan sales with no resource. They emphasised the 
irnportance of internal bank funds as a determinant of local InVestment when bankers 
have a comparative advantage in screening and monitoring these projects. They showed 
that costly information and the attendant importance of bank capital in limiting on- 
balance sheet lending cause loan sales to arise. Loan sales are effectively a way to employ 
non-local bank capital to support local investments. The model charactcrises how 
outright loan sales can occur even when acquiring banks cannot perfectly screen the ex 
ante quality of the loans they are purchasing; purchasers assess that banks are selling 
loans because they do not have the capital to hold them. Thus, an important prediction 
emerges: banks that are capital-constrained in the face of high loan demand arc more 
likely to engage in loan sales. 
Although their model was referred to banks, the general framework on the financial 
market Imperfections rather than on banks per se; the nature of the information 
produced by financial intermediaries can affect the form of external finance. Their results 
highlight that when the amount of capital affects an intermediary's marginal investment 
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decision, asset sales may be an efficient way of funding local loans in times of high loan 
demand. 
The one theoretical model published to date is an informational asymmetric model by 
Greenbaum and Thakor (1987) that predicts that banks wifl securitise their best assets, 
retaining their worst. Note that 'worst' is in terms of the expected value of the payoff of 
a loan. Greenbaum and Thakor's model suggests that an increase in regulatory taxes on 
banks has caused the rise of securitisation. This, however, does not explain the rise of 
securitisation within the non-banking sector, the critical role of rating agencies, and the 
rise of securitisation in jurisdictions where regulatory taxes are being reduced. They 
viewed the bank as an institution with a cost advantage in screening borrowers. Hence, 
banks are able to perform the loan origination function more efficiently than others. 
They showed that the bank's decision to fund a loan is affected by credit market 
informational asymmetries, the information processing technology, and by governmental 
intervention. 
Clearly, with symmetric information regarding borrowers' payoff distributions and 
without governmental intervention, banks are indifferent between deposit funding and 
securitisation. However, with asymmetric information about borrowers' payoff 
distributions, and still without governmental intervention, banks -%vill prefer securitisation 
for their best assets and deposit funding for their worst. Governmental deposit insurance 
and regulation will affect the bank's choice of funding mode under asymmetric 
information. Sufficiently low bank capital requirements in combination with sufficiently 
generous regulatory subsidies linked to footings will lead to the choice of the traditional 
deposit funding mode, regardless of the quality of borrowers. Thus, the incentive to 
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securitise can be enhanced by third-party insurers and mutual funds. However, once 
again a sufficiently large footings-related regulatory subsidy can result in a preference for 
deposit funding. The choice of the funding inode will also be affected by information 
processing costs. For securitisation to be preferred these costs must be low enough. 
Greenbaum and Thakor find that in an unregulated environment with asymmetric 
information, banks will securitisc as wcH as fund somc of thcir loans. Moreover, without 
contemporary information systems that support the servicing of large and complex asset 
pools and the trading of partitioned (stripped) claims against these pools, securitisation 
would be impossible. Thus, the information cost argument is facilitating. Technological 
-advances have undeniably reduced the cost of producing liquidity. But this argument 
alone would lead to the liclucfaction of intermediary assets without their necessary sale. 
Thus, with sufficiently low costs of liquefying assets, banks and thrifts could be expected 
to do so without disposing of them. 
Lockwood et al. (1996) provide some evidence that supports Greenbaum and Thakor's 
hypothesis and give indirect evidence of the regulatory burden borne by banks. In a 
study of 294 securitisations by financial institutions, they show that securitisation 
increases shareholder wealth in well-capitalised banks and finance companies but reduces 
shareholder wealth in weak banks. They examine several propositions related to asset 
securitisation. Firstly, they test the proposition that securitisation leads to wealth effects 
for shareholders of issuing firms. Second, the proposition that wealth effects from 
securitisation differs by industry is examined by classifying securities into four groups 
using SIC codes (banks and thrift institutions, finance companies, automobile 
companies, and other industrial firms). Third, they test the proposition that wealth 
164 
effects of the ABS differ on the basis of financial slack status of issuing firms. The 
hypothesis is based on the fact that the ABS announcement of firms with little financial 
slack will be viewed less favourably than the ABS announcements of firms with superior 
financial slack. They also test the proposition that wealth effects differ on the basis of 
type of asset being securitised (auto loans, credit card receivables, trade and lease 
receivables). Finally, Lockwood et al. test the proposition that the ABS issue leads to a 
change in market and interest rate risk of the issuing firms. 
A sample of 294 public offerings was obtained consisting of 121 ABS issues by banks, 48 
by finance companies, 65 by automobile companies, and 60 by other (non-auto) 
industrial companies. They proxy financial slack for the quarter preceding the ABS 
announcement as capital surplus plus retained earnings and they derive a relative firm 
slack variable as follows: first, they divide slack for the firm by the firm's market value 
(price per share times number of outstanding shares of common stock) for the quarter 
preceding the ABS announcement to derive a size-adjusted slack measure for the firm. 
Then, they repeat the procedure for the industry to which the firm belongs to derive a 
size-adjusted slack measure for the industry. Industry slack is the sum of the slack 
variables for all firms in the industry and industry size is the sum of the market values of 
all firms in the industry. Finally, the defmc the relative slack measure for each firm by 
dividing the firm's slack measure by the industry's slack measure. 
In order to examine the wealth effects of the ABS announcement, standard event study 
methodology was employed. Daily returns for the 294 events were taken and the 
parameters of the market model were estimated using these daily returns over days 
-111 
to 
-11 relative to the announcement day (t = 
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where R, t is the return on security j for day t, R,,, is the return on the cquaUy-weighted 
market index for day t, and ej, is the random disturbance for security j, day t. The 
foHowmg 21 days (-10 through +10) were designated as the event period. 
To examine the null hypothesis that the mean excess return across the n events equals 
zero, the foHowing test statistics for excess return for event day t, - ERpt 
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and for 
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To determine the effect of securitisation on the wealth of stockholders of the issuing 
firms, excess returns were computed and examined for the entire sample and on sub- 
samples grouped by industry. 
Differential effects based on financial slack and type of ABS were assessed using a cross- 
sectional OLS regression of the CERj (- 1,0), 
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CERj(- 1, o) = Yo + YiRSj + Y2D, i + Y3D3i + 6j) i=1,2,..., n (5.4) 
where RSj is the relative financial slack of the firm as of the quarter preceding the ABS 
announcement; D, j equals one if the ANS is backed by auto loans, zero othenvise, and 
D3i equals one if the ABS is backed by trade or lease receivables, zero othenvise; and ci 
is a random disturbance. 
To exanune the effect of secuOtisation on the market and interest rate risk of issuing 
firms, the fMoxving regression was performed on each security, 
Rit 
-., ý oci + biR,,, t + b, ilt + b3iR., tDt + b4iltDt + ut, (5.5) 
where Ri, is the daily stock return, R,,,, is the return on an equally-weighted index, and 
1, is the daily interest rate variable orthogonalised with the market index; that is, 1, is 
the residual for day t in the regression performed on days 
-111 through -11 and +11 
through +120 of daily treasury bill rates on the market return. The variable D, is a 
dummy variable equal to zero for days 
-111 through -11 and equal to one for days + 11 
through +120. The change during the post-event period (days +11 through +120) in 
systernatic risk is measured by b3, while the change in interest rate risk is measured by 
b4* 
Lockwood et al. reported four major findings. First, the effects of asset securitisation 
were found to be industry specific. These initial tests indicated that finance companies 
realised wealth gain and banks realised wealth loss at the time of ABS announcement. 
167 
Automobile and other industrial firms realised no change in wealth at the time of their 
ABS announcements. 
Second, the wealth change at the time of the ABS announcement was found to be 
positively related to financial slack for banks. These findings indicated that banks that 
issue ABS at a time of capital weakness were viewed negatively by the market. To 
examine the slack proposition further, they compared the CERs of strong banks (high 
financial slack) with the CERs of weak banks (low financial slack). Strong banks 
experienced significant wealth gain, whereas weak banks experienced significant wealth 
loss 
Furthermore, they found that wealth effects of ABS were unaffected by the type of asset 
being securitised. There were no significant differential wealth effects across credit card, 
auto loans, and trade and lease receivables securitisations after controlling for the 
financial slack status of the issuing firms. Finally, the evidence suggested that market and 
interest rate risk dropped after the ABS -announcement for automobile and finance 
companies. The evidence also indicated that interest rate risk dropped after the ABS 
announcement for strong banks. In contrast, there were a significant number of increases 
in both market and interest rate risk after the ABS announcement for weak banks. From 
their findings, it is clear that the market perceives benefits accruing to financc companies 
and strong banks that securitise assets. For these firms, securitisation may reduce the 
need for financing, offer fee income, and increase earnings even more in cases where 
securitisation is used to retire existing debt. ABS also may lead to a decrease in risk 
through a decreased reliance on debt financing and through earnings smoothing by an 
appropriate timing of receivable sales. 
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Moreover, the market perceives costs accruing to weak banks that secuntise assets. 
Securitisation by weak banks may lead to ovcr-collaterahsation, high marginal cost to 
originate new loans, and reduction in loan portfolio size. The potential negatives also 
may led to a deterioration in the quality and stability of reported earnings, increasing risk 
for weak banks that securitised assets. 
The role of rating agencies is generally neglected when academics consider the evolution 
of financial institutions' interaction with financial markets, yet it is critical. Jones et al. 
(1995) looks at Duff and Phelps' philosophy in assessing mortgage backed securities 
while Goldstein (1996) outlines how differing rating agencies' perception of probability 
of default versus severity of default affect ratings, but they do not mention 
securitisations. 
Okabe (1998) describes securitisation as being an alternative financing source with an 
clement of catastrophic risk off-lay for that part of risk not covered by the credit 
enhancements. The evolution of securitisation presents new challenges to investors in 
the debt and equity of the securitisers because the continuing exposure of securitisers to 
part of the securitised assets' risk is not eVident from the post securitisation financial 
statements. Citing Moody's efforts to create alternative analytical techniques for 
securitisers (Foley and Foley, 1997), Okabe focuses particularly on the difficulties on 
interpreting the one-off gain from sale that securitiscrs must book under the recently 
promulgated Financial Standards Accounting Board Ruling 125 (FASB 1996). Lenders 
that use securitisation have created a variable in their financial statements 
- 
namely, the 
"residual" income that is captured in the gain-on-sale calculation 
- 
that affects the value 
of the asset backed debt as weU as the corporate sponsor's debt and equity. In his 
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analysis, Okabe showed how changes in the key variables used in calculating the gain-on- 
sale residual can affect the result and, in so doing, affect investors' evaluation of both the 
asset backed securities and corporate financial strength. 
There are four major components to the calculation of the present value of the residual 
in a securitisation: 
1. the structure and costs of the underlying ABS deal; 
2. expected prepayments; 
3. expected credit defaults; and 
4. the present value discount rate. 
Of these variables, only the structure of the ABS deal is fixed and unchangeable; each of 
the other variables is subject to interpretation -and judgement. Okabe stressed the fact 
that the assumptions used to calculate the gain should represent management's best 
estimates as to the performance of the loan pool. Investors that apply methods that 
measure the level of risk in this receivable are better prepared to price this risk into the 
securities, whether they be ABS or corporate obligations. 
Although credit-granting standards create a significant level of conformity in evaluating 
borrower behaviour, the probability of default of one specific loan is independent of the 
probability of default of another. The ability of an ABS trust to absorb this default risk is 
a function of the performance of the serviccr and the funds expected to be available 
from the loan pool, which is reported by sponsoring lenders as the present value of the 
residual interest in the trust. As we mentioned above, there are only three variables that 
can affect the default rate and cash avaflable 
- 
default rates, prepayments, and the 
valuation discount rate. 
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Default rates and volatility in credit loss performance can be measured in an objective, 
disciplined way through static pool analysis. These data may be available from the 
sponsoring lender or in the public domain through securitisation servicing reports. For 
amortising asset pools, the greatest determinant of available cash flow is prepayments, 
which -affect a significantly larger portion of the loan pool than defaults. A change in 
prepayments causes a greater movement in the amount of excess cash flow than any 
other factor. Discount rates, while an important factor in determining the carrying value 
of the finance income receivable, affect the rate of return on the retained asset rather 
than the actual cash flow or asset performance. 
A comprehensive analysis of the gain-on-sale calculation can provide both corporate and 
ABS investors with significant insight into the level of risk in the securities they own. It 
also offers a tool for determining whether returns justify the risks involved. However, 
residual analysis is not a panacea. Investors should continue to draw information and 
insight from every available source, including equity, fixed income, and debt rating 
analysts, security undenvriters, credit enhancement providers, and, most important, the 
sponsoring lenders. These insights, when combined with residual analysis, provide an 
integrated analytic approach that gives investors the best opportunity to manage risk and 
maximise returns. 
Another strearn of the literature that considers sin-ýIar concepts discusses asset sales. 
Lang et al. (1995) look at substantial non-fixcd income asset sales from non-financial 
corporations. They argue that firms selling assets arc looking for the cheapest source of 
funds for meeting their objectives 
- 
essentiaRy an agency conflict story. They find that 
the stock market reaction to asset sales is positive only when the proceeds of the sale are 
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paid out to shareholders. Their starting point is that management values firm size and 
control, so that it is reluctant to sell assets for efficiency reasons alone. For such 
management, a more compelling motivation to sell assets is that asset sales provide funds 
when alternative sources of financing are too expensive, possibly because of agency costs 
of debt or because information asymmetries make equity sales unattractive. 
With this view, which they call the financing hypothesis of asset sales, the completion of 
an asset sale is good news about the value of the asset because if the value of the value 
had turned out to be low, the sale would not have taken place. Further, one expects the 
market to discount proceeds of asset sales retained by the firm in the presence of agency 
costs of managerial discretion since shareholders do not capture all of the value of the 
asset sold. 
Lang et al. test the financing hypothesis of asset sales against the efficient deployment 
hypothesis of asset sales, where asset sales promote efficiency by allocating assets to 
better uses, and sellers capture some of the resulting gains. The efficient deployment 
hypothesis assumes that management maximises shareholder wealth. In contrast, the 
financing hypothesis assumes that management pursues its own objectives and, more 
specifically, values control and firm size. Since it values firm size, management has little 
incentive to sell assets unless it needs to raise funds and cannot do so cheaply on capital 
markets. Management may have to raise funds to reduce financial distress costs, to pay 
dividends to shareholders to prevent a takeover, or to undertake investments that it 
values but shareholders do not. 
In order to inVestigate the financing hypothesis, they had to identify the use of the 
proceeds from asset sales, since this hypothesis specifics that the stock-price effect of the 
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announcement of asset sales is related to the use of the proceeds. Since the analysis was 
focused in the differences between firms that were expected to pay out the proceeds and 
those that were not, Lang et al. used 93 sales made by 77 firms to determine why the 
asset was sold and how management expected to use the proceeds. The sample had 40 
asset sales by 35 firms NVIth proceeds paid out to creditors and/or shareholders and 53 
sales by 43 firms with proceeds retained by the firm (the sample of 40 sales was called 
the 'pay-out sample' and the sample of 53 sales the 'reinvest sample'). 
If the financing hypothesis applies to the sales in the sample, one would expect the 
proceeds paid out to be used to pay down debt rather than to distribute cash to 
shareholders. If a firm is excessi'Vely levered in management's eyes, management has a 
strong motivation to sell assets to reduce leverage and avoid possible costs of financial 
distress. In contrast, management that values size and control seems unlikely to want to 
pay out the proceeds to the shareholders in the absence of pressures from the market for 
corporate control. The financing hypothesis also predicts that the market discounts the 
proceeds of successful asset sales when the proceeds are reinvested. In order to test this 
hypothesis, the authors compared the announcement abnormal returns for the pay-out 
sample and the reinvest sample. Finally, they employed a regression analysis framework 
of the abnormal return on firm and sale characteristics to identify any significant relation 
between the stockýprlce reaction and the use of the proceeds. 
Their findings are consistent with the financing hypothesis. On average, firms benefit 
from announcing successful sales because a successful sale means that the firm received 
enough money to make the sale worthwhile. Further, proceeds are discounted when 
retained by the selling firm because of agency costs of managerial discretion. In the 
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particular sample, firms selling assets typically were poor performers and they were more 
likely to pay out the proceeds when they find it difficult to scnllcc their debt. The average 
stock-price reaction to asset sales is positive and it is significantly higher for firms that 
pay out the proceeds. There was not, however, a direct link between abnormal returns 
and proXies for agency costs of managerial discretion. Though their evidence 
demonstrates the relevance of the financing hypothesis, it is also clear from the analysis 
and from the empirical results that it is difficult to evaluate the information conveyed by 
asset sales because asset sales convey news about the value of the asset sold, the intended 
use of the proceeds and, possibly, the firm's financial strength. Larger samples of 
possibly less significant asset sales might offer a way to disentangle these various effects 
with more precision and provide useful information on the relative importance of the 
financing hypothesis and of the efficient deployment hypothesis. 
5.4 Securitisation in the insurance industry 
In general, as we mentioned before, securitisation benefits borrowers by enhancing 
capital supply at competitive costs, it benefits investors by broadening the spectrum of 
investment options, and it benefits originators by generating underwriting fees and 
trading commissions. The benefits and costs that are unique to the insurance industry 
can take various forms. 
Pavel and Phillis (1987) empirically show that regulatory taxes have an important impact 
on a bank's decision to sell loans. Similar regulatory taxes (including surplus and reserve 
requirements and pren-uums paid to guaranty funds) are imposed on insurers, and they 
can be avoided, in theory, with sales of assets and liabilities through securitisation. Shante 
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(1989) and Agostino and Cosgrove (1990) suggest that sales of loadings of renewal 
premiums through securitisation can improve surplus if the transaction is structured 
without recourse. 
In 1988, General American Life "sold" a part of its renewal premiums to Citicorp. In 
1987, Monarch Capital, the parcnt of Monarch Life Insurancc Company, "sold" certain 
deferred charges on single premium variable fife products to a syndicate of nine 
commercial banks. Neither company was allowed to treat its transaction as a sale of 
assets and both were required to set up reserves. Consequently, no surplus relief resulted. 
Thus, regulatory conservatism may be one reason that similar transactions have not been 
seen more often. Other reasons could be the lack of expertise in such transactions and 
the costs of sccuritising uncertain cash flows such as renewal premiums. 
If regulatory and technological changes become favorable to securitisation, insurers 
(particularly mutual insurers because of their inability to raise capital in financial markets) 
with low expense ratios will bcncfit from securitisation. by specializing in originating and 
servicing policies (i. e., Cananwill was able to originate and service more premium loans 
to earn fees by "churning" over the sale proceeds from securitiscd premium loans). 
Prop erty-liability insurers, who often suffer from cycles of hard and soft markets partially 
due to availability of capital, will also benefit from securitisation (see Winter, 1988; 
Cummins and Danzon, 1992). 
Moreover, securitisation can create liquidity. Sales of the securitised assets generate assets 
(cash) for the originator and, thus, liquidity. Another way is by converting illiquid assets 
into high-grade securities through tranching and credit enhancing. The high credit rating 
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enhances the marketability of the securitised assets and thus increases the value of the 
undcrlying asscts. 
Another major benefit that incurred through securitisation is tax savings. Tax savings can 
originate from two sources: the tax shelter from realising the book loss of policyholder 
loans and the savings in equity tax for mutual insurers. 
However, there are potential costs involved in the securitisation process of different 
assets. For example, sales of assets with market values lower than book values result in a 
lower equity-to-surplus ratio. This can be costly if capital requirements or optimal capital 
structure concerns induce the insurer to raise additional capital. Thus, xvhilc the 
realisation of book loss creates a tax shelter, it also generates the potential need for new 
equity capital. 
An adverse selection problem could result from securitisation. Good risks would be 
securitised and sold off, and poor risks would be left on the insurer's books and insured 
by guaranty funds for a flat premium. This adverse selection might shift poor risks from 
insurers who securitise to other insurers, policyholders, or taxpayers. The risk-based 
capital requirements, however, would curtail such adverse selection. 
Moreover, securitisation is a complex process that incurs underwriting, issuing, and 
credit enhancement costs. Among these costs, credit enhancement costs are the most 
significant for securitising insurance products, because a certain degree of cash-flow 
engineering is necessary to securitisc complex insurance products, assets, or liabilities. 
From the perspective of costs and expertise involved in a transaction, insurance products 
or assets with more stable cash flows are more likely to be securitiscd. 
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5.5 Origins of insurance securitisation and the problem of risk transfer 
Insurance securitisation most likely originated in the reinsurance capacity crisis that 
f6flowed Hurricane Andrew, when the amount of coverage nearly halved and premium 
rates nearly doubled. Claims following Hurricane Andrew reached $18 billion, the most 
costly insured event in history. Another capacity and pricing crisis followed the 
Northridge Earthquake in California in 1994, which produced $11 billion in insured 
losses. After that, capacity surged and rates softened with the advent of new reinsurers in 
Bermuda and the revitalisation of the Lloyd's insurance syndication market. 
From 1989 to 1995, total insured property losses in the U. S. reached $75 billion, nearly 
50% morc than total insured property losses in the preceding 40 years. In that same 
period, average insured loss per catastrophe exceeded $300 million, versus Just $56 
million in the earlier period. This explosion in insurance exposure was the result of 
several fqctors: rising population density in heavily insured areas, inflation of property 
values, and increased penetration of property/casualty insurance. 
Broad dixcrsification has become more elusive for property reinsurers as, globaUy, there 
has been little growth in insured values, apart from a few peril regions. Industry risk 
books abound with exposure to California earthquake, Southeastern U. S. hurricane, 
European windstorm and flood, and Japanese earthquake. Volatility in reinsurance 
pricing and capacity has followed increased population density and the growth of 
insurance demand concentrated in those few peril areas; insurers have begun to turn to 
capital markets and derivatives technology to smooth out those swings and to customise 
the terms of coverage, including multi-year cover. 
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By 1997, insurer USAA (United States Automobile Association), with exposures 
concentrated in Florida, Texas, Virginia, and the Carolinas, used a sccuritisation to secure 
cover for windstorm losses in states on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. USAA entered into 
a single-occurrcncc, excess-of-loss reinsurance treaty with a Cayman rcMsurcr established 
specifically to provide that single coverage: the entire source of capital backing 
Residential Rc, the special-purpose remote reinsurer, in underwriting the treaty was 
provided by an issuance of $477 mflhon one-year notes. The note proceeds provided 
collateralised cover for an 80% quota share of up to $500 million in losses in excess of 
USAA's retention of $1 billion in losses. Thus, a capital markets issuance served to 
collateralise both the notes and the reinsurance treaty, creating a new source of high 
credit quality reinsurance capacity (on June 1,2000, Residential Re issued its fourdi 
annual instalment of one-year notes, with similar terms). 
Investors have also shown interest in non-catastrophe insurance sccuritisations. In 1998, 
the special-purpose vehicle Mutual Securitisation plc issued two tranches of limited 
resource notes (, C140 million class Al due 2012 and 
, 
C120 million class A2 due 2022) 
linked to the emerging surpluses, or profits, of National Provident Institution (NPI), a 
UK mutual fife insurer. These notes respond to the mortality and lapse rates of a 
specified block of life policies and the management of a portfolio of -assets supporting 
the policies. The main source of emerging surplus is embedded management charges 
levied on an asset portfolio. Repayment of the bonds will be linked to the repayment of a 
loan made to NPI by Mutual Securitisation; to repay the loan, NPI will depend upon the 
surplus associated with the dcfmed book of policies. 
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Generally, catastrophe-linked securities is an emerging asset class of structured insurance 
risk products. These securities offer returns that are linked to the occurrence of 
catastrophic events such as earthquakes and hurricanes. They can provide investors with 
diversification from corporate and asset-backcd securities at comparable or wider 
spreads. Issued through special purpose vehicles Oust like the securitisation of regular 
assets), these securities offer an opportunity to participate directly in catastrophe risk 
without having to assume the operational risks inherent in securities issued by property 
and casualty insurance companies that underwrite this risk. Investing in "pure" 
catastrophe risk can also improve the risk/return profile of a diversified portfolio of 
assets because this risk is generally non-correlated xvith the systematic risks present in 
other securities markets. 
In addition, an outgrowth of the need for additional reinsurance capacity following 
Hurricane Andrew (1992) and the Northridge Earthquake (1994), which in combination 
produced $45 billion in industry-wide insured losses (in 1997 dollars), catastrophc-finked 
securities provide insurers with a new form of reinsurance protection. In exchange for a 
reinsurance premium (i. e., interest on the securities), investors assume financial exposure 
to the risk that a catastrophe will strike and will generate insured losses above a certain 
level. If such a catastrophe occurs, catastrophc-finked securities investors would receive a 
reduced yield and/or lose part or all of their principal, and the insurer would receive a 
reinsurance claim payment. By transferring catastrophe risks to the capital markets in this 
manner, insurance companies are supplementing their use of traditional reinsurance and 
internal loss management mechanisms to reduce volatility in their financial statements 
and preserve overaH fiquidity. 
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Moreover, very little of the reinsurance in place provides protection against industry- 
wide losses for catastrophic events greater than $5 billion. That is, for a $50 billion 
catastrophic event, the overwhelming majority of the last $45 billion of losses (after the 
first $5 billion) are not covered by reinsurance. In a narrow sense, this is not surprising, 
given that the relatively small capital and surplus of the reinsurance industry ($26.7 
billion for US reinsurers, $6.5 billion for Bermudan reinsurers, $7 billion for Getman 
reinsurers, and $16.8 billion for others). Thus, -at present levels of capital, the world wide 
reinsurance industry is not capable of funding large event risks in the US alone, not to 
mention the rest of the world. 
It is striking that so little reinsurance is available for large event losses. A number of 
studies have focused on the detern-dnants of the corporate demand for insurance (Mayers 
and Smith, 1982; Mayers and Smith, 1990). These analyses explicitly recognisc that while 
the primary motive for individuals' insurance purchases, risk aversion can partially 
explain the demand for insurance by closely held corporations and partnerships, it 
provides a dcficicnt explanation for insurance purchases by widely held corporations. 
Mayers and Smith (1982) argue that the corporate demand derives from the ability of 
insurance contracts to (1) allocate risk to those of the firm's claimholders who have a 
comparative advantage in risk bearing, (2) lower expected transactions costs of 
bankruptcy, (3) provide real-service efficiencies in clairns administration, (4) monitor the 
compliance of contractual provisions, (5) bond the firm's real investment decisions, (6) 
lower the corporation's expected tax liability, and (7) reduce regulatory constraints on 
firms. 
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Hoyt and K hang (1999) also study the corporate insurance purchase decision. They find 
evidence that tax effects, as outlined in Mayers and Smith (1982), are important. 
Specifically, insurance provides a faster adjustment of the depreciable basis of 
replacement property than does self-insurance. It also aRows the firm to protect other 
tax benefits (investment tax credits, loss carry-forwards, etc. ). Insuring depreciated assets 
can be profitable after tax. If the premium is a deductible expense, after tax it could be 
less than expected losses. At the same time if the recovery of a loss is not taxable 
income, after tax the expected recovery then exceeds the premium, with no offsetting 
book loss as the lost asset was depreciated. Hoyt and Khang found that insurance 
purchases increased significantly with increases in the ratio of cumulative depreciation to 
the historical cost of fixed assets. 
In a subsequent study, Mayers and Smith (1990) examined reinsurance purchases by 
1,276 prop erty/ casualty insurance companies and provided evidence that ownership 
structure matters. Generally, the less divusified the owners' portfolios, the greater the 
reinsurance purchases. Thus, as a confirmation of financial theory expectations, Lloyd's 
reinsure most, while widely held stocks reinsure least. Moreover, subsidiary and group 
relations affect the demand for reinsurance. They also provide evidence that size, credit 
standing, and geographic concentration reduce the demand for reinsurance and weak 
evidence that line-of-business concentration reduces reinsurance demand, as well. The 
estimated negative effect of geographic concentration suggests that the real-services 
-argument is quantitatively important. However, their results face potential limitations. 
The power o the tests employed is reduced by the lack of information about the tax 
status of individual firms. The data arc aggregated into lines of insurance; while within 
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lines, policies are undoubtedly heterogeneous in their riskiness. With more detailed 
information about the risks of the specific policies sold by particular firms, tests with 
greater power are possible. 
Thus, reinsurance and substitute risk transfer mechanisms in general, can be alternative 
forms of financing by allowing an insurer to write as if it had more surplus. If the 
servicing costs of debt exceed the loading elements of the reinsurance, risk transfer can 
increase the overall profitability. For mutual companies 'Without access to either debt or 
equity markets, reinsurance can become the only viable financing arrangement. 
Many observers, practitioners, and acadernics have argued that bringing catastrophic 
exposures directly to the capital markets can help reduce reinsurance prices and increase 
risk transfer. Mechanisms include cat-linked bonds, swaps, exchange traded options and 
futures, cat-linked issues of equity, etc. 
5.6 Catastrophe risk management: Capital markets trends 
Catastrophe risk can be viewed as composed of layers of risk from events with 
decreasing probability of occurrence and increasing magnitude of losses. Sophisticated 
modelling efforts have shown that catastrophic events occur in randorn intervals of time 
and less severe catastrophes occur with more frequency. Risk management of 
catastrophe losses varies from one insurer to another. 
As insurers have increased use of advanced catastrophe modeffing to predict losses, they 
have tended to purchase coverage equal to their probable loss under a severe loss 
scenario or, at a minimurn, for losses in excess of 10% of their capital. However, as we 
mentioned before, large insurers find that protecting their balance sheet against an 
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infrequent but large catastrophe is currently priced too high due to lack of capacity in the 
reinsurance industry for covering this type of risk. Hence, insurers are seeking capital 
market solutions to bridge this gap in capacity and to create a more efficient risk transfer 
mechanism. 
As insurers explore alternative solutions for gaining additional reinsurance coverage, they 
have participated in several creative capital market developments including government 
initiatives, exchange traded derivatives and catastrophe-linked securities. 
In response to reduced personal lines insurance availability after Hurricane Andrew, the 
US and state governments have created various funds to provide additional capacity in 
the event of a catastrophe. These include the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund, the 
California Earthquake Authority, the Hawaii Hurricane Relief Fund, and others. These 
funds are set up to access the capital markets immediately after an event to provide 
additional funding either directly to homeowners or to insurance companies. These 
special funds are expected to proNide incremental capacity to the property-casualty 
industry and potentially bridge part of the gap in reinsurance supply. 
The introduction of exchange traded catastrophe risk contracts marked the entry of 
insurance risk products into the capital markets. Derivative contracts are offered on the 
Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) and the Catex (nc-, vly formed electronic exchanges in 
New Jersey and Bermuda). These contracts have payoffs that depend on indices that 
measure insured losses from catastrophes in specific geographical regions. In principle, 
insurers can use these contracts to reduce their exposure to underwriting losses due to 
catastrophcs. 
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The first insurance derivative contracts, introduced by CBOT in December 1992, were 
futures contracts based on the undenvriting results of twenty-two insurers for the entire 
country and for three regions of the United States. (cast, mid-west, and west). Trading 
volume for these contracts was anemic during their two years of existence, which has 
been attributed to several factors, including: (1) insurets/remsurers' preference for 
option spreads (a long call position combined with a short call position with a higher 
exercise price) as opposed to future contracts because option spreads have payoff similar 
to catastrophe reinsurance contracts; (2) the lack of historical data on the underlying 
indices; and (3) the basis risk associated with broad geographical indices. The CBOT 
discontinued the futures contracts and now only trades option contracts. 
These particular option contracts are based on Property Claims Services (PCS) indices, 
which track the aggregate amount of Insured losses resulting from catastrophic events 
that occur in given regions and risk periods. After a catastrophic event occurs, PCS 
estimates the insured property damage by suneying a wide range of insurers regarding 
the doUar amount of claims they expect to receive (PCS defines a catastrophe to be an 
event that causes more than $25 million of insured losses to personal property, vehicles, 
boats, and busMcss interruption). PCS also uses its own information about the value of 
the property in the affected countries and, in some cases, conducts its own on-the- 
ground survey of the damage. 
Once PCS has made its assessment, it releases an official loss estimate for each of the 
states affected. The state losses arc added to the appropriate regional and/or state indices 
(see Table 5.1) so that each index represents the total losses incurred in that region 
during the risk period. 
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Table 5.1 PCS Catastrophe indices 
Region Risk period Contract months States covered 
Florida Quarterly Mar, Jun, Sep, Dec FL 
Tex-as Quarterly Mar, Jun, Sep, Dec TX 
California Annual Dec CA 
Eastern Quarterly Mar, Jun, Sep, Dec Includes Northeastern and 
Southeastern regions 
Northeastern Quarterly Mar, Jun, Sep, Dec ME, NH, VT, MA, CT, RI, NY, NJ, 
PA, DE, 1\11), DC 
Southeastern Quarterly Marjun, Sep, Dec VA, XVV, NC, SC, GA, 17L, AL, MS, 
LA 
Midwestern Quarterly Mar, Jun, Sep, Dec OK, AR, TN, KY, OH, MI, IN, IL, 
Wl, MN, ND, SD, IS, NE, KS, 1\10 
Western Annual Dec HI, AP, ' WA, OR, CA, NV, AZ, NNI, 
UT, CO, XVY, MT, ID 
National Quarterly, Mar, Jun, Sep, Dec, All fifty states plus Washington DC 
Annual Annual 
The risk period for each index is the time period over which losses arc aggregated. For 
an index in which catastrophes are seasonal (as in the case of hurricanes and tornadoes), 
the risk period is quarterly and the options trade on a March, June, September, 
December cycle. For regions in which catastrophes are not seasonal (earthquakes), the 
risk period is annual and only a December contract is traded. Each index is zero at the 
beginning of its risk period and in increases by one point for each $100 million of 
insured property damage that occurs in the time period. 
Following each risk period, moreover, there is a "loss-development" period of either six 
or twelve months. During this time, PCS will update the amount of damage that 
occurred during the risk period as more information becomes available. For example, if 
there were storms in Florida in the third quarter of 1997 that caused an aggregate of $10 
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billion of damage, the September 1997 Florida index value would be 100. But if during 
the fourth quarter, PCS determines that the storms actuaRy caused $12-25 biflion of 
damage, the September 1997 Florida index would be adjusted to 122.5, while the 
December 1997 Florida index would be unaffected by this change. 
The development period is necessary due to the difficulty in making a timely and 
accurate assessment of the amount of damage that has occurred after a large catastrophic 
event. The development period thus insures that the indices are accurate reflections of 
the damages incurred, and that buyers receive the fuU benefits of their hedges. 
Although the more narrowly defined geographical areas should help reduce the basis risk 
that is involved with the PCS catastrophe options, industry analysts continue to cite basis 
risk as one of the main shortcomings of these particular derivatives contracts (Major, 
1997). Harrington and Niehaus (1999) provide evidence on the potential effectiveness of 
state-specific insurance derivatives in hedging underwriting risk by relating individual 
insurer groups' annual loss ratios for homeowners, commercial multiple peril, and fire 
insurance in twenty eastern and southern states. They find that state-specific PCS 
catastrophe derivatives can be effective hedges against variation in insurer by line and 
state loss ratios. They also suggest that industry by fine and state loss ratios, on average, 
could provide more effective hedges than by line and state catastrophe loss ratios. 
Finally, they report that derivatives on state-specific catastrophe losses may allow 
homeowners insurers with different books of business in different states to construct 
materially more effective hedges than with a broader regional contract. 
Apart from catastrophe options, catastrophe-linked securities have been issued by 
insurance companies that they want to transfer or sale insurance risk in the form of an 
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investment security. These securities are issued for -an expected maturity with the 
payment of coupon and retirement of principal dependent on occurrence of a 
catastrophic event with losses greater than a specified trigger during a dcfincd risk or 
loss-occurrence period. As in other assct-backcd transactions, the issuer sets up a special 
purpose vehicle (SPNý that is bankruptcy remote. The vehicle is generally set up offshore 
for regulatory and tax reasons and issues securities that carry the risk of catastrophe 
losses over a specified level. It then issues a back-to-back reinsurance contract to the 
insurer, thus enhancing the insurer's reinsurance coverage. 
The security, Eke reinsurance, can be structured as a quota-sharc or an excess-of-loss 
issue. In the quota-share structure, the issuer shares with investors a fixed percentage of 
losses over the attachment point. In an excess-of-loss structure, investors absorb losses 
over the -, itt,, ichmcnt point for the total arnount of the issue (equivalent to the exposure 
amount in a reinsurance contract). 
The underlying catastrophe can either be one type of event or a mix of events. Risks can 
be spread across geographic region, type of event, or underlying property type 
(residential, commercial, industrial, ctc. ). Only events that occur prior to the end of the 
specified loss occurrence period and result in losses in excess of the attachment point arc 
considered loss events for the securities. Underlying losses in any specific transaction can 
be based either on the insurer's book of policies or on a basket of risks as measured, for 
example, by the PCS index. 
If the contract is based on the actual loss experience of the cedant's own book of 
business, this is known as an indemnity-based contract, and closely resembles a 
traditional reinsurance program. An indexed structure, on the other hand, can make it 
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easier for investors to analyse the risk, because they no longer need to understand the 
details of the cedant's business. However, the cedant can be exposed to basis risk, to the 
extent that its own exposure differs from that of the index used to determine the payoff 
of the contract. It is possible that in a given event, the ccdant experiences large losses, 
while the losses in the index 
- 
and thus the payments to the cedant 
- 
are relatively small. 
Because of this basis risk, the cedant may want to pay less of a premium for such 
coverage. A final possibility for the contract structure is the use of physical parameters of 
the natural hazard, such as the magnitude and location of an earthquake, as the trigger 
(parametric structure)- 
The SPN7 invests cash nused from the issue in high quality, liquid, fixed income 
mstruments (typically US Treasuries or AAA rated securities). This short-term portfolio 
is used to cover losses from events or to repay investors on maturity of the bond, and to 
provide a minitnum rate of return (e. g., LIBOR, Treasury bill). The contract is structured 
like a cash-collateralised reinsurance contract, and unlike traditional reinsurance 
contracts, does not carry any credit risk of the reinsurer. The coupon of the catastrophe- 
linked securities includes a spread over the minitnum rate earned by the short-term 
portfolio. The insurer pays the spread to the SPN7, which passes through the total coupon 
payment to investors (see Figure 5.1). 
The maturity of the security is based on the period during which a loss event can occur, 
called the risk period (or the loss occurrence period), and the time for computation of 
losses, called the development period. The development period may be up to one year, 
during which time the company receives final claims, surveys its p olicyholders' properties 
and deternunes total damage claims. Typically, loss estimates two to three months after 
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the catastrophe give an indication of whether losses from the event have exceeded the 
trigger. However, the actual amount of losses is determined after the development period 
(i-c., aftcr final claims arc received). 
Figure 5.1 Iffustrative CLS structure 
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To attract a wider investor base, some structures provide protection of principal, with 
only coupon at risk. This is accomplished by establishing a structural feature which 
provides the investor with US Treasury STRIPS with a par value equal to the principal 
value of the catastrophe-linked security, upon occurrence of a quafiý, Ing catastrophe. 
Since principal for these securities is backed by US Treasuries, these securities will 
generaHy be rated higher than catnstrophe-linked securities with principnl at risk. 
Nevertheless, investors face the risk of earning little or no yield for the remaining period 
of the STRIPS. A related structure which has been considered involves swapping US 
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Treasury securities held by the SPV for surplus notes or equity of the insurer upon 
occurrence of a qualifying catastrophe. 
The appeal of catastrophc-finkcd securities (i. e., cat bonds) has been documented in 
several different studies. Froot et al (1995) show that cat investments over-performcd 
domestic bonds and that the returns on cat risks are less volatile than either stocks or 
bonds. They have examined pricing and claims data from actual reinsurance contracts 
(more than 2,000 contracts) brokered by Guy Carpenter Co. from 1970 to 1994. All of 
the contracts were excess-of-loss contracts (with a pre-specified maximum amount at 
risk-). In order to calculate the return, they acted as though the investor put up an amount 
at the beginning of the contract year equal to two times the limit, thus accounting for a 
potential limit reinstatement. Insurers contribute the reinsurance premium and 
reinstatement premium (if any) into the same dollar pool. The authors assumed that all 
these funds were invested in US Treasury Bills, until and unless there is a drawdown due 
to the occurrence of an event. At the end of each year, the investor takes home aU funds 
remaining in the -account minus 1% of the limit, which the authors assumed that goes 
towards transaction fees. The investor's return is the excess above what an equal-sized 
investment in one-year Treasury bills would have returned. 
Froot at al. reported that by investing in a portfolio of cat reinsurance contracts 
(weighted by limit), an investor would have earned 200 basis points above the Treasury 
Bill rate. In the best and worst year from 1970 to 1994, the excess return would have 
been 7.5% and 
-22.1%, respectively. Higher average returns were earned by the lower 
layers, which are the excess-of-loss contracts that are most frequently impacted by loss. 
Also, the returns on national exposures were generally higher than returns on regional 
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exposures. However, they. were more volatile too, which is expected given that national 
companies are, on average, more exposed to high risk areas (such as Florida, California, 
etc. ) 
Moreover, they also find that the correlation between cat risks and other asset classes 
was statistically indistinguishable from zero. The estimated correlation coefficients 
between cat exposures and other asset classes range from a low of 
-0.13 to a high of 
0.21. by comparison, the correlation between US stocks and bonds is estimated to be 
much higher, at 0.40; between international stocks and international bonds at 0.45; and 
between international stocks and domestic stocks at 0.58. all of these latter correlations 
arc statistically positive at standard levels of significance. 
Another study by Canter ct al. (1997) shows that a portfolio of ten prormncnt 
catastrophe reinsurance companies has a strong positive correlation (beta of 0.83) with 
the stock market movements. As a result, buying reinsurance company equity does not 
bring significant diversification benefits to the investors. In this respect, catastrophe- 
linked securities offer better diversification opportunities since they are expected to have 
near zero betas. They also correlated the yearly percent change in the S&P 500 index 
with the yearly percent change in the PCS national index using data from 1949 to 1994. 
They find that the correlation cocfficicnt is insignificantly different from zero. Thus, 
options on PCS indices are expected to be zcro-beta asscts. 
Litzenberger et al. (1996) demonstrate that returns on cat bonds are essentially 
uncorrelated with the market, making them excellent tools for portfolio diversification. 
They showed that adding smaR amounts of securitised reinsurance to diversified 
portfolios would enhance the risk/reward opportunities to investors. By considering the 
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Black and Litterrman (1991) approach of the capital asset pricing model, they employed 
the Sharpe ratio of the portfolio in order to identify the attractiveness of this new asset 
class. The addition of a new security to an existing portfolio would be attractive if and 
only if it increases the portfolio's Sharpe ratio, i. e. the ratio of excess return to standard 
deviation of return. Over the sample period, March 1955 through December 1994, the 
correlations of the adjusted historical loss ratios (AHLR) with the returns on the S&P 
500 index and a government bond index were 0.058 and 0.105 respectively. These 
numbers imply that the correlation with the securities embedded with the cat exposure 
option is slightly negative, because the return on these securities varies inversely with the 
AHLRs. Their results (Table 5.2) show that catastrophe reinsurance bonds are 
sufficiently attractive to warrant inclusion in a diversified bond or balanced fund. 
Table 5.2 Excess returns for one-year cat notes 
Type of embedded 
CAT exposure 
Weight of CAT note in Excess of loss Binary 
enhanced portfolio (bp) (bp) 
S&P 500 index 1% 11 22 
2% 22 44 
Bond 1% 24 
2% 48 
Balanced 1% 13 27 
(50% stock/50% bond) 2% 27 53 
ROL 12,51% 19.25% 
Offered return 7.94 10.85 
FinaUy, Doherty (1997) identifies another txvo instruments in managing catastrophe risk. 
Apart from PCS options and catastrophe bonds, post-loss equity re-capitalisation and 
catastrophe equity puts -are two instruments that can be used in order to mitigate the 
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exposure faced by insurance companies. Contingent surplus notes (CSNs) are surplus 
notes than an insurer has purchased the right to issue to specific intermediaries or 
investors. The right may be contingent on certain events taking place, or it may be 
unconditional. An insurer that wants to use CSNs to access additional capital in the event 
of a catastrophe might arrange for a financial intermediary to set up an investment trust. 
Using the proceeds from the sale of trust notes or certificates to investors, the trust 
would invest in US government bonds or other liquid securities. The arrangement would 
give the insurer the right, under specified circumstances, to issue surplus notes to the 
financial intermediary in exchange for cash or liquid assets. The intermediary, in turn, 
would have the right to substitute the surplus notes for the securities held by the trust. 
It is obvious that investors can earn higher returns by investing in CSN trusts than by 
investing directly in treasury securities. The trusts can pay higher returns as a result of the 
fees they collect on behalf of investors. To the extent that an insurer meets its 
obligations under its surplus notes, investors receive periodic payments of interest and 
principal, even after the insurer suffers substantial catastrophe losses. 
On the other hand, insurers using CSNs may face high transaction costs. In addition to 
paying various fees, insurers incur the costs of giving intermediaries and investors the 
information those parties need to evaluate the risk they are assuming and their potential 
returns. Moreover, evaluating the probability that an insurer will repay surplus notes can 
be difficult, because the notes are subordinate to other claims on the insurer and because 
the insurer must get permission ftom the relevant regulatory authority to repay the notes. 
Finally, catastrophe equity puts, or CatEPuts-", are a form of option that stock insurers 
can buy from investors. These options, developed by AON Corporation, give an insurer 
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the right to seH a specified amount of its stock to investors at a predetermined price if 
catastrophe losses surpass a specified trigger. Thus, catastrophe equity puts can give 
insurers access to additional equity capital precisely when they need funds to cover 
catastrophe losses. 
An insurance company that uses catastrophe equity puts faces a counterparty risk 
- 
the 
risk that the seflers of the catastrophe equity puts -, viH not have enough cash available to 
purchase the agreed amount of the insurer's stock. Insurers can mininlise that risk by 
buying catastrophe equity puts only from investors with superior credit ratings. Insurers 
can also include in the catastrophe equity puts language that requires the investors to 
collateralise the options if their credit ratings deteriorate. 
Furthermore, an insurance company that uses catastrophe equity puts faces a risk that 
exercising its options will trigger a change in control of the company. The company can 
eliminate that risk by basing the catastrophe equity puts on non-voting shares, such as 
prcferred stock. 
On the other hand, investors selling catastrophe equity puts face the risk that the), NviH 
end up owning shares of a firm that cannot sun,, i-,, e. They can protect themselves against 
that possibility by including conditions that prevent insurers from exercising their 
catastrophe equity puts when they suffer losses so severe that they would still be 
impaired even after exercising their options and receiving the new capital. But, when 
catastrophe equity puts include such features, they provide less protection to insurers and 
their policyholders. 
An investor that sells catastrophe equity puts faces the same stock market risk as 
investors that sell traditional options on stocks 
- 
the risk that unanticipated downward 
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i-novcment in the price of a stock will make the predetermined price specified in the put 
options less attractive than when the investor sold the puts. An insurer that buys 
catastrophe equity puts does not necessarily face a corresponding risk that unanticipated 
upward movement in the price of its stock would reduce the attractiveness of the 
predetermined price, because the insurer is free to decide not to exercise its catastrophe 
equity puts and instead to raise capital using other means. 
5.7 Analysis of catastrophe bond stnicture and performance 
When insurance securitisations were first considered, insurers were reluctant to disclose 
too much of their undenvriting data. Ccdants receive the most precise coverage from 
indemnified transactions, which respond directly to a specified group of policies, but 
many were reluctant to reveal their under%vriting procedures or actual policy 
composition, beyond statutory filings. 
An indemnified transaction 
- 
such as the four annual Residential Re issuances for USAA 
- 
reflects the undcnvriting and claims settlement process of the ceding company. In this 
case, the safe account was a trust, administered by the offshore SPV Residential Re. 
Residential Re had no business purpose other than to sell a one-year $400 million 
reinsurance contract to USAA and to issue $400 million in risk-transfer securities to fully 
collateralise that reinsurance (Froot and Seasholes, 1997). The proceeds of the issuance 
were held in a trust and invested in highly rated, short-term investments such as 
commercial paper. In the event of a catastrophe, the trustee would have sold the 
investments to cover 80% of USAA's losses in excess of $1 billion (until the $400 million 
is exhausted). In return for this reinsurance, Residential Re rcccl'%Tcd a prcniiurn from 
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USAA of 600 basis points ($24 million). The premium, along with virtually all of the 
interest on the commercial paper, went directly to investors, regardless of whether USAA 
cxpcrienced a loss. 
To fund the reinsurance, Residential Re issued securities of two types: principal variable 
and principal protected. If there was a loss, principal variable investors would have lost 
some or all of their initial investment. These notes paid interest at a rate of LIBOR plus 
575 basis points (this is essentially interest plus the reinsurance premium of 600 basis 
points, less about 25 basis points for costs. The principal protected securities would have 
had their principal repayment delayed for ten years in the event of a loss, with a 
reduction in interest along the way. The principal protected securities paid LIBOR plus 
273 basis points. 
Following the risk of a covered peril event, the priMary difficulty facing investors M 
indemnified notes is the e. ýdstence of lengthy development periods, which are bond 
extensions that allow for the discovery of damage and the settlement of claims, a feature 
typical of insurance cover. Although the risk period ends on the scheduled maturity, at 
the option of the cedant, investors might have to wait two years or more to determine 
the disposition of their in-vestinent. 
Some issuance bonds are linked not to the ceding insurer's business but to the behaviour 
of an industry-wide or geographic index, such as the data compiled by PCS in the U. S. 
Ceding insurers that issue indexed notes can be exposed to significant basis risk, to the 
extent that the index does not mimic cedant losses. Bccausc it is gencraUy easier to 
calculate an index than the final claims of the ceding insurer, indexed notes tend to have 
development periods under two years. 
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For example, Seismic Ltd. (Seismic), domiciled in the Cayman Islands, issued $145.5 
million in 22-i-nonth notes. The note proceeds provide Bermuda-based Lehman Re with 
a source of indexed cover for cumuladvc insured losses in California if caused by 
earthquake and fire following earthquake, as determined by PCS. Seismic's payments to 
Lehman Re are tied to a reference schedule of cumulative insured quake losses. Under 
this schedule, principal in the collateral account will be paid out in increments of 10% of 
the original balance, per $1 billion in PCS estitnatcd losses over $22.5 billion. Lehman Re 
may also extend the notes for a month at its sole discretion, but up to 18 months, In 
three-month segments, if PCS loss estimates for the fixed, 22-month period exceed 
certain hurdles, which grow over time. 
This transaction is similar to a 1997 earthquake-linked two-year note issued by SR 
Earthquake Fund Ltd. There, Swiss Re sought PCS-indexed cover from California 
earthquakes. However, these notes were structured to respond to a large single event 
rather than to cumulative state-wide losses during the term of the notes. 
Finally, notes can be structured parametrically, without reference to the cedant's 
business. Parametric notes make their payments based upon pricing calculations related 
primarily to the quantities associated Nvith pertinent events, such as magnitude, intensity, 
and epicentre of an earthquake or wind speed, forward velocity, and country of landfall 
of a hurricane. This so-called synthetic indemnification could reduce basis risk to the 
cedant while nearly eliminating the development period for investors. Each indexed or 
parametric transaction must specify mathematically the relationship between the 
parametric formula or index and the claims against note principal by the ceding insurer. 
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In 1999, Concentric Ltd., domiciled in the Cayman Islands, issued $100 million five-year 
Japanese earthquake notes. Upon certain trigger-c-,, ent earthquakes, the assets in the 
collateral -account backing the notes will be used to make payments to Oriental Land, a 
Japanese real estate company, which is perhaps best-known as the owner and operator of 
Tokyo Disneyland. The amount of those payments will not be tied to indemnificd losses 
of Oriental Land. Rather, they Nvill be tied parametrically to earthquake depth, epiccntre, 
and magnitude as measured by the governmental Japanese Meteorological Agency. 
Payments will be made under a fixed formula, so the further an earthquake's epicentrc is 
from Tokyo Disneyland, the greater its magnitude must be to trigger a given level of 
payment. 
Atlas Re, domiciled in Ireland, provided another recent parametric issuance: thrce-year 
muld-perfl notes providing collaterafised rctrocessional capacity to French reinsurer 
SCOR S. A. The retrocessional agreement covers certain insured windstorm losses in 
seven European countries and certain insured losses due to earthquake and fire foHoNving 
quake in Japan and the contiguous U. S. Each year, SCOR will provide updated policy 
data to the peril modelling firm EQECAT. EQECAT will recalculate exposures, 
adjustment factors, and attachment points in three currencies. Payouts wiU be based on a 
subset of the subject business with high data resolution, then multiplied by an adjustment 
factor, to capture the likely effect on SCOR's whole subject business. EQECAT will 
determine the attachment points corresponding to a fixed annual probability and apply 
prevailing foreign exchange rates. EQECAT will also reset the per-event limit to 
maintain a constant loss exccedence probability. In this transaction, the notes will follow 
the fortunes of SCOR with respect to the subject buslness; in return, SCOR wiH retain a 
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10% quota share in the coverage layer provided by the notes. As to extension risk in the 
notes, if adjusted covered losses reach 75% of the attachment point, SCOR may elect to 
delay maturity by 18 months. 
Namazu Rc is a special-purpose Cayman Islands Class B reinsurer that in 1999 issued 
$100 rniflion five-year notes backing a reinsurance agreement with German rcinsurer 
Gerling-Konzern Globale Ruck-versicherungs-AG (Gcrling). This agreement wiH provide 
payments to Gerling following certain earthquakes in Japan. Namazu Rc was capitalised 
by issuing $5,000 in shares to a Cayman Islands charitable trust. 
Undqr the terms of the reinsurance agreement, Gerling wiH cover the expenses of 
Natnazu Re in connection with setting up the various vehicles and compensating the 
various service providers involved in the transaction (e. g., administrator, indenture 
trustee, and verification agent), in addition to the reinsurance premium, which provides 
the spread over LIBOR on the note coupons. Namazu Re has little capital and will rely 
on Gerling to pay its expenses, including the cost of any indernnifications provided by 
Namazu Re. 
Namazu Re exists only to transfer the flows of a reinsurance treaty into bond flows; 
restrictions on its activities are important to isolate the collateral from other parties. 
Thus, Namazu Re's business will consist solely of the issuance of the notes and the 
execution and performance of the reinsurance agreement and related agreements and 
activities. Namazu Re will not engage in any other business, incur any other 
indebtedness, distribute its capital (other than its own liquidation after the notes have 
matured), or enter into -any contract of insurance or reinsurance other than that With 
Gerling (see Figure 5.2). 
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Figure 5.2 Structure of the Namazu Re transaction 
r ---------- Total return 
Aon FP, 
Collateral 
guaranteed by Account Aon Corp., 44 
as Swap r LIBOR 
counterparty 
us$ LIBOR 
loom 
Security interest 
R/I M 
+ 
agreement I UUM 
GKG, Namazu Re Note holders 
as ceding 
reinsurer 
4.50% LIBOR A 
premium +4.50% 
rate 
----------------------- 
Claims payments Up to $loom 
-at redemption 
The note proceeds were deposited into a coHateral account assigned by a dced of charge 
(under English law) to an indenture trustee and then invested in mediurn-term U. S. 
government and agency paper, high grade commercial paper, and AAA securities with a 
weighted average life of no more than five years. 
Namazu Re also entered into a total-return swap with a AA counterparty, the primary 
purpose of which was to convert the return on the collateral account into a LIBOR 
coupon and to guarantee principal of the assets In the collateral account. The total return 
swap provides an enhancement of return on the coflateral account. However, without the 
principal guarantee of AON Corp., the assets would have to be invested in short-term 
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funds. In this transaction, investors arc relying on the credit of AON Corp. for the 
LIBOR coupon and the return of principal before the assets in the collateral account 
mature. 
The transaction was intended to mimic but not depend precisely on the indemnified 
losses of Gerling, so can be viewed as a synthetic indemnification. Serni-annually, Gerling 
will update the exposure data used by EQECAT, the peril modelling firm that assessed 
the transaction. EQECAT will then reset the layer covered by the reinsurance agrecment, 
so that cx ante the transaction presents investors with a constant risk profile through 
time. 
As a result, based not on a portfolio of policies but on a notional portfolio of locations 
'and policy terms stored in EQECAT's Japanese earthquake model, EQECAT will 
calculate the loss level coinciding with a 1% per annum probability of attachment (the 
notional portfolio is denominated in Yen, though the bonds are in U. S. dollars; the 
translation is irrespective of currency exchange rates). EQECAT will reset the 
attachment point (the lower end of the layer) to maintain that 1% probability whenever 
there is a meaningfully large quake or whenever Gerling would like to update the 
notional portfolio. Initially, the attachment point was set to 9.30 billion Yen. EQECAT 
then sets the exhaustion point (the top of the layer) high enough that the layer running 
between the attachment point and the exhaustion point has an annual expected loss of 
0.75%. The initial estimate was 12.583 billion Yen. Initially, a spike in damages up to that 
exhaustion point had a per annuin probability of 32% (see Figure 5.3). 
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Figure 5.3 General Scheme of the Coverage Layer 
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The initial coverage layer is the 3.283 billion Yen, running from 9.300 billion Yen 
(attachment point) to 12.583 billion Yen (exhaustion point). The per-annurn probability 
is 1% that damages on the notional portfolio reach 9.300 billion Yen and attach the note 
principal. The per annum probability is 0.32% that damages on the notional portfolio 
reach 12.583 billion Yen and exhaust the collateral account. The per annum expected 
loss is 0.75% of the notional portfolio, hence 0.75% of the note principal, since investors 
have a proportional interest (quota share) in the coverage layer. 
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5.8 Conclusions 
Currently, most insurance securitisations address wind, earthquake, and mortality risks, 
with sorne issuance in auto lease residual values and interest in covering personal auto 
liability. This focus had been the result of specific reinsurance capacity constraints and 
was driven by the search for coverage. 
In the future growing interest in the issuance of bonds tied to more generalised weather 
risks, such as excess heat or cold, excess rainfall or snowfall, and drought could be 
developed. These covers are not widely available at the moment, though many industries 
have large weather exposures, including agriculture, energy, property insurance, retailing, 
ski and other resorts, manufacturing, and real estate. According to the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange, where energy-, weather-, and agriculture-related futures contracts 
are traded, about 20% of the U. S. GDP is vulnerable to weather or natural hazards. 
Interest in life insurance securitisations wiU also remain strong. However, the use of 
assignments of life insurance policies in the secondary markets has been somewhat 
constrained by regulatory concerns. The NAIC has worked to address the possibility of 
unfair dealing in the assignment of elder life settlements. It is clear that legislation and 
oversight will pavc the way for substantial growth in the securitisation of life insurance. 
Moreover, different stakeholders can also join forces in promoting new financial 
instruments to supplement reinsurance for protecting insurers against catastrophic losses. 
The challenge is to convince investors that their chances of suffering large losses are 
relatively small compared to the expected return on their investment. This process is not 
any easy one, particularly if the investment community is unfamiliar xvith the types of 
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risks against which they would be providing protection. The ambiguity associated with 
estimating future losses and the conflicts between experts on their assumptions for 
developing catastrophe models leave investors somewhat confused about what they arc 
getting themselves into if they decide to commit funds to some of these new financial 
instruments. 
Moreover, there is an opportunity to evaluate alternative strategies for managMg the risks 
from natural disasters by taking advantage of a set of new developments in the areas of 
risk assessment, information technology, and catastrophe modelling. Turning first to risk 
assessment, by merging information derived from past records of earthquakes and 
hurricanes with an increased understanding of the characteristics of these hazards, 
scientists have been able to reduce the uncertainty about forecasting future events. With 
respect to damage estimation, engineers can better characterise the performance of 
different types of structures during hurricanes of different wind speeds and earthquakes 
of different magnitudes and intensities. 
On the information technology side, the development of faster and more powerful 
computers enables investors and modellers to examine extremely complex phenomena in 
ways that were Unpossible even five years ago. Large databases can easily be stored and 
manipulated so that large-scale siMulations of different disaster scenarios under 
alternative policies can now be undertaken. 
New advances in catastrophe modeHing provide an opportunity to combine scientific 
risk assessments with historical records to estimate the probabilities of disasters of 
different magnitudes and the resulting damage to the affected region. A catastrophe 
model is the set of databases and computer programs designed to analysc the effect of 
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different scenarios on hazard-prone areas. The information can be presented in the form 
of expected annual losses based on simulations run over a long period of time (e. g., ten 
thousand years) or the effect of specific events (e. g., worst case scenarios). Several firms 
have developed catastrophe models and provide detailed analyses of their databases to 
the various parties concerned with these risks (e. g., insurance companies, reinsurers, 
government agencies, and disaster-prone communities). 
Finally, catastrophe securities could be seen as a miniature reinsurer. The security is a 
package of catastrophe exposure and the capital needs to be set aside to cover this 
exposure without any credit risk. With the issuance of a catastrophe security, the market 
is presented with a very transparent type of deal. Assuming that all the information is 
given in the offering memorandum, investors can work out the probability of loss with 
the same accuracy as traditional reinsurers would be able to. Another reason to believe 
that this estimation of the probability is quite accurate is that the aggregation of 
information by an mfmite number of market participants (a good proxy for capital 
markets) leads to the best achievable result based on all available information. 
Having established the probability of loss, the market then prices in the cost of the 
capital, that in this case needs to be reserved for only one specific catastrophe event as 
described in the offering documents. The price for the risk is hence the market price. By 
definition this price must be very close to the cost of capital of a reinsurer that 
predorninantly writes catastrophe business. The fact that the general level of catastrophe 
premium in the traditional reinsurance market is lower than the capital markets indicates 
value destruction (even when adjusted for the counter party credit risk). 
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The lack of focus on these key issues, which have had a profound impact on the 
development of financial management in modern business, has resulted in value 
destruction on a massive scale. Future research needs to address these facts and provide 
solutions that will price every little piece of balance sheet that an underwriter wants to 
put to work, to avoid further erosion of the equity value of the industry. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The scope of this thesis is to investigate the different ways that capital is employed by 
insurance companies in their business and the various implications in a regulatory and 
risk measurement and management framework. 
It has been identified that the current system used by insurance companies to report their 
regulatory level of capital is to a certain extent inadequate. In comparing the current 
European solvency margin system with the US risk-based system, one must conclude 
that the European model is inadequate. How should one proceed to draw the best from 
the risk-bascd models which are conceptually superior, without having the complexities, 
rigidities and costs of these systems? There is no simple answer to this question. One 
solution that suggests itself is a more collaborative approach between regulators and 
company management. Under such a system the regulatory authority would define risk 
models that would be acceptable, but would leave the detailed modelling to the 
companies themselves, with the oversight of an approved internal audit function within 
the company. Hence it would be possible to combine sufficient rigour without undue 
cost and inflexibility. An internal audit team combining actuarial, accounting, 
underwriting and economic expertise would seem appropriate for non-life insurance; 
perhaps an actuary alone would be sufficient for life insurance, since the task is less 
complex. The role of the regulatory authority would be to approve the models and to 
monitor the output of the models against benchmark standards. 
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Although the current European solvency margin system may appear crude compared to 
the US risk-based system, with weak theoretical foundations, its application is very 
straightfonvard. The dilemma between objective correctness and functionality is resolved 
in favor of the latter (Farny, 1997). The US risk-based capital model is significantly more 
tailor-made to an individual insurer risk profile, although its theoretical foundations -are 
far from strong. It is also harder to apply in practice and imposes high internal 
compliance costs on insurers. There is a general skepticism as to whether the US-style 
risk-based model could be transferred to Europe. And this skepticism can be found 
among European supervisors in the Muller Report. Moreover, the US system is not only 
complex but is also very prescriptive even for insurance supervisors, since it has a 
detailed set of regulatory responses that are triggered if the capital base of an insurance 
company falls below the minimum risk-based capital level. One can argue that this 
degree of prescription builds undue rigidities into the regulatory process. 
Regulatory capital is of course just one of a number of regulatory tools, alongside other 
supervision techniques and regulations covering conduct of business rules and client 
moncy. ldcally, the marginal costs and marginal bcncfits of all thesc tools apphcd in 
combination need to be judged, to try to decide on the most efficient mix. 
Additionally, the imposition of capital rules in isolation is of little value if the regulator 
cannot be sure that the insurer has adequate systems to monitor and measure the risks 
that the capital standards are intended to limit, and that the firm's management arc 
honest and competent. As well as choosing the right balance of regulatory tools, 
regulators need to take account of other mechanisms which are not part of the regulatory 
armoury, but which can also help them achieve their objectives. Market discipline is one 
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important example: if the market is in a position to judge that a firm is weakly capitalised 
or poorly run, it may penalisc the firm in various ways, such as discounting the firm's 
share price. And less tangibly, c-,, idcnce of weak management can damage a company's 
reputation, which may make it harder for it to write new business. All these factors 
impose incentives, in different degrees on different companies, to operate in a sound and 
efficient manner, and to hold capital as a cushion against future losses. 
These are some of the lessons that the Stage 2 of the EU solvency exercise. But it is clear 
that insurance supenTisors and the insurance industry will also need to work together to 
construct a workable and cost-effective system for solvency of assessment, including 
capital adequacy, if the new computer-based risk modelling techniques are to be used. 
The fruitful interaction of regulators and the insurance industry has a good precedent in 
Europe: the development of the 3rd Insurance Directives. But what is also clear is that 
the current rethinking of capital adequacy and solvency within the banking sector by the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supetvision will also have a key influence, as banking 
regulation itself moves away from its own static riskýbased capital rules. A new solvency 
framework, including capital standards, is likely to emergc which has common featurcs 
across the fmqncial services sector, not least because of the need for level competitive 
playing-fields, as product and corporate convergence within the sector continues. 
However, the framework must be able to take into account the particular characteristics 
of the risks facing non-life insurers and those facing life insurers, if it is be effectivc. 
Furthermore, another objective of this study is to investigate the presence and causes of 
the undenvriting cycle in the United Kingdom and reveals several interesting findings. 
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The results of the autoregressive model largely support the eXistence of the undenvriting 
cycle in the UK because undcnvriting cycles are found in the aggregate sector and all the 
lines that were tested. 
The analysis of premium changes provides some support for the rational 
expectations/111stitutional intervention hypothesis although it is not able to gather 
enough evidence for the hypothesis that composite data collection, regulatory, policy 
renewal and accounting lags (Cummins and Outreville, 1987) have caused the 
undenvriting cycle. 
Moreover, the results generally differ from those found for the developed countries by 
Lamm-Tennant and Weiss (1997). This could be due partly to the fact that econornic 
developments in these countries are different from the UK. It could also be due partly to 
the different level of regulatory control prevailing in these countries. 
As UK is deemed to continue as the largest insurance and reinsurance financial centre, 
our findings pertaining to the underwriting cycle in UK would be useful to the existing 
insurers as well as those seeking to Invest in the UK insurance market. One of the 
important findings from this study for the c. Xisting insurers and prospectivc entrants is 
that although the undenvriting cycle does exist in the UK, the causes of it are different 
from those found in other countries. Therefore, they should take into account the 
differences when they enact measures to circumvent the detrimental effects of the 
underwriting cycle in the UK. 
One of the shortcomings of this study is that, due to the lack of data and information, 
the analysis of premium changes is not able to provide support for the hypothesis that 
the undenvriting cycle is caused by the institutional lags as advocated by Cummins and 
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Outrcville (1987). Further, since only five lines of the insurance industry are included in 
this study, future research can extend the undenvriting cycle test and analysis of premium 
changes to more lines -%vhen data are available. The cycle length of each line could be 
further analysed by using the cycle period analysis model proposed by Lamm-Tennant 
and Weiss (1997). Future research in this area could be particularly interesting if there arc 
differences in the institutional structure and regulatory oversight of the industry in the 
UK. 
In the third chapter, we investigate how credit ratings are connected to the credit risk 
faced by insurance companies. Insurer credit ratings also have a direct impact on the cost 
of capital, since the primary source of debt capital to insurers is policy liabilities, and 
lower rated firms will likely have to sell their policies at lower prices compared to higher 
rated firms. 
Since the cost of capital is a long-term concept, the intention would be to produce a 
figure that compensates equity investors over a long period of time. Although a 
company's cost of capital will changc ovcr time, the cost of capital for a company or an 
industry should be relatively stable from period to period unless there has been some 
dramatic structural reasons for the change. 
An indirect way to deterinine the cost of capital would be to link the credit spreads of 
corporate bonds with the associated credit ratings for these bonds. As the credit spread 
compensates the holder of the debt instrument for expected losses, there should be a 
link between the credit spread and the credit rating class, gll%"en the fact that there exist 
ample evidence that rating categories indeed entail an indication of relative credit risk. 
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We have indeed shown that there exists a close relationship between credit rating classes 
and credit spreads of corporate bonds. 
Furthermore, we analysed the relationship between credit ratings and the financial ratios 
that highlight a financial healthy insurance company. The following variables have been 
employed in our estimations: 
X, 
Statutory capital 
Total assets 
X, Net income 
Total assets 
X3 
Net prennums written in long 
- 
tail business 
Total net prcn-ýiurnswntten 
X4 
-"ý Net reserves 
Shareholder fiinds 
Npt rkim., X5 
-I 
Net premiumswritten 
X6 Net commissions 
Net prcn-dums written 
Reinsurance ceded 
"'- 7- 
X8 
= 
Net premiums 'Written ' 
Stocks in common stock investments 
Total invested assets 
The coefficient on the inverse measure of leverage (capital to assets) is negative and 
significant in our estimations. The significantly negative results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that higher leverage is associated with greater uncertainty, which in turn is 
associated with a negative impact on the ratings. Also consistent with the uncertainty 
hypothesis is the positive and significant sign of the coefficient on the profitability 
variable. 
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The coefficient on stocks in common stock investments is positive and significant in 
both cases. Moreover, the predicted sign on the reinsurance variable can be ambiguous, 
depending on whether the use of reinsurance is seen as reducing uncertainty by shifting 
risk, or increasing uncertainty by making the insurer's financial health dependent on the 
financial health of its reinsurers. The results support the first argument since the 
coefficient on the variable measuring the percent of business ceded to reinsurers is 
positive and significant. 
The coefficient on the variable measuring the percentage of business in long-tail lines 
(variable X3) is not significant. Surprisingly, the variable representing the percent of net 
reserves is also negatively related and not significant. 
The ratio of net commissions to net premiums written determines the percentage of 
direct written premiums that is paid to salespersons. A high ratio would show a high 
commission rate, which may be the result of an affiliate agency, or at least the payment 
of commissions higher than those normally paid in the industry. The variable is 
negatively related to the overall rating of the insurance companies. This is consistent With 
the expectation of a lower rating due to excessive commissions to agencies or 
salespersons. Finally, the variable representing the amount of net claims as a percentage 
of the net premiums written is sign1ficantly negative in fine with the stated expectation. 
It is crystal-clear that there is a close connection between the cost of capital assumed by 
the insurance companies and the credit rating assigned to them by the credit agencies. 
This affects not only the profitability of the insurance company but also the amount of 
capital that the company can employ in each day-to-day business functions. 
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Future research in the field must be focused on different ways that credit ratings can 
provide an into-depth analysis of the financial health of insurance companies and what 
strategic decisions have to be made in order to gain a favorable rating that will provide an 
easier way in accessing capital and improve financial performance. 
Finally, in determining the way that insurance companies can refund themselves, we 
found that securitisation provides a straightforward way in accessing the capital markets. 
Sccuritisation benefits borrowers by enhancing capital supply at competitive costs, it 
benefits investors by broadening the spectrum of investment options, and it benefits 
originators by generating underwriting fees and trading commissions. 
Currently, most insurance securitisations address wind, earthquake, and mortality risks, 
with some issuance in auto lease residual values and interest in covering personal auto 
liability. This focus had been the result of specific reinsurance capacity constraints and 
was driven by the search for coverage. 
Securitisation can create liquidity by generating assets or by converting illiquid assets to 
high-grade securities that increases the value of the underlying assets. Moreover, 
securitisation can be used as a tax savings tool in a number of ways: the tax shelter from 
realising the book loss of policyholder loans and the savings in equity tax for mutual 
insurers 
In the future growing interest in the issuance of bonds tied to more gencralised weather 
risks, such as excess heat or cold, excess rainfall or snowfall, and drought could be 
developed. These covers are not widely available at the moment, though many industries 
have large weather exposures, including agriculture, energy, property insurance, retailing, 
ski and other resorts, manufacturing, and real estate. 
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Interest in life insurance securitisations will also remain strong. However, the use of 
assignments of life insurance policies in the secondary markets has been somewhat 
constrained by regulatory concerns. The NAIC has worked to address the possibility of 
unfair dealing in the assignment of elder life settlements. It is clear that legislation and 
oversight will pave the way for substantial growth in the securitisation of life insurance. 
Moreover, 
-different stakeholders can also join forces in promoting new fmancial. 
instruments to supplement reinsurance for protecting insurers against catastrophic losses. 
The chaflenge is to convince investors that their chances of suffering large losses are 
relatively small compared to the expected return on their investment. This process is not 
any easy one, particularly if the investment community is unfamiliar xvith the types of 
risks against which they would be pro, %qding protection. The ambiguity associated with 
estimating future losses and the confficts between experts on their assumptions for 
developing catastrophe models leave investors somewhat confused about what they arc 
getting themselves into if they decide to commit funds to some of these new financial 
instruments. 
There is an opportunity to evaluate alternative strategies for managing the risks from 
natural disasters by taking advantage of a set of new developments in the areas of risk 
assessment, information technology, and catastrophe modelling. Turning first to risk 
assessment, by merging information derived from past records of earthquakes and 
hurricanes with an increased understanding of the characteristics of these hazards, 
scientists have been able to reduce the uncertainty about forecasting future events. With 
respect to damage estimation, engineers can better characterise the performance of 
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different types of structures during hurricanes of different wind speeds and earthquakes 
of different magnitudes and intensities. 
On the information technology side, the development of fastcr and more powerful 
computers enables investors and modellcts to examine extremely complex phenomena in 
ways that were impossible even five years ago. Large databases can easily be stored and 
manipulated so that large-scale simulations of different disaster scenarios under 
alternative policies can now be undertaken. 
FinaUy, new advances in catastrophe modeffing provide an opportunity to combine 
scientific risk assessments with historical records to estimate the probabilitics of disasters 
of different magnitudes and the resulting damage to the affected region. A catastrophe 
model is the set of databases and computer programs designed to analyse the effect of 
different scenarios on hazard-prone areas. The information can be presented in the form 
of expected annual losses based on simulations run over a long period of time (e. g., ten 
thousand years) or the effect of specific events (e. g., worst case scenarios). Several firms 
liavc developed catastrophe models and provicic detailed analyses of their databases to 
the various parties concerned with these risks (e. g., insurance companies, reinsurers, 
government agencies, and disaster-prone communities). 
Future research should explore the different ways that new structured deals can be 
employed in adding value to insutance companies balance sheets. Since secutitisation 
represents a relatively new financial tool for insurance companies, researchers should 
explore alternative solutions that insurance companies can employ for gaining additional 
capital coverage, including exchange traded derivatives and c-atastrophe-linked securities. 
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The pricing and modelling of these instruments represents a research chaflenge that Nvill 
be bcncficial for both researchers and practitioners. 
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